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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 




SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK OWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho corporation, 
and Sill,TNYSISDE INDUSTRIAL AND 
PROFESSIONAL PARK, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability corporation, 
Defendants. 




I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On December 18,2006, Printcraft Press, Inc. ("Printcraft") commenced this 
action against Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc. ("Sunnyside Utilities"), Sunnyside Park 
Owners Association, Inc. ("SPOA"), and Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Park, 
LLC ("SIPP") (collectively "Defendants"). On July 19, 2007, Printcraft filed a first 
amended complaint seeking damages from the defendants for breach of a third party 
utility agreement, failure to disclose and/or misrepresentation, constructive fraud for 
failure to disclose the size of a sewer system and its limitations, and constructive fraud 
for failure to disclose the existence of a third party beneficiary utility agreement. 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
On July 19, 2007, each defendant filed an answer and motion for summary 
judgment. Sunnyside Utilities supported its motion with excerpts of a deposition from 
Travis Waters ("Waters"). SPOA and SIPP supported their motions with discovery 
responses and the Affidavit of Kirk Woolf ("Woolf'). On August 2, 2007, Printcraft 
filed a memorandum in opposition with the affidavits of Lane V. Erickson and Waters. 
On August, 102007, the Court heard oral argument on the defendants' motions 
for summary judgment. The COUli also heard oral argument on motions for continuance 
and to strike by Printcraft. The Court granted the motion to strike in part, and denied it in 
part. The Court denied the motion for continuance. The Court took the motions for 
summary judgment under advisement. Having considered the record, legal memoranda 
and oral argument, the Court makes its decision. 
II. STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION 
A motion for summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), I.R.C.P.; Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 597, 
600,944 P.2d 1360, 1363 (1997). Upon considering a motion for summary judgment, all 
controverted facts are liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party. Friel v. Boise 
City Housing Authority, 126 Idaho 484, 485,887 P.2d 29 (1994). Where a jury will 
decide the facts at trial, the cOUli must draw all reasonable factual inferences and 
conclusions in favor of the non-moving party. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 
Idaho 527, 529, 887 P.2d 1034, 1036 (1994). In ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment, the district court is not permitted to weigh the evidence or to resolve 
r~ '"'" A ..., ~ .t 
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controverted factual issues. Bybee v. Clark, 118 Idaho 254, 257, 796 P.2d 131, 134 
(1990). 
The pariy moving for summary judgment always bears the burden of proving that 
no genuine issue of material fact exists on an element of the non-moving party's case. If 
the moving party fails to challenge an element or fails to present evidence establishing 
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on that element, the burden does not shift 
to the non-moving pariy, and the non-moving party is not required to respond with 
supporting evidence. Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., at 600,944 P.2d at 1363. 
If the moving party has met its burden by either an affirmative showing of the 
moving party's evidence or by a review of the non-moving party's evidence, the burden 
shifts to the non-moving party to establish that a genuine issue for trial does exist. ld; 
Navarrette v. City of Caldwell, 130 Idaho 849, 851,949 P.2d 597, 599 (1997). To 
withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party's case must be 
anchored in something more than speculation; a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough 
to create a genuine issue. Nelson, A.1.A. v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409, 410, 797 P.2d 117, 118 
(1990); Zimmerman v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 854, 920 P.2d 67, 70 
(1996). 
Rule 56(e), LR.C.P., requires that both supporting and opposing affidavits be 
made on personal knowledge, set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence, and 
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Moreover, inadmissible opinions or conclusions do not satisfy the requirements for proof 
of material facts. Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-Morning Co., 122 Idaho 778, 783-786, 839 
P.2d 1192,1197-1200 (1992). The question of admissibility of affidavit and deposition 
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testimony is a threshold question to be answered by the trial court before applying the 
required liberal construction and reasonable inferences rule in favor of the party opposing 
a motion for summary judgment. No objection or motion to strike is required before a 
trial court may exclude or not consider evidence offered by a party, Hecla ~Mining Co., 
122 Idaho at 784, 839 P.2d at 1198; Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 45, 844 P.2d 24,27 
(et. App. 1992). 
III. MATERIAL FACTS 
A. UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
Waters is the owner and president of Printcraft, which is an Idaho corporation. 
Sunnyside Utilities, SPOA and SIPP are Idaho corporations with Woolf and Doyle Beck 
("Beck") as the officers and/or members. 
In 1996, SIPP obtained a permit from District Seven Health Department ("District 
Seven") for a septic system and tank. The system currently serves SPOA, which is the 
owners association for SIPP. Sunnyside Utilities is responsible for providing the septic 
services to SPOA and its members pursuant to an agreement entered into on April 16, 
2002 entitled "Third Pmiy Beneficiary Utility Agreement" ("Agreement"). The 
Agreement provides that Sunnyside Utilities would provide the following service for 
SPOA and its members: 
[T]he present and future owners of or occupants of all and each of the 
properties, buildings, and other improvements which are now or may 
hereafter be served by the water supply systems and/or sewage systems of 
the Company as well as the holders of any mortgage or mortgages 
covering any such buildings, and other properties and improvements. 
(Agreement, Sec. l(a)) See also Agreement, Sec. 10(b). 
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On September 12,2005, CTR Development, LLC ("CTR") paid Sunnyside 
Utilities a sewer connection fee for a new building that would be served by the system. 
Either Printcraft or CTR provided Sunnyside Utilities with the blueprints of the new 
building. On January 23, 2006, CTR transferred its property to J&LB Propeliies. On the 
same day, J&LB Properties entered into a written lease agreement with CTR 
Management, LLC ("CTR Management"). Also on the same day, CTR Management 
entered into an oralmonth-to-month sublease agreement with Printcraft. Printcraft 
subsequently began occupying the premises for its printing business. 
Printcraft discharged water softener brine, hazardous wastes, processed water and 
excessive flows of wastewater into the system in violation ofIDAPA 58.01.03.004.03. 
On June 9, 2006, the sewer system overflowed. On December 15, 2006, Sunnyside 
Utilities severed the sewer connection to Printcraft. 
B. DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
The pm1ies strongly dispute the cause of the system's failure and the events that 
occurred subsequent to the system's failure. However, construing the facts liberally in 
favor of Printcraft, the non-moving party, the Court assumes the following facts for 
purposes ofthis motion only. 
The system failed as a result of Sunnyside Utilities' lack of care and compliance 
with District Seven regulations. Waters and Woolf met on September, 25 2006 to discuss 
issues relating to the system's failure. During the meeting, Printcratl: showed Woolf the 
premises, specifically indicating the substances it discharged into the system and the 
sources of the discharges. Woolf and Beck knew the nature of Printcraft's business and 
the types of substances it would discharge into the system as a result of the blueprints 
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Sunnyside Utilities had received previously. Despite its prior acceptance of Printcraft' s 
discharges, Sunnyside Utilities asked Printcraft to either eliminate various discharges or 
change the points of discharge. Printcraft complied with the requests and Sunnyside 
Utilities, through Wolf, approved of the alterations in early October 2006. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1. Breach of Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement 
Sunnyside Utilities argues that it was justified in disconnecting the septic system 
to Printcraft because Printcraft discharged various substances into the system in violation 
of state and federal law and Sunnyside Utilities' Rules and Regulations. Sunnyside 
Utilities cites Bantz v. Bongard, 124 Idaho 780, 785, 864 P.2d 618,623 (1993) and Tolley 
v. THI Co., 140 Idaho 253, 262, 92 P.3d 503, 512 (2004). SU11l1yside Utilities 
additionally argues that the Court granted SU11l1yside Utilities' summary judgment on 
July 5, 2007 holding that Printcraft violated state and federal law and Sunnyside Utilities' 
Rules and Regulations. Finally, Sunnyside Utilities argues that Printcraft is not entitled 
to enforce the Agreement because Printcraft is an incidental beneficiary. SmIDyside 
primarily cites I.C. § 29-102; Shmp v. WH Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 305, 796 P.2d 
506,514 (1990); and Stewart v. Arrington ConstT'. Co., 92 Idaho 526, 446 P.2d 895 
(1968). 
In response, Printcraft argues that when the Court granted summary judgment to 
Sunnyside Utilities, it also allowed Printcraft to file an amended complaint so no finding 
was made as to Printcraft violating the law or Sunnyside Utilities' regulations. Printcraft 
also argues that it cannot be charged with breaching the Agreement before September 
r: ""'.1 
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2006 because it was unaware of the Agreement until that time. Printcraft further argues 
that there were no violations subsequent to September 2006 because it entered into and 
complied with a separate agreement that it made with the defendants in October 2006. 
Printcraft cites several cases setting forth general contract law, but does not cite any legal 
authority specifically supporting the foregoing arguments. In response to Sunnyside 
Utilities' argument regarding incidental beneficiaries, Printcraft argues that no one in the 
Sunnyside Professional and Industrial Park could be an intended beneficiary under the 
Defendants' logic and "[t]he title of the Agreement makes it clear that there has to be a 
third party somewhere [and] Printcraft is an 'occupant' as defined by the strict language 
of the Agreement itself and is therefore an intended beneficiary." 
In reply, Sunnyside Utilities argues that the Court's decision to grant the motion 
to amend has no bearing on whether the Court should grant the current motion for 
summary judgment. Sunnyside Utilities supports this argument with Thomas v. A1edical 
Or. Physicians, 138 Idaho 200, 61 P.3d 557 (2002). Sunnyside Utilities disputes that an 
agreement was reached in October 2006, but argues that even if the parties entered into 
an agreement, it is illegal and unenforceable because Printcraft continued to violate state 
and federal law. Sunnyside Utilities cites Barry v. Pac. West Canst., 140 Idaho 827, 832, 
103 P.3d 440, 445 (2004). Finally, Sunnyside Utilities argues that there is no 
requirement that an agreement entitled "Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement" must 
have an intended third party beneficiary. Moreover, Sunnyside Utilities argues that there 
are intended third party beneficiaries under the Agreement, but that Printcraft is not part 
of the class. 
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First, the Court will address Printcraft's argument regarding the Court's Order. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated: 
The dual purposes of Rule 15(a) are to allow claims to be 
determined on the merits rather than technicalities and to make pleadings 
serve the limited role of providing notice of the nature of the claim and the 
facts that are at issue. Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 
866, 871, 993 P.2d 1197, 1202 (1999) (citation omitted). A court may 
consider whether the allegations sought to be added to the complaint state 
a valid claim in determining whether to grant leave to amend the 
complaint. Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc., v. Idaho First Nat'! 
Bank NA., 119 Idaho 171, 175,804 P.2d 900, 904 (1991). A court, 
however, may not consider the sufficiency of evidence supporting the 
claim sought to be added in determining leave to amend because that is 
more properly determined at the summary judgment stage. Christensen 
Family Trust, 133 Idaho at 872, 993 P.2d at 1203. 
Thomas at 210,61 P.3d at 567. 
The Court agrees with Sunnyside Utilities that the Court's Order granting the 
motion to amend has no bearing on the current motion for summary judgment. Under 
I.R.C.P. 15(a), the Court could not consider the sufficiency of the evidence relating to 
Printcraft's motion to amend. As stated by the Thomas Court, summary judgment is the 
proper stage to consider the sufficiency of the evidence. Therefore, the fact that the 
Court granted Printcraft's motion to amend does not mean that the Court cannot grant 
Sunnyside Utilities' motion for summary judgment if Sunnyside Utilities meets its 
burden of proof and Printcraft fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact. 
Next, the Court will address Printcraft's arguments regarding its ignorance of the 
Agreement until September 2006 and its compliance with the alleged October 2006 
agreement. The Court agrees with Printcraft that lack of knowledge of a contract may 
prevent the contract from having binding effect on a party without knowledge. See 
Pitner v. Federal Crop Ins. Corp., 94 Idaho 496, 498, 491 P.2d 1268, 1270 (1971) ("A 
1- ,,",, 
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necessary element in the formation of a valid bilateral contract of cancellation is mutual 
assent.") (citing Fox v. Bankers L{fe & Casualty Co., 61 Wash.2d 636, 379 P.2d 724 
(1963) and 45 c.J.S. Insurance s 444 (1946)). Furthermore, a party's compliance with an 
agreement typically precludes judgment against the complying party. However, 
Printcraft has not offered any evidence rebutting Sunnyside Utilities' evidence that 
Printcraft violated IDAPA 58.01.03.004.03 by discharging water softener brine, 
hazardous wastes, processed water and excessive flows of wastewater into the system. 1 
Accordingly, the Court finds that there is no issue of material fact that Printcraft 
discharged substances into the sewer system in violation of state law? Sunnyside 
Utilities was justified in severing Printcraft's sewer connection in light of this illegality. 
The fact that Printcraft may not have been aware ofIDAPA 58.01.03.004.03 does not 
excuse Printcraft's illegal disposal because "[i]gnorance of the law is not a defense." 
State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 926, 866 P.2d 181, 183 (1993) (citing Hale v. Morgan, 22 
Ca1.3d 388, 149 Cal.Rptr. 375, 380, 584 P.2d 512, 517 (1978)). Finally, the alleged 
October 2006 agreement does not change this result. The Idaho Supreme Court has 
stated: 
The Court will not enforce an illegal contract. Quiring, 130 Idaho 
at 568, 944 P.2d at 703. Illegal contracts are void, and generally the Court 
will "leave the parties where it finds them." Id.; Trees, 138 Idaho at 9,56 
P.3d at 771; Kunz v. Lobo Lodge, Inc., 133 Idaho 608, 611, 990 P.2d 1219, 
1222 (Ct. App. 1999). This Court has stated that, "the rationale for 
leaving the parties where the law finds them is premised on the notion that 
I IDAPA 58.01.03.004.03 provides that "Cooling water, backwash or backflush water, hot tub or spa water, 
air condition water, water softener brine, groundwater, oil, or roof drainage cannot be discharged into any 
system unless that discharge is approved by the Director." 
2 As noted previously, Sunnyside Utilities also alleges that Printcraft violated federal law. Printcraft has 
failed to refute this allegation as well. However, the Court was unable to locate any references to federal 
law by Sunnyside Utilities regarding this issue other than saying Printcraft violated "applicable federal 
laws" or "EPA regulations." Accordingly, the COUli will not discuss the federal law that Printcraft 
allegedly violated. 
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both parties are equally at fault." Trees, 138 Idaho at 9,56 P.3d at 771. 
When the Court "leaves the parties where it finds them," it denies 
recovery to either party. Morrison v. Young, 136 Idaho 316, 319, 32 P.3d 
1116,1119 (2001); Kunz, 133 Idaho at 612,990 P.2d at 1223. 
Jd. Any agreement between the parties that allowed Printcraft to continue to violate 
IDAPA 58.01.03.004.03 is illegal and unenforceable. Therefore, Sunnyside Utilities' 
termination of septic service to Printcraft because of state law violations is not an 
enforceable breach. 
Finally, the Court will address Sunnyside Utilities' argument that Printcraft 
cannot enforce the Agreement because Printcraft is an incidental beneficiary. The Idaho 
COUli of Appeals has stated: 
In order for a third paIiy beneficiary to recover on a breach of contract 
claim, the third party must show that the contract was made for his or her 
direct benefit and that he or she is more than a mere incidental beneficiary. 
Dawson v. Eldredge) 84 Idaho 331, 337, 372 P.2d 414, 418 (1962). The 
contract itself must express an intent to benefit the third party. Stewart v. 
Arrington Constr. Co., 92 Idaho 526, 532,446 P.2d 895, 901 (1968). 
Nelson v. Anderson lumber Co., 140 Idaho 702, 708,99 P.3d 1092, 1098 (Cl. App. 
2004). The Idaho Supreme Court has explained that not only must a third-party be a 
direct beneficiary to recover, but the third party must be a member of a limited class to 
recover. The Court stated: 
In order to recover as a third party beneficiary, it is not necessary 
that the individual be named and identified as an individual although that 
is usually sufficient; a third party may enforce a contract if he can show he 
is a member of a limited class for whose benefit it was made. Johnson v. 
Holmes Tuttle Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 160 Cal.App.2d 290, 325 P.2d 193 
(1958). The class may be limited either by a narrow description of the 
injuries to be guarded against and the damages to be paid, Anderson v. 
Rexroad, 175 Kan. 676, 266 P.2d 320 (1954), or by a similar description 
of the class to be protected. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co. v. 
Delong Corp., 246 Or. 369,425 P.2d 498 (1967); Shell v. Schmidt, 272 
P.2d 82 (Cal. 1954). Where the group to be benefited is large and vaguely 
defined, individual members are no more than incidental beneficiaries and 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
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no rights are created by virtue of the contract between the public body and 
the contractor. Davis v. Nelson-Deppe, supra; Sauve v. Title Gar. and 
Sur. Co., 29 Idaho 146, 158 P. 112 (1916); Earl E. Roher Trans. & s. Co. 
v. Hutchinson Water Co., 182 Kan. 546, 322 P.2d 810 (1958). 
Stewart v. Arrington Canst. Co., 92 Idaho 526, 532,446 P.2d 895,901 (1968). It is 
undisputed that the only class to which Printcraft might belong under the Agreement is 
the class defined in Section l(a) or Section 10(b) of the Agreement. As stated previously, 
Sections 1 (a) and 1 O(b) state in relevant part that Sunnyside Utilities will provide 
ongoing service to the following customers 
[T]he present and future owners of or occupants of all and each of the 
properties, buildings, and other improvements which are now or may 
hereafter be served by the water supply systems and/or sewage systems of 
the Company [Sunnyside Utilities] as well as the holders of any mortgage 
or mOligages covering any such buildings, and other properties and 
improvements. 
(Agreement, Sec. 1 (a» See also Sec. 1 O(b). Printcraft is an "occupant" of a 
property "served by" the "sewage system" of Sunnyside Utilities. Therefore, Printcraft is 
clearly an intended beneficiary of the Agreement. 
2. Constructive Fraud 
Sunnyside Utilities argues that the Court should grant its motion for summary 
judgment dismissing the failure to disclose and/or misrepresentation and constructive 
fraud claims for four reasons.3 First Sunnyside Utilities argues that it had no duty to 
disclose information to Printcraft because there was no fiduciary or other similar 
relationship between the pmiies that would give rise to a duty to disclose. Sunnyside 
Utilities supports this argument primarily with Sowards v. Rathbun, 134 Idaho 702, 707, 
3 As indicated in the procedural history section of this decision, Printcraft's complaint included causes of 
action for breach of the Agreement, failure to disclose and/or misrepresentation, and two claims for 
constructive fraud. Each of these causes of action can be properly addressed under "constructive fraud." 
Therefore, the Court is addressing and considering each of these causes of action when it uses the tenn 
"constructive fraud." 
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8 P.3d 1245, 1250 (2000) and "Mitchell v. Barendregt, 120 Idaho 837, 844, 820 P.2d 707, 
714 (Ct. App. 1991) (overruled on other grounds by Polk v. Larrabee, 135 Idaho 303, 17 
P.3d 247 (2000). Second, Sunnyside Utilities argues that the facts not disclosed were 
immaterial to Printcraft's decision to enter into the sublease with CTR Management. 
Sunnyside Utilities cites Aspiazu v. Mortimer, 139 Idaho 548, 82 P.3d 830 (2003) to 
define materiality. Third, Sunnyside Utilities argues that Printcraft cam10t establish 
reliance because it did not have a right to reliance and did not do anything in reliance of 
the non-disclosures. Sunnyside Utilities cites Watson v. Weick, 141 Idaho 500, 507, 112 
P.3d 788, 795 (2005) as general background of the reliance element of fraud. Fourth, 
Sunnyside Utilities argues that Printcraft did not suffer any damages as a direct and 
proximate result of any alleged non-disclosure by Sunnyside Utilities. Sunnyside 
Utilities does not cite any legal authority in support of its final argument. 
Printcraft responds that Sunnyside Utilities had a duty to disclose: (1) under the 
terms of the Agreement; (2) because the development was named "Sunnyside 
Professional and Industrial Park" indicating that industrial activity was permitted; (3) 
pursuant to a letter sent by District Seven to SIPP on April 15, 2002 indicating that 
District Seven prohibited further sewer connections to SIPP; and (4) because Woolf 
and/or Beck knew of the nature of Printer aft's business from the blueprints, but failed to 
warn Waters of the septic system's limitations. Printcraft supports the argument that 
there was a duty to disclose by citing Watts v. Krebs, 131 Idaho 616, 620, 962 P.2d 387, 
391 (1998). Second, Printcraft argues that the failure to disclose was material because 
Printcraft would not have occupied the premises if it had known of the limitations of the 
sewer system. Printcraft cites Watts, supra and Restatement (Second) of Torts §538(2) 
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(1977). Third, Printcraft argues that it had a right to rely on the non-disclosures and that 
it justifiable relied on the non-disclosures. Printcraft argues its reliance is analogous to 
the fact pattern in Watts, supra. Fourth, Printcraft argues that it suffered damages 
because Sunnyside Utilities disconnected it from the sewer system after it had complied 
with the October 2006 agreement. 
In reply, Sunnyside Utilities argues that Watts does not apply to this case by 
analogy because Watts involved a relationship of trust and confidence that is not present 
in this case. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated: 
To successfully bring an action for fraud, a plaintiff must establish 
the existence of the following elements: (1) a statement or a representation 
offact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its 
falsity; (5) the speaker's intent that there be reliance; (6) the hearer's 
ignorance of the falsity of the statement; (7) reliance by the hearer; (8) 
justifiable reliance; and (9) resultant injury. Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 
10, 56 P.3d 765, 772 (2002). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56( c) governs 
the grant of summary judgment on the issue of fraud. Lettunich v. Key 
Bank Nat. Ass'n, 141 Idaho 362, 368 fn. 1, 109 P.3d 1104, 1110 fn. 1 
(2005). 
Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 155 P.3d 1166 (2007). The Court has additionally 
stated: 
Fraud may be established by silence where the defendant had a 
duty to speak. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 100 S.Ct. 1108, 
63 L.Ed.2d 348 (1980); see also Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 
740 P.2d 1022 (1987) (failure to disclose may amount to a 
misrepresentation); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55,415 P.2d 698 
(1966) (failure to disclose may amount to a misrepresentation); Jones v. 
Majestas, 108 Idaho 69, 696 P.2d 920 (Ct. App. 1985) (fraud may be 
established by silence where information to be conveyed is not already in 
possession of other party). A duty to speak arises in situations where the 
pmiies do not deal on equal terms or where information to be conveyed is 
not already in possession of the other party. Jones v. Maestas, 108 Idaho 
69,696 P.2d 920 (Ct. App. 1985); see also Sorenson v. Adams, 98 Idaho 
708, 571 P.2d 769 (1977) (silence in circumstances where a prospective 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
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purchaser might be led to harmful conclusion is a form of 
"representation"). 
G & A1 Farms v. Funk frr. Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P.2d 851 (1991). "The 
absence of any one of the elements is fatal to recovery." Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 
141 Idaho 233, 239, 108 P.3d 380,386 (2005). 
Regarding constructive fraud, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated: "The gist of a 
constructive fraud finding is to avoid the need to prove intent (i.e., knowledge of falsity 
or intent to induce reliance), since it is inferred directly from the relationship and the 
breach." Country Cove Dev., inc., v. Myron, 143 Idaho 595, 601, 150 P.3d 288,294 
(2006) (citing 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 4 (1997)). 
a. Duty to Disclose 
The Smvards Court stated the following regarding the duty to disclose: 
A party may be under a duty to disclose: (1) if there is a fiduciary 
or other similar relation of trust and confidence between the two parties; 
(2) in order to prevent a partial statement of the facts from being 
misleading; or (3) if a fact known by one party and not the other is so vital 
that if the mistake were mutual the contract would be voidable, and the 
patiy knowing the fact also knows that the other does not know it. 
Bethlahmy, supra. 
Sowards, supra. 
Printcraft has not established the existence of any special relationship between it 
and Sunnyside Utilities. Furthermore, there is no evidence that any of the Defendants 
made any partial or ambiguous statement which would have been misleading to 
Printcraft. However, there is a material question of fact regarding whether Sunnyside 
Utilities had a duty to disclose under the third prong listed by the Sowards Court. By 
affidavit, Waters testified that the Woolf and/or Beck understood the nature of the 
business and its need for a septic connection, but failed to disclose several deficiencies 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
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with the system. (Waters Aff. at 5-8, ,r, 18-27) Waters further testified that he did not 
know the limitations of the septic system. 
h. Materiality 
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated: "As to a claim of fraud, '[m]ateriality refers 
to the importance of the misrepresentation in determining the plaintiff's course of 
action.'" Aspiazu, supra (citing Watts v. Krebs, 131 Idaho 616, 619, 962 P.2d 387, 390 
(1998)). 
Idaho courts have not addressed whether materiality is a question of law or a 
question of fact. However, the importance of the alleged non-disclosures on Printcraft's 
course of action appears to the Court to be a question of fact. See White v. 
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 368 Ill.App.3d 278,856 N.E.2d 542 (Ill. Ct. App. 2006) 
(materiality in a common law fraud claim is a question of fact) and Powers v. United 
Services Auto. Ass'n, 115 Nev. 38,979 P.2d 1286 (Nev. 1999) ("materiality is generally a 
question of fact, and only where reasonable minds cannot differ may the issue be 
resolved as a matter of law"). 
c. Reliance 
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that "the issue of justifiable reliance is 
generally a question of fact .... " King v. Lang, 136 Idaho 905, 42 P.3d 698 (2002) 
(citing Perkins v. Thorpe, 106 Idaho 138, 142,676 P.2d 52, 56 (Ct. App. 1984)). The 
question of whether Printcraft reasonably relied on Sunnyside Utilities' non-disclosures is 
a question of fact for the fact finder, the jury in this case, to decide. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
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d. Damages 
Although the Court could not find Idaho legal authority for the following 
proposition, it appears to the Court that the issue of whether a party suffered damages as 
a direct and proximate cause of an alleged failure to disclose is a question of fact for the 
fact finder, the jury, to decide. 
Therefore, the COUli must deny Sunnyside Utilities' motion for summary 
judgment as to constructive fraud. 
B. SPOA'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1. Breach of Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement 
SPOA reasserts the arguments made by Sunnyside Utilities in support of the 
argument that it did not breach the Agreement. Printcraft also reasserts the arguments it 
made opposing Sunnyside Utilities' motion for summary judgment on this cause of 
action. For the same reasons the Court is granting Sunnyside Utilities' motion for 
summary judgment on this cause of action, the Court grants SPOA's motion for summary 
judgment. Further, the Agreement requires Sunnyside Utilities, not SPOA, to provide 
septic services. 
2. Constructive Fraud 
SPOA reasselis the arguments made by SUlmyside Utilities in support of the 
argument that the COUli should grant the motion for summary judgment relating to the 
failure to disclose and/or misrepresentation and constructive fraud claims. Printcraft also 
reasserts the arguments it made opposing Sunnyside Utilities' motion for summary 
judgment on this cause of action. There is no evidence that Woolf and/or Beck was 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
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acting on behalf of SPOA in dealing with Printcraft as to the septic system. Therefore, 
the Court must grant SPOA's motion as to constructive fraud. 
C. SIPP'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1. Breach of Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement 
SIPP argues that Printcraft's cause of action for breach of the Agreement must fail 
against SIPP because SIPP is not a party to the Agreement. SIPP also reasserts the 
arguments made by Sunnyside Utilities and SPOA. Printcraft also reasserts the previous 
arguments. Printcraft does, however, acknowledge and assert the following: 
Plaintiff acknowledges that the Defendant SIPP is not a party to 
the written Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement and therefore has no 
liability thereunder. However, as set out below, the Defendant SIPP was a 
party to the oral agreement and is liable threon for breach of severing 
Plaintiff s sewer connection. 
(Response at 18, fn 1) 
For the same reasons the Court is granting Sunnyside Utilities' motions for 
summary judgment on this cause of action, the Court grants SIPP's motion for summary 
judgment on this cause of action. FUlihermore, the Court grants SIPP's motion for 
summary judgment as it relates to SIPP not being a party to the Agreement as conceded 
by Printcraft. 
2. Constructive Fraud 
SIPP reasserts the arguments made by the other defendants in support of the 
argument that the Court should grant the motion for summary judgment relating to the 
failure to disclose and/or misrepresentation and constructive fraud claims. Printcraft also 
reasserts the arguments it made opposing the other defendants' motions for summary 
judgment on these causes of action. For the same reasons the Court is denying Sunnyside 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
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Utilities' motion for summary judgment on this cause of action, the Court denies SIPP's 
motion for summary judgment. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court concludes, and 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that each of the Defendants' motions for summary 
judgment ARE GRANTED with respect the Breach of Third Party Beneficiary Utility 
Agreement count, and SPOA' s motion for summary judgment IS GRANTED with 
respect to the constructive fraud claims. Sunnyside Utilities and SIPP's motions for 
summary judgment ARE DENIED with respect the constructive fraud claims. 
DATED [his 3f day of August 2007. 
/i~JMoe~~/ 
. L--R1CHARD T. ST. CLAIR 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ~ day of August 2007, I did send a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct 
postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective cOUlihouse mailbox; 
or by causing the same to be hand-delivered. 
Mitchell W. Brown 
Lane V. Erickson 
Racine, Olson, Nye, 
Budge & Bailey, Chtd. 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Mark R. Fuller 
Fuller & Carr 
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935 
Attorneyfor Defendants 
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RONALD LONGMORE 
Clerk of the District Court 
Bonneville County, Idaho 
By ~ 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 








Case No. CV-06-7097 
On the 17th day of October, 2007, Defendant Sunnyside Park 
Owners Association's motion for attorney fees came before the 
Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, in open court at Idaho 
Falls, Idaho. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. John Avondat appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff. 
Mr. Mark Fuller appeared on behalf of Defendant Sunnyside 
Park Owners Association. 
The Court advised that until all claims on all parties were 
finalized he would hold his decision in abeyance regarding the 
issue of attorney fees. 
Mr. Fuller argued Defendant's motion for the record. Mr. 
Avondat objected to a determination being made at this time and 
rested on his filed objection. 
The Court will consider the matter submitted and make a 
determination at a later date. 
Court was thus adjourned. 
H:cv067097.42mo 
l01707AM5Tingey 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of October, 2007, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to 
be delivered to the following: 
Michael Gaffney 
2105 Coronado 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Mark R. Fuller 
PO Box 50935 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Deputy Court Clerk 
10/2:6/200i 12: 18 FAX 208 524 Fuller&Carr Law Office 
MARK R. FULLER (ISB No. 2698) 
DANIEL R. BECK (IS8 Ko. 7237) 
FULLER & CARR 
410 JvlEt·!ORIAL DRIVE, SUITE 201 
P . 0 + Box 50 935 
IDAHO FAL,I,S, 10 83405-0935 
TELEPHONE: (208) 524-5400 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR 
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 






SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, SUNNYSIDE 
PARK OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., 
an Idaho corporation and 
SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL AND 
PROFESSIONAL PARK, LLC., an 
Idaho limited liability 
company, 
Oefendants. 
Case No. CV-06-7097 
STIPULATION RE: PROTECTIVE 
ORDER 
[4]003 
COMES NOW, the Defendants, by its counsel of record, Mark R. 
Fuller of Fuller & Carr, and the Plaintj.ff I by its counsel of 
record, Michael Gaffney of Bea]":d St. Clair and enter into the 
following Stipulation regarding Plaintiff's Protective Order: 
1. It is hereby stipulated that Plaintiff's counsel and 
Defendant's counsel has reviewed the Protective Order and agree to 
the provisions set forth in the Protective Order. Defendant 
agrees to provide a copy of each written observation, test report 
or photograph to allow Plaintiff an opportunity to designate 
r-- ry ""': STIPULATION K1::; PROTEC'rrVE ORUl:;R - 1 
JLJ,. .. ) 
1l)/.2!?/2007 12:18 FAX 208524 '" Fuller&Carr Law Office !4i 004 
whether or not such documents are "confident:ial information" prior 
to any disclosure outside the scope of para. 7 of the Protective 
Order. Plaintiff shall designate all such "confidential 
LlfoY':-nation" tvithin ten (10) days of the Plaintiff's receipt of 
su dOCLlmelit s ~ 
2. Plaintiff shall identify which conversations, samples, 
cr other items of information provided to Defendant during the 
inspection are "confidential information" and Defendant shall 
treat such designated disclosures as confidential. 
DAi'ED this 2) ii.. day of C%~ l , 2007. 
STU'[JLATION l:\E: PROTECTIVE ORDER - :.2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO I IN A~D FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 








Case No. CV-06-7097 
On the 30th day of October, 2007, Plaintiff's motion to 
amend counterclaim came before the Honorable Joel E. Tingey, 
District Judge, in open court at Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Jeff Brunson appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff. 
Mr. Mark Fuller and Mr. Dan Beck appeared on behalf of the 
Defendant. 
Mr. Beck presented Plaintiff's motion to amend counterclaim. 
Mr. Brunson argued in opposition to the motion. Mr. Beck 
presented rebuttal argument. 
The Court will take the matter under advisement and issue an 
opinion as soon as possible. 
Court was thus adjourned. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of October, 2007, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to 
be delivered to the following: 
Jeff Brunson 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Mark R. Fuller 
Dan Beck 
PO Box 50935 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 01 THtfr 3(J]T mID 
STATE OF IDAHO, fN AND FOR THE COw\TTY OF BONNEVILLE 
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an Idaho ) 
corporaton, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, Counterdefendant, ) 
) Case No. CV -06-7097 
vs. ) 
) ORDER 
SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an Idaho ) 
corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK ) 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho ) 
corporation, and SUNNYSIDE ) 
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL ) 
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
THIS MATTER came before the Court upon the motion of Sunnyside Parks 
Utilities, Inc. to amend its counterclaim to include a claim for punitive damages. The 
Court having reviewed the record, and heard oral argument, and finding that the moving 
party has established at this time a reasonable likelihood of proving facts at trial sufficient 
to support an award of punitive damages, and good cause appearing therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of Defendant/Counterclaimant is 
granted. The issue of whether punitive damages will ultimately be submitted to a jury 
will be reserved for determination at the time of trial 
Dated this ')0 day of October, 2007. 
ORDER - 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the day of October, 2007, I served a true and correct copy 
ofthe foregoing document upon the following by U. S. mail postage prepaid, or by hand 
delivery, or by depositing at recipients' courthouse box: 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY 
2105 Coronado Stret 
Idaho Falls, ID 
Mark Fuller 
FULLER & CARR 
605 N. Capital Avenue 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
ORDER - 2 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Clerk of the District Court 
Bonneville County, Idaho 
By ~/ 
t~. ~ .~ 
vv\J 
Deputy Clerk 
MARK R. FULLER (ISB No. 2698) 
FULLER & CARR 
410 DRiVE, SUITS 201 
P.O. Box 50935 
IDAHO , 10 83405-0935 
TELEFHONE: (208) 524-5400 
DEFENDANT /COUNTER CLAHIANT SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES r INC. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR 
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
PFUNTCRAFT PRESS, INC. , an 











INC. , an Idaho 
and SUNNYSIDE 
AND PROFESSIONAL 
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability ion. 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-06-7097 
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES' 
ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT, 
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIMS, PRAYER 
FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES, AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
COjV1ES NOW the Defendant, Sunnyside Park Utili ties, Inc., an 
Idaho corporation (hereafter "s ide Park Utilities"), and l 
response to the Amended Complaint filed Plaintiff, states and 
a leges as follows: 
1. Defendant denies each and every al ion set forth in 
the Amended Complaint except as expressly admitted herein. 
2. Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a cause of act on 
SUNNYS DE PT-'cRK UTILIT ES' ANS1fJER TO 
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upon which relief can be granted. 
3. In re se to paragraph 1, defendant es this 
is an action arising out of certain disclosures the defendant 
failed to make. Defendant asserts that this is an action arising 
out of the disconnection of Printcraft Press's sewer connection to 
Sunnyside Park Utilities. The defendant admits that there is a 
sewer system located in the Sunnyside Industrial and Professional 
Park subdivision which is operated and maintained ide 
Park Utilities. 
4. In answer to parag s 2, 3, 4, and 5, defendant 
admits the same. 
5. In answer to paragraphs 6 and 7 defendant a s the 
same. 
6. In answer to parag 8, defendant admits that 
Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Park, LLC (hereafter "8 pp H ) 
completed and filed with District Seven Health Department a s i 
permit for the installation of a septic system that would serv ce 
a minimum of one to two buildings. Defendant admi s tha a copy of 
District Seven Health Department's septic permit is a tached as 
Exhibit "A" to the Complaint. 
7. In anS'Ner to paragraph 9, defendant admits the same. 
8. In answer to paragraph 10, defendant admits the same. 
9. In answer to paragraph 11, de admits that on 
t t1 1 , 1999, SIPP and Bonneville County entered into a 
Devel Agreement. The defendant denies that 8IPP promised to 
p all street improvements and utilities as were necessary to 
be completed. The agreement specifically states that t 
SUNNYS PARK UTILI ' ANSWER TO AMENDED 
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"owner(s)" will construct said needed utility or street 
s . The agreement does not obli e the "Devel r" to 
construct needed utility or street improvements. 
10. In answer to paragraph 12, defendant admits the saIne. 
II. In answer to paragraph 13, defendant denies the same. 
12. In answer to paragraph 14, defendant admits the same. 
13. In ans\ver to paragraph 15, defendant admits that a 
meeting was held. However, defendant denies the rema nder of the 
allegations contained in paragraph 15. 
14. In answer to paragraph 16, defendant admits the same. 
15. In answer to paragraph 17, defendant denies that the 
letter sent by District Seven Health rtment memorialized the 
meeting held on March 29, 2002. Defendant admits that the let e 
attached as Exhibit "FII to Plaintiff's complaint is a true and 
correct copy of the letter sent by strict Seven Health 
t. 
16. In answer to paragraph 18, defendant denies that t 
entered into an agreement with the Defendant Sunnyside Park Owners 
Association, Inc. (hereafter "SPON/ ) for the provi ng of water 
and sewer services to the subdivision identified in the p at 
Defendant asserts that it entered into an agreement with SPOA I 0 
sewer services to past, present, and future ovmers and 
occupants of any subdivis s whi were being or one be 
served by Sunnyside Utilities' sewer facilities. 
17. In answer to paragraph 19, defendant admits the same. 
18. In answer to paragraph 20, defendant admits that the 
Third Party Beneficiary }\greement states: "This Agreement sha 1 
SUNNYSIDE PARK ILITIES' ANS\!JER TO AlvlENDED 
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also be bi upon and shall inure to the benefit of ... al present 
and future owners or occupants." Defendant denies the remainder 0 
paragraph 20. 
19. In allS\i\ler to pa 21, Defendant ts tr1e saITte .. 
20. In answer to paragraph 22, Defendant denies that t-
Agreement is only binding on Plaintiff if the reement was 
recorded. Defendant specifically denies that the reement 
contains speci c language several aces indica t that the 
Third Party Beneficiary reement would be recorded "so as 0 put 
all persons on notice that any properties receiving sewer serv ces 
would be subject to the terms of the reement." Defendant admits 
that a true and correct copy of the Third Party Beneficia 
Utility Agreement is attached as Exhibit "G" to plain ~ f"f"' ~ -LLJ.... :::> 
Compla 
'") In answer to paragraph 23, defendant adrni s the same. L. 
22. In answer to parag 24, defendant ts the same. 
23. In answer to paragraph 25, defendant ts hat on 0 
about September 12, 2005 CTR Development, LLC, the o",mer of the 
property at that time, entered into an agreement th side 
Utilities for sewer services and paid the $1,800.00 connection 
fee. Sunnyside Utilities thereafter allowed the sewer connection 
to be made to the building currently occupied Plaintiff. 
De admits that a true correct copy of Check No. 5896 
made eTR Development to Sunnyside Utilities is attached as 
Exh t "I" to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. 
24. In answer to paragraph 26, defendant upon information 
provided by the plaintiff, admits the same. 
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25. In answer to paragraph 27, defendant rl " a'.Aml"LS that 
Sunnyside Utilities specifically requested from CTR Deve~ 
copies of drawings or proposed drawings concerning the Iding 
vvhich would be built and located on the premises. Defendant does 
not have suf cient information to determine if Plaintiff ded 
the requested documents or CTR Development p ded the reques ed 
docurnents. Therefore, Defendant cannot admit or deny whether or 
not Plaintiff (as opposed to CTR Development) p the 
dr ngs to ide Utilities and its officers and/or directors. 
26. In answer to paragraph 28, defendant denies the same. 
27. In answer to paragraph 29, defendant denies the same. 
8. In answer to paragraph 30, Defendant admits that either 
PIa iff or CTR Devel nt provided the document attached as 
Exh l "K" to defendant. Defendant denies that i t received a 
fourth page showing the floor plan or layout of the second floor. 
Defendant was verbally informed that the second floor was to be 
used solely for storage. 
29. In answer to paragraph 31, defendant admits the same. 
30. In anS\ver to paragraph 32, defendant admits that here 
were 10 or 11 connections to the sewer system operated 
defendant in June of 2006. Defendant admits that one of the sewer 
connections was to the property owned by J&LB Properties and that 
Plaintiff was occupying J&LP Properties' Iding. Defendant 
denies the remainder of the allegations in paragraph 32. 
31. In answer to paragraph 33, defendant admits that in 
June 2006, defendant's sewer system experienced a temporary 
overload. Defendant admits that it immediately reported the 
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temporary overload to District Seven Health Department and that an 
onsite investigation was conducted District Seven Health 
r~ment. Defendant denies the remainder of paragraph 33. 
32. In answer to paragraph 34, defendant admits that a 
true and correct copy of the June 28, 2006 letter f::.:-om District 
Seven Health Department to SIPP and Sunnyside Utilities is 
attached as Exhibit to Plaintiff's Amended into 
Defendant denies the remainder of the allegations in paragraph 34. 
33. In answer to ragraph Defendant ts that a true 
and correct copy of the July 6, 2006 letter is attached as Exhib 
"]V]" to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. Defendant denies the 
rema r of the allegations in paragraph 35. 
34. In answer to paragraph 36, Defendant admits that an 
addi tional s ic permit for installation of additional capacit 
\;laS obtained. Defendant admits that a true and correct copy of the 
s ic pe t is attached as Exhibit "Nil to Plaintiff's AInended 
Defendant denies the remainder of the aIle ions in 
paragraph 36. 
35. In answer to paragraph 37, defendant admits t 
:Jist ct Seven Health t physically inspected the 
installat ion of the expansion and repairs of the s lC system 
\vhich were conducted and completed Sunnys LJtilit es. 
De admits that a true and correct copy of t Septic System 
Inspection Report is attached to Plaintiff's A.mended Complaint as 
Exhibit "0." Defendant denies the remainder of paragraph 37. 
36. In answer to paragraph 38, defendant admits the same. 
37. In answer to paragraph 39, defendant admits that a copy 
SUNNYSIDE PARK LITIES' A~SWER TO 
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of the t 23, 2006 letter from Doyle Beck is attached as 
Exhibit "Q" to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. Defendant denies the 
remainder of the allegations in paragraph 39. 
38. In answer to paragraph 40, defendant admits that a copy 
of the S ember 13, 2006 letter from Greg Crockett is attached as 
it "R" to Plaintiff's A.'ll.ended Complaint. Defendant denies the 
remainder of the allegations in paragraph 40. 
39. In answer to paragraph 41, defendant admits that a copy 
of the September 6, 2006 letter from Do e Beck is attached to 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint as Exhibit "S". Defendant denies the 
remainder of paragraph 41. 
40. In answer to paragr defendant admits that 
Plaintiff requested from Sunnyside Utilities a copy of all 
documents, contracts, agreements, or the like governing S s 
Utili ies' sewer utility services. De denies the rema nde 
of the all ions in paragraph 42. 
41. In answer to paragraph 43, defe nt ts t the 
Third Party Beneficiary Utility ement and the Rules and 
at ons were p to Printcraft. Defendant admits that a 
true and correct copy of Doyle Beck's September 0, 2006 let er ~ 
attached as Exhibit " T" to Plaintiff's A.uended 1.a 
Defendant denies the remainder of paragraph 43. 
42. In answer to paragraph 44, its that 
side Utilities and the plaintiff met at the plaintiff's 
ses to scuss the issues of the plaintiff's discharges. 
Defendant admits that plaintiff agreed to collect and di se of 
all substances Sunnyside Utilities classified as "processed waste" 
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which Sunnyside Utilities asserts is any non-human wastes. 
Defendant ts that Plaintiff's counsel memorialized the 
agreement in a letter and that a true and correct copy of such 
letter is a tached as Exhib "U" to plaintiff's Amended 
laint. 
43. In answer to paragraph 45, defendant admits that Kirk 
Woolf met with the Plaintiff. Defendant admits that the Plaintiff 
asserted to Mr. Woolf that the Flexo ink was aqueous in nature and 
not harmful. Defendant denies the remainder of the allegations in 
paragraph 45. 
44. In answer to paragraph 46, defendant admits that a true 
and correct copy of the October 2, 2006 District Seven Health 
Department letter is attached as Exhibit "V" to plaintiff's 
A.'1lended Complaint. Defendant denies the remainder of the 
all ions in paragraph 46. 
45. In answer to paragraph 47, defendant admi s that a true 
and correct copy of the October 5, 2006 District Seven Health 
Department letter attached as Exhibit "W" to the Plaintiff's 
l\mended Complaint. Defendant denies the remainder of the 
allegations in paragraph 47. 
46. In answer to pa 48, defendant ts that a 
di e arose between strict Seven Health Department and the 
s. Defendant asserts that the only issue related to the 
dispute between District Seven Health rtment and the 
defendants is the temporary overload caused by Plaintiff in June 
of 2006. Defendant admits that a true and correct copy of the 
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dated NO"\Ternber 21, 2006, is attached as Exhibit "X.1f 
4 . In answer to paragr 49, defendant ts tl1e same. 
48. In answer to paragraph 50, defendant s that 
side Utilities sent the letter attached as Exhibit \'ZI! to 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. Defendant asserts the 
statements therein speak for themselves. Defendant denies the 
remainder of paragraph 50. 
49. In answer to paragraph 51, defendant admits that 
side Utilities received a letter dated December 12, 2006 from 
Printcraft and that such letter is attached as Exh it "AA" to 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. Defendant asserts that such letter 
speaks for itself. Defendant denies the remainder of paragraph 51. 
50. In answer to paragraph 52, defendant s that 
ide Utilities sent the letter attached as Exhibit "BB" to 
he Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. Defendant asserts that the 
statements therein speak for themselves. Defendant denies the 
remainder of paragraph 52. 
51. In answer to paragraph 53, defendant admits that t 
severed the sewer connection on December 15, 2006. Defendant s 
not have sufficient information to either admit or deny the 
remainder of the allegations in paragraph 53, and therefore es 
the same. 
52. In answer to paragraph 54, defendant admits that 
Sunnyside Utilities has provided docurnents to plaintiff 
establ shing that Sunnyside Utilities' sewer system's capacity 
from 1996 when it was first constructed and installed th June 
of 2006 was in the amount of 500 gallons per Defendant also 
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a ts that ide Utilities' sewer system capacity after June 
2006 was in the total capacity of 2,000 gallons per day. Defendant 
ts that evidence of Sunnyside Utilities' sevver systen, 
capaci ties are attached as Exhibit "CC" to PIa iff! s Amended 
laint. 
53. In answer to paragraph 55, defendant admits that 
Sunnyside Utilities provided documentation to Plaintiff that 
Sunnyside Utilities measured sewer discharge into Sunnyside 
Utilities' sewer system from February 6, 2007 through May 16, 
2007, and that the average amount of such scharges were 
approximately 370 gallons per day. Defendant admits that a true 
and correct copy of Sunnyside Utilities' calculations and 
measurements are attached as Exhibit "DO" to Plaintiff's Ame!lded 
C aint. Defendant denies the remainder of paragraph 55. 
54. In answer to paragraph 56, defendant admits that it has 
sufficient capacity to receive all sewer discharges in acco 
with the terms of the contract. Defendant admits that p aintiff 
has demanded reconnect ion and that Defendant has refused to a low 
such a reconnect ion because of the plaintiff's intention to 
discharge substances and quantities prohibited by Defendant's 
Rules and Regulations and applicable state and federal law. 
55. In answer to paragraph 57, defendant denies the same. 
56. In answer to paragraph 58, defendant re-alleges and 
res ates all the factual allegations set forth In paragr s 
through 58 and incorporates the same reference. 
57. In answer to paragraph 59, defendant admits the same. 
58. In answer to paragraph 60, defendant denies the same. 
SUNNYS 
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59. In answer to paragraph 61, defendant denies trle same. 
60. In answer to pa 62, fendant den es the same. 
61. In answer to paragraph 63, defendant denies the same. 
62. In answer to paragraph 64, defendant admits that ; +- did ~'-
not record the Third Party Beneficiary Agreement. Defendant denies 
that it sewer services to the Plaintiff merely because 
Plaintiff was an occupant of the Sunnyside Industrial and 
Professional Park Subdivision. 
63. In answer to parag 65, defendant denies the same. 
64. In answer to paragraph 66, defendant denies the same. 
65. In answer to paragraph 67, defendant admits that it 
severed the sewer connection. Defendant denies the remainder of 
the a legations in paragraph 67. 
66. In answer to paragraph 68, defendant denies the same. 
67. In answer to paragraph 69, defendant denies the same. 
68. In answer to paragraph 70, defendant admits the same. 
69. In answer to paragraph 71, defendant admits the sanle .. 
70. In answer to paragraph 72, defendant denies the same. 
In answer to paragraph 73, defendant denies the same. 
7 ) ~ . In answer to paragraph 74, defendant he re-al eges 
and re-states all the admissions and denials in paragraphs 1 
through 73 and incorporates the same herein reference as if set 
ly. 
3. In answer to paragraph 75, defendant den ies District 
Seven Health Department provided a permit for only "one to two 
buildings" to be connected to defendants building. Defendant 
asserts that such permit provided for a minimum of "one to two 
SUL\NYSIO-
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buildings." Defendant admits that District Seven Health 
l cated in il of 2002 that no new sewer connect ons were to 
be made to the existing system. Defendant ies that such 
"indication" had any legally binding effect on defendant's sewer 
system or defendant's ability to connect additional buildings to 
defendant's sewer system. 
74. In answer to paragraph 76, defendan denies the same. 
7 In answer to paragraph 77, defendant denies the same. 
76. In answer to paragraph 78, defendant denies the same. 
7" , ! • In answer to paragraph 79, defendant denies the same. 
78. In answer to paragraph 80, defendant denies the same. 
9. In answer to paragraph 81, defendant denies the same. 
80. In answer to paragraph 82, defendant denies the ame. 
De endant es each and every subpart of pa 82. 
81. In answer to paragraph 83, defendant denies same. 
8 . In answer to paragraph 84, defendant he re-al eges 
and re-s ates its admissions and denials to parag s 
83 as set forth herein. 
83. In answer to paragraph 85, defendant denies the same. 
84. In answer to paragraph 86, defendant denies the same. 
Defendant denies each and every subpart of paragraph 86. 
85. In answer to paragraph 87, defendant denies the same. 
86. In answer to paragraph 88, defendant es the same. 
87. In answer to paragraph 89, defendant denies the same. 
88. In anS\ver to paragraph 90, defendant denies the same. 
89. In answer to paragraph 91, defendant denies the same. 
90. In answer to paragraph 92, defendant denies the same. 
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91. In answer to paragraph 93, defendant hereby re-alleges 
and re-states its admissions and denials to paragraphs 1 through 
92 as set forth herein. 
92. In answer to paragraph 011 J'r defendant denies the same. 
93. In answer to paragraph 95, defendant denies the same. 
94. In answer to paragraph 96, defendant denies the same. 
95. In answer to paragraph 97, defendant denies the same. 
96. In answer to paragraph 98, defendant denies the same. 
0 
j In answer to paragraph 99, defendant ad111i t s that 
Plaintiff requested any and all documents that would be as so iated 
Wl the property and sewer services provided Sunnyside 
Ut lities. Defendant admits that, in response, on Sept r 20, 
2006, Sunnyside Utilities provided Plaintiff with a of the 
Th rd Party Beneficiary Utility reement and the ide 
Utilities Rules and Regulations. Defendant denies the remainde 0 
pa 99. 
98. In answer to paragraph 100, defendant denies the same. 
99. In answer to paragraph 101, defendant s the same. 
Defendant denies each and every subpart of paragraph 101. 
and 
104 
100. In answer to paragraph 102, defendant denies the same. 
10l. In answer to paragraph 103, defendant denies the same. 
102. In answer to paragraph 104, defendant denies the same. 
103. In answer to paragraph 105, defendant he re-alle 
re-states its ssions and denials to paragraphs 1 
as set forth herein. 
104. In answer to paragraph 106, defendant denies the 
SlJNNYS PAPK TIES' llJ\lS\iJER TO A[vlE1,JDED 







105. To the extent Plaintiff has failed to satis and/or 
y with all terms, conditions and p sions, lor per rm 
all of its obligations under the Third Party Beneficiary Utility 
reement and ide Utilities' Sewer Rules and lations, 
Plaintiff's claims are barred and de is excused from any 
duty or performance cla Plaintiff. 
106. Defendant asserts that the Plaintiff lacks s LO 
pursue its claims. 
107. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's cla are barred 
la k of ty and t Plaintiff is at most an incidental 
bene iciary of any agreement. 
108. De asserts that it has no fiduciary relat ons 
th the Plaintiff. 
109. Pla iff's claims are barred by Plaintiff's breach of 
the contract. 
110. Plaintiff's claims are barred as a resu t of 
Plaintiff's own illegal acts. 
111. To the extent Plaintiff failed to min ze or a-void 
some or all of the damage alleged in the Complaint, any reco-very 
inst this defendant must be reduced in whole or in the 
amount attributable to such failures. 
112. Defendant asserts that if Plaintiff is deemed to be 
enti tled to any award of damages against defendant, such aVJard 
must be offset by amounts owed to Defendant by Plaintiff as set 
forth in Defendant's Counterclaims hereafter. 
113. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, and each claim therein, 
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES' ANSWER TO 
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is barred the doctrines of waiver and/or estoppel. 
114. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, and each claim therein, 
lS barred the rine of independent intervening cause. 
115. The Amended aint and each claim therein, is ba red 
the doctrine of laches. 
116. The .~ended Complaint, and each claim therein, lS 
barred the doctrine of ean hands. 
17. Plaintiff has failed to join one or more indispensable 
parties to this iti ion. 
118. The claims in the Complaint are barred the doctrine 
of illegality. Defendant cannot contract with Plaintiff to t 
an i legal act and enforcement of any such contract s barred. 
IDAPA 58.01.03.004 prohibits discharge of cooling water, ba kwash 
or back flush water, air conditioning water, water softener brine 
o flows which exceed the design flow of the system, without pr 0 
authorization from the Director of Department Seven Health 
rtment. Plaintiff scharged see to s the 
i ted substances and excessive flows of process \vater into 
the system. Plaintiff has not obtained approval from the Director 
for discharge of such substances or dis rge of flows which 
exceed the system desi and therefore any such scharges nto 
the s em would be and are illegal. 
1 9. Plaintiff has failed to set forth its cIa with 
sufficient particularity to permit Defendant to raise all 
iate defenses, and therefore, Defendant reserves the ri 
to seek leave of court to amend or supplement its Answer, 
luding affirmative defenses, to specify further grounds for 
J\NSitJER 
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the claims and causes of action that are the subj ect of 
t s action. 
120. reason of the filing of Plaintiff's Compla 
Sunnyside Utilities has been required to retain the serv ces 0 an 
attorney to defend this action and has incurred attorney sand 
costs in such defense. In accordance \vi th IRCP 54, Idaho Code 
§12-120, Idaho Code §12-121, Idaho Code §12-123, IRCP 11 (a) (1), 
and the Sewer Rules and Regulations, Article IV, Section 
Sunnyside Utilities 1S entitled is reimbursement of all attorney 
fees, expenses, and losses incurred herein in defense of 
Plaintiff's claim and as a result of Plaintiff's actions. 
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM 
ide Park Utilities, Inc., hereby alleges the follmv 
Amended Counterclaims against Printcraft Press, Inc., pursuant to 
IRCP 13: 
FACTS COMMON TO ALL COUNTERCLAIMS 
1. ide Park Utili ties, Inc., (hereafter "Sunnyside 
Utilities") is an Idaho corporation with its principle place of 
business in lIe County, Idaho. 
2 . Sunnyside Utilities engages 1n the siness of 
ding water and sewer service to the owners and 0 s of 
certain properties, buildings, and other s in 
a h Thi Party Beneficia Utility reement and 
Sunnyside Utilities' Rules and Regulations. 
3. Print craft Press, Inc., (hereafter "Printcraft ff ) is an 
daho corporation with its principle place of business located at 
3834 South Professional Way, Idaho Falls, Bonneville County, 
SUNNYSIDE PARK OT LI ~ES' ANSWER TO 
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Idaho. 
4. That jurisdiction and venue of this action arise in 
lIe County, State of Idaho. 
That pursuant to an agreement with CTR Devel 
LLC., (hereafter "CTR Development") Sunnyside Utilities to 
p de water and sewer service to the building located at 3834 
South Professional 1iJay, (hereafter "the property") 
6. Provision of VIa ter and sewer services to CTR 
Deve opment was to be regulated by the Sunnyside Utilities' Rules 
and Regulations, the Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement, 
arId applicable state and federal rules arId regulatio11s.. That a 
copy of such Agreement and applicable Rules and Regulations are 
attached as Exhibits "A" and "B" to Plaintiff's Original 
laint. 
'7 
I. In January of 2006, CTR Development sold the prope y 
and any rl s to use Sunnyside Utilities' sewer services to J& 
rties, Inc. 
Q 
v. J&LB Properties, Inc. , thereafter entered illtO a 
written lease agreement with CTR Management, LLC. (hereafter" 
Management fI) The lease agreement specifically ded that the 
lessee, CTR IVlana was responsible for furnishing and pa ng 
for all utilities and that J&LB Properties had no obligation to 
furni utilities to the building. a copy of such Lease 
reement lS attached as Exhibit "J" to Plaintiff's Amended 
Complaint. 
9. Printcraft is a sub-tenant in the subj ect property 
pursuant to an oral, month-to-month sub-lease agreement between 
COUNTE8CLAItv.1S, P8AYE8 FOE PUN I 
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Pr craft and eTR Management. 
10. Printcraft began discha ng wastes into 
Utilities sewer system on or after January 23, 2006. 
4 1 
1.J... Printcraft's s s included hazardous ca s, 
water softener brine, reverse osmosis water, fountain concentrate, 
is alcohol, ink, and mul t Ie other discharges that were 
ha to Sunnyside Utilities' sewer system. 
12. In addition, Print craft discha wastes in excess of 
the ca ty of Sunnyside Utilities' sewer system. 
13. Printcraft never informed Sunnyside Utilities about the 
types or the i ties of sewer discharges that it intended to 
o ide Utilities' sewer stem. 
14. Nei ther Printcraft, nor eTR ever informed 
Sunnyside Utilities that the lease with J&LB Properties 
specifically excluded eTR and Printcraft Press from 
using J&LB rties' rights to the sewer connection with 
ide Utilities. 
5. Pr craft Press either negligently did not read, 0 
intentionally did not obey the multiple warnings and prohibitions 
contained in the Material Safety Data Sheets for the n ous and 
hazardous chemicals Printcraft discharged into the side 
Utilities' sewer system. 
16. On or about June 9, 2006, Printcraft's discharges 
caused Sunnyside Ut il i ties' seVJer system to over load and caused 
sewage to on the near Sunnyside Utilities' drain 
field. 
17. Defendant observed significant quantities of ink in the 
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sewage on the ground as a result of the June 9, 2006 overload. 
8. On or about July 2, 2006, Sunnyside Utilities obta 
a temporary expansion permit and increased the capacity of ::'he 
sewer system in order to avoid future overloads of the system. At 
that time Sunnyside Utilities was still unaware of all the var ous 
types and ities of discharges coming from Printcraft into he 
seVJer system. 
19. In st 2006, Sunnyside Utilities discovered that 
Printcraft had been scharging reverse osmosis water, ink, 
cals and other harmful substances into the sewer system. 
20. On or about September 6, 2006 Sunnys Utilities 
specifical informed Printcraft that the sewer system was onl 
designed to accomrnodate human waste and that Printcraft needed to 
control its discharge ities and cease discharging chemica s, 
processed water, and ink into the sewer system. 
21. On or about September 20, 2006, Sunnyside Utilities 
ded Print craft with a copy of the Third Party Beneficiary 
Utility reement and Sunnyside Utilities' Rules and Regulat ons. 
On September 26, 2006, Printcraft Press acknowledged hat 
l was aware of the system limita ons and of the sputes th 
the Department of Environmental Quality and strict Seven Hea th 
Department as a result of the June, 2006 overload, and sed to 
collect and dispose of all substances that ide Utili ties 
classified as "processed wastes," including all reverse osmosis 
water. 
23. In December of 2006, Sunnyside Utilities discovered 
that Printcraft continued discharging substances that Sunnys de 
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Utilities classified as "processed wastes." 
24. On December 11, 2006, Sunnyside Utilities sent a letter 
to Printcraft, demanding that Printcra cease all discharges of 
" ssed wastes ll immediately. 
25. On December 2006, Sunnyside Utilities again 
requested that Printcraft cease all discharges of "processed 
wastes" and informed Print craft that it must allow monitoring of 
its discharges i Printcraft desired to continue receiving sewer 
services. Printcraft refused to allow its discharges to be 
monitored only because Printcraft was knowingly and intentiona ly 
scharging "processed wastes" and had no intention of ceas to 
scharge "processed wastes" despite the agreement reached betwe 
Printcraft and Sunnyside Utilities on or about September 26, 006. 
26. On December 1 1 2006, Sunnyside Utilities severed 
sewer connection to the buil Printcraft 1S occupying. 
2 ' I. On December 19, 2006, Print craft caused its newly 
installed alternative sewer system, with a capacity of 1,000 
gallons to overload, allowing sewage to pond on the ground near 
Pr craft's bui Mult e additional overloads 
occurred. 
28. On December 20, 2006 1 the Department of Environmental 
Qual ty conducted an investigation of the sewage on the and 
determined that "Odor of wastewater smelled like k. Color of 
wastewater was a dark blue to black color." A copy of the 
investigation letter dated January 5, 2007 is attached as it 
"1." 
29. The investigation 
SUNNYSIDE PAPK 
.I\[/IENDED COONTEPCLAII'1S I PRI\ YEP FOP PUNI 
the Department of Environmental 
TO 
AND DEMAND (1 
Quality, only five days after Sunnyside Utilities severed the 
sewer connect +=c' conLlrms that Printcraft was discharg ng 
"processed wastes." 
COUNT I: BREACH OF CONTRACT 
30. Defendant re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 
reference. 
31. Defendant and Plaintiff entered into a 
contractual relati as follows: 
a. On September 6, 2006, Defendant informed Plaint £ f 
hat Defendant's sewer system had capacity only to co lect 
and dispose of "human waste" and that no other wastes would 
be allowed into the system. 
b. On September 19, 2006, Plain iff requested a copy of 
any contracts, agreements, documents, or the like, which were 
applicable to parties receiving sewer services from Sunnyside 
Utilities. 
c. On ember 20, 2006, Defendant ded Plain iff 
wi h Defendant's Third Party Beneficiary Uti ity reement 
and Defendant's Rules and Regulations for sewer service. Such 
Rules and Regulations specifically define "sewage" as 
blackwaste or blackwater (also known as "human was es") and 
specifically excludes a le 1 i s t 0 f \\ pro c e sse d \va s e s /I 
from being discharged into the sewer system. 
d. On or about September 26, 2006, Plainti ff agreed to 
abide by Defendant's Rules and Regulations for sewer service 
stating that it agreed not to discharge any substance 
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side 
Utilities' sewer system. 
e. Defendant accepted Plaintiff' ,s sewer discharges In 
exchange for PIa iff's pa of monthly sewer se ce 
fee. 
32. Defendant substantially performed its obli ions under 
the contract from September 26, 2006 until December 15, 2006 arld 
did not materially breach the contract. 
33. Plaintiff breached the contract by discha ng water 
softener brine, hazardous chemicals, substances that are 1 
to Defendant's sewer facilities, inks, and excessive f ow of 
discharges. 
34. As a rect result of the acts of PIa tif Defendant 
was re red disconnect Plaintiff from the sewer system on 
December 15, 2006. The costs of such disconnection included 
$1,228.64 for a backhoe and operator to perform the sconnection 
and $1,420.00 for inspection and supervision by t Defendant. 
35. As a direct and proximate result of the breaches of 
contract by Plaintiff, Defendant is entitled to damages of 
$2,648.64 or such other amount as may be proven at trial. 
36. In accordance with IRCP 54, Idaho Code §12-120, 12 121, 
12 123, IRCP 11 (a) (1) r and the Sewer Rules and lations, 
Art icle IV, Section 2, ide Park Utilities is entitled to 
reimbursement of all attorney fees, expenses, and losses incurred 
herein in prosecution of ide Park Utilities' counterclaims. 
COUNT II. COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
37. Sunnyside Park Utilities re-alleges 
32 by reference. 
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38. The contract between these parties includes material 
lied covenants. 
39. ied in every contract is a covenant that 
parties will act in good faith and fair deal wi th each other 
with respect to the terms of the contract. 
40. Printcraft has failed to deal fairly with and act in 
faith towards Sunnyside Park Utilities and has breached the 
lied covenant of good faith and fair deal 
4 Printcraft's breach of the ied covenant of 
fai th and fair dealing has unfairly frustrated Sunnyside Park 
Utili ies' ri to receive the benefits of the contract. 
42. Printcraft's breach of the ied covenant of 
faith and fair dealing is a material breach of the contract a~d is 
the direct and proximate cause of damages suffered Sunnyside 
Park Utilities, whi s are continuing. 
43. ide Park Utilities has suffered damages and will 
hereafter suffer damages in an amount to be proven at tria In 
excess of the jurisdictional amount of this Court. 
COUNT III. NEGLIGENCE 
44. Sunnyside Park Utilities re-alleges parag s 1 
reference. 
45. Printcraft has a duty not to allow its sewer discha s 
to cause unreas le, foreseeable risks of rm to third ies. 
46. Printcraft breached its duty by failing to exercise 
reas e care in following the warnings and directions on the 
!Vlaterial and Safety Data Sheets provided to Printcraft he 
manufacturers. 
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47. Printcraft further breached its duty failing o 
exercise reas case to ensure hat Printcraft's discharges 
,vere not harmful to Sunnyside Park Utilities' sewer system and 
facilities and that Pr cra I s discharges did not exceed 
capacity of Sunnyside Park Utilities' sewer system. 
48. Printcraft further breached its duty by discharging 
illegal substances and hazardous chemicals im:o ide Park 
Utilities sewer facilities. 
Printcraft's breaches were the direct and te cause 
of the temporary overload ln Sunnyside Park Utili ies' sewer 
system during June of 2006. 
50. Printcraft's breaches were the direct and proximate cause 
of a s arising out of the temporary overload, including an 
expansion of the sewer system, treatment of the on the 
sewage, all costs and fees related to the ongoing di e \vi th 
District Seven Health Department, and all costs and fees related 
to the ongoing dispute with the Department of Environmental 
t 
ity. The costs of such expansion, treatment, and di es 
December, 2006 are as follows: 
Construction Permit: 
Purchase of Additional Septic Tanks: 
Valves from Falls Plumbing Supply: 
Cost of Excavation, Drain Field 
Supplies, Meter Reading and Supervision: 
Attorney Fees through December, 2006: 
Cost for Eme Excavator and 
and Operator to Excavate and Install 
Tanks and Piping: 
Cost for lime to neutralize overflow: 
TOTAL 
$ 200.00 
$ 1,7 .00 
$ 1 4.2"7 





In t on, if this Defendant is required to construct a large 
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soil absorption system, and/or to abandon its current system, as a 
resu t of the acts of Plaintiff, Defendant will also seek as 
s the cost of such construction, a/or III an 
amount to be proven at trial. Defendant's attorney fees and costs 
related to the District Seven Health Department and rLment of 
ronmental Quality litigation continue to increase. 
51. Defendant is entitled to be compensated for its damages 
in the amount of $42,259.87, and its continuing s in an 
amount as wil be proven at trial. 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
52. side Park Utilities re-alleges paragraphs 1-51 
reference. 
53. Printcraft's actions were wanton, malicious and in 
reckless sregard of the Sunnyside Park Utilities ri 
property. 
54. Sunnyside Park Utilities has suffered damages to i s 
ri s rty. 
55. Printcraft's wanton, malicious, and reckless actions 
continue. 
55. Sunnyside Park Utilities is entitled to an award of 
punitive damages, in an amount to be determined the jury, to 
deter Printcraft from continuing in its wanton, malicious, and 
rec ess behavior. 
PRAYER 
liJHEREFORE f Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc. respectful y 
requests the following relief against Printcraft Press, Inc. 
1. That Printcraft recover nothing by reason of its 
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Amended Complaint and that all such claims be dismissed. 
That Sunnyside Park Utili ties be awarded its s 
for Printcraft's breach of contract in the amount of $2,643.64, 
together with continuing damages as may be proven at trial. 
3. That Sunnyside Park Utili ties be awarded its damages 
caused Printcraft's negligent discharges in the amount of 
$42,259.8 , together with continuing damages as may be proven at 
trial. 
fees. 
4. That Sunnyside Park Utilities be awarded tive 
s, in an amount to be determined the ury. 
5. That ide be awarded all of its costs and attorney 
6. For such other relief, legal or equitable, to which 
ide has any 
DATED this 
ght or entitlement. 
day of November, 2007. 
Mark R. Fuller 
Attorney for Defendant 
DEMAND FOR JURy TRIAL 
Sunnyside Park Utilities hereby demands a trial a Uvel ve 
(12) person j on a 1 issues of fact. 
,/' 
OlWED this ~ day of November, 2007. 
--'---
~;(JJL 
IvJark R. Fuller -'------
Attorney for Defendant 
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTI , ANSi:JER 1'0 AMENDED CO[vJL,AI 
COUNTERCLZUfYIS, PRAYER PUNITIVE DPIlVli\GES FOR cJURY 
.~o ,0, "" 
> " o I.~; 
6 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that served a true and correct copy of t 
following described pleading or document on the attorneys 1 s ed 
below on this day of November, 2007: 
Document Served: 
Attorneys Served: 
Jef D. Brunson, Esq. 
Lance J. Schuster, Esq. 
John M. Avondet, Esq. 
Michael D. Gaf ,Esq. 
BEARD ST. CLAIR 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, 10 83404 
COiJt,;rEF.CL1UMS, PR.l\YER FOR PUNI 
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES' ANSWER 
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Mark R. Ful er 
FULLER & CARR 
TO 
ANi:) DEtJ)AND 
Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558 
Lance J. Schuster, ISB No. 5404 
Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996 
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
80 
7 20 P 4 :15 
DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO 
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC. an Idaho 
corporation, an Idaho corporation, 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, 
vs. 
Case No.: CV-06-7097 
SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an Idaho ORDER TO SHORTEN TIME 
corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, SUNNYSIDE 
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL 
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
This matter having come before this Court by and through the Motion to ShOlien 
Time, and good cause having been shown: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the hearing on the Plaintiff's Motion to Allow 
Disclosure, Illentification and Use ofRebup.aJ}~.~pert Witnesses shall be heen. on 
J.-...J 
Order to Shorten Time Page 1 
Tuesday, November 27,2007 at 9:00 a.m. 
DATED: NovemberZG, 2007. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On November iLL, 2007, I served a true and correct copy of the NOTICE OF 
SERVICE upon the following by the method of delivery desigpated: 
7 
Mark Fuller 0 U.S. Mail G Courthouse Box 0 Facsimile 
Fuller & Carr 
PO Box 50935 
Idaho Falls, 1D 83405-0935 
Fax: (208) 524-7167 
Michael D. Gaffney 
Lance J. Schuster 
Beard st. Clair Gaffney PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, 1D 83404 
Fax: (208) 529-9732 
Clerk 
o U.S. Mail lcoUltnom;e Box o Facsimile 
Order to Shorten Time Page 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 




vs. Case No. CV-06-7097 
SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, 
Defendant. 
On the 27th day of November, 2007, Plaintiff's motion to 
allow discovery came before the Honorable Joel E. Tingey, 
District Judge, in open court at Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Lance Schuster and Mr. Jeff Brunson appeared on behalf 
of the Plaintiff. 
Mr. Mark Fuller and Mr. Dan Beck appeared on behalf of the 
Defendant. 
Mr. Schuster presented an oral motion to continue the jury 
trial setting. Mr. Fuller stipulated to a continuance. 
The Court granted the motion for continuance. 
Jury trial was reset for July 22, 2008. Trial may go for 
two weeks. If so, trial may continue the week of July 29th . 
Pretrial conference was scheduled for July 9, 2007 at 8:30 a.m. 
The pending motion was considered moot. 
Court was thus adjourned. 
H:cv067097.48mo 
J L TINGEY 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of November, 2007, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to 
be delivered to the following: 
Lance Schuster 
Jeff Brunson 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Mark R. Fuller 
Dan Beck 
PO Box 50935 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Deputy Court Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
7 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF 




Plaintiff, ORDER AND NOTICE 
RESETTING JURY TRIAL 
Case No. CV-06 7097 
SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, 
Defendant. 
Pursuant to Rule 16 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, 
the following pre trial schedule shall govern all proceedings in 
this case: 
ORDER 
I. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. A Pre-trial Conference is rescheduled for July 9, 2008 
at 8:30 a.m. 
2. Jury trial is rescheduled for 10:00 a.m. (or 1:30 p.m.) 
on July 22, 2008. Trial lS expected to continue the 
week of July 29. 
3. Dispositive motions must be filed at least 60 days 
prior to trial. 
4. Plaintiff(s) expert witness disclosure and Defendant's 
expert witness disclosure on its counterclaim, 
including opinions and conclusions must be filed at 
least 100 days before trial. All rebuttal expert 
witnesses, including opinions and conclusions must be 
disclosed and filed at least 75 days before trial. 
5. All discovery shall be completed 45 days prior to 
trial. 
6. The parties and their attorneys shall attend a 
mediation session before a qualified attorney mediator 
or district judge selected by the parties. Mediation 
should be completed at least 90 days prior to trial. 
II. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each attorney shall, no 
later than three (3) days prior to the pre-trial conference: 
1. File a list of names of persons who may be called to 
ORDER 
testify. 
2. File a descriptive list of all exhibits proposed to be 
offered into evidence 
3. File a brief citing legal authorities upon which the 
party relies as to each issue of law to be litigated. 
4. File proposed jury instructions. The parties need not 
submit IDJI2 instruction numbers 1.01 through 1.43. 
All instructions shall be prepared in accordance with 
I.R.C.P. 51(a). 
III. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each attorney shall no later 
than seven (7) days before trial: 
1. File any objections to the jury instructions requested 
by an opponent specifying the instruction and the 
grounds for the objection. 
2. Deposit with the clerk of the court all exhibits to be 
introduced. Plaintiff shall mark exhibits in numerical 
sequence as outlined in Plaintiff's exhibit list and 
Defendant's exhibits shall be marked in alphabetical 
sequence as outlined in Defendant's exhibit list. 
Pages of exhibits shall be stapled, with a sticker 
placed on the first page of the actual exhibit. 
IV. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: 
1. Any exhibits or witnesses discovered after the last 
required disclosure shall immediately be disclosed to 
the court and opposing counsel by filing and service 
stating the date upon which the same was discovered. 
2. No witnesses shall testify and no exhibits shall be 
admitted into evidence at trial other than those 
disclosed, listed and submitted to the clerk of the 
court in accordance with this order .. 
3. This order shall control the course of this action 
unless modified for good cause shown to prevent 
manifest injustice. 
4. The Court may impose appropriate sanctions for 
violation of this order. 
DATED this ~ day of November, 2007. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of November, 2007, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to 
be delivered to the following: 
Lance Schuster 
Jeff Brunson 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Mark R. Fuller 
Dan Beck 
PO Box 50935 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
ORDER 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Deputy Court Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 









Plaintiff, Case No. CV-2006-7097 
-vs.- MINUTE ENTRY 
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES INC. ET AL., 
Defendants. 
December 20,2007, a Defendant's Motion to Strike Affidavit and Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Amended Complaint came on for hearing before the Honorable Joel E. 
Tingey, District Judge, sitting in open court at Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Ms. Rhonda Quintana, Deputy Court Clerk, were 
present. 
Mr. Lance Schuster and Jeffrey Brunson appeared on behalf of plaintiff. 
Mr. Mark Fuller and Mr. Daniel Beck appeared on behalf of the defendant's. 
Mr. Schuster offered the motion as argument for the Motion to Strike Affidavit. 
Mr. Beck had previously submitted his response and submitted on such. 
The Court denied the Motion to Strike Affidavit. 
Mr. Beck addressed the Court in support of the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Court inquired of counsel regarding the argument. 
Mr. Beck responded and then continued his argument in support. 
MINUTE ENTRY - 1 
Mr. Schuster offered argument in opposition. 
The Court inquired of counsel. 
Mr. Schuster responded and continued argument in opposition. 
Mr. Beck offered rebuttal argument in support and requested the motion be granted. 
The Court took this matter under advisement and will issue its opinion and decision in 
due course. 
Court was thus adjourned. 
c: Mark Fuller 
Michael Gaffney 
122007 AMTingey5 
MINUTE ENTRY - 2 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL D~,SlRtCTr.1n2 
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SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, and SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL 
& PROFESSIONAL PARK, L.L.C., an Idaho 
limited liability company 
Defendants, 
ANALYSIS 
Case No. CV-06-7097 
ORDER 
This matter has come before the Court upon Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment RE: Constructive Fraud. The procedural background, disputed and undisputed 
facts, and standard of adjudication applicable to this matter were previously set out in the 
Court's Memorandum Decision and Order entered on August 31, 2007. 
In that Decision, the Court considered Defendants' prior motions for sunU11ary 
judgment and granted said motions in part, and denied said motions in part. As to 
Plaintiffs claims for failure to disclose and for constructive fraud, the Court granted 
summary judgment as to Defendant SUlU1yside Park Owners Association, Inc., but denied 
summary judgment on those claims as against Sunnyside Utilities, Inc., and SUlU1yside 
ORDER 1 
Industrial and Professional Park, LLC, on the grounds that there were disputed issues of 
fact. 
Defendants have again moved for summary judgment on those claims on the 
grounds that Plaintiff did not rely on any alleged non-disclosure, and further had no right 
to rely upon any alleged non-disclosure. For purposes of the present motion, the facts 
indicate the following. 
On December 23, 1999, Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Park, LLC (SIPP) 
transferred the property now know as Block 1, Lot 5 at Sunnyside Industrial Professional 
Park to Miskin Scraper Works, Inc. Miskin Scraper Works, Inc. transferred the propeliy 
to Waters Land and Cattle, LLC on March 26,2004. On August 18,2005, Waters Land 
and Cattle, LLC transferred the property to CTR Development, LLC. CTR Development, 
LLC constructed the physical building located on the propeliy, and while the current 
owner, paid $1800.00 to Defendant Sunnyside Park Utilities (Sunnyside Utilities) to 
establish a sewer connection to Block 1, Lot 5. Shortly thereafter, a connection was 
established to the property allowing access to the septic system installed by SIPP. On 
January 23,2006, CTR Development, LLC transferred the property to J&LB Properties, 
Inc., who is the current owner of the property. 
J&LB Properties, Inc. entered into a written lease agreement with CTR 
Management, LLC on January 23, 2006 to rent the premises located on Block 1, Lot 5. 
On that same day, CTR Management, LLC entered into an oral lease with Printcraft 
Press, Inc. (Printcraft) where Printcraft would rent the premises on a month-to-month 
basis. Shortly thereafter Printcraft began occupying the premises and operating a full 
color printing service which employs approximately 40 employees. The Bonneville 
ORDER 2 
COlmty Planning and Zoning Department issued a Temporary Certificate of Occupancy 
for the premises on March 16, 2006. The temporary certificate expired 180 days later on 
September 12,2006. A Certificate of Occupancy was issued by the BOlmeville County 
Planning and Zoning Department on February 1,2007. 
In June of 2006, the septic system operated by Sunnyside Utilities and installed by 
SIPP began to fail and sewage leaked onto the ground. The Defendants claim that 
Printcraft caused the failure because of the large amount of processed waste iqjected into 
the septic system. On December 15, 2006, the Defendants severed the sewer connection 
to the premises being rented by Printcraft because Defendants believed that Printcraft was 
discharging prohibited material into the septic system. 
Defendants argue that since Plaintiff was occupying the property in the absence of 
an occupancy permit, it can not claim justifiable reliance on alleged misrepresentations or 
non-disclosures i.e., there can be no justifiable reliance when performing an unlawful act. 
The Court however does not believe that occupying the property without a permit is 
dispositive of this issue. Instead, it is the Court's opinion that the occupation of the 
property without an occupancy permit is simply evidence which may have an affect on 
whether reliance was justified (as determined by a jury), proximate cause, and/or 
damages. 
FUlihermore, the alleged detrimental reliance is not just the occupancy of the 
building, but also the closing down of Plaintiff's business at the prior location. There was 
nothing illegal about making a decision to cease doing business at one location in 
anticipation of doing business at another location. In granting inferences in favor of the 
non-moving party, at least some of the alleged detrimental reliance and corresponding 
ORDER 3 
damages arose from the decision to relocate to the property in question, not just the 
decision to occupy the building at a particular time. 
Defendants further argue that there could be no justifiable reliance because no 
"promises" had been made to Plaintiff regarding sewer service and that the Plaintiff s 
rental agreement also did not provide for sewer service. However, it is the Court's 
opinion that this goes to the heart of the factual issues relating to a claim of constructive 
fraud. The evidence indicates that Plaintiff assumed and believed that the "industrial 
park" would have adequate facilities for sewage and waste water. There is also a 
disputed issue of whether Defendants were aware of Plaintiffs sewage and waste water 
requirements. Accordingly, the issue of whether express promises or agreements had 
been made regarding sewer service is necessarily related to whether there was a prior 
failure to make a required disclosure regarding the limitations of the septic facility. 
Accordingly, consistent with the Court's decision of August 31, 2007, there are 
disputed issues of material fact precluding summary judgment on these claims. Those 
factual issues include the nature of the statements made between the Parties' 
representatives, the respective knowledge of the Parties as to the infrastructure of the 
property and the requirements of Plaintiffs business, and whether Defendants reasonably 
should have disclosed the limitations of the septic system. Derivative factual issues from 
the foregoing include whether Plaintiff relied upon the alleged non-disclosures and 
whether such reliance was justified. 
Based on the foregoing, Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment Re: 
Constructive Fraud is DENIED. 
r.r~~ 
ORDER 4 
.... J \.../ -> •. 
Dated this :::t;day of December, 2007. 
DIstrict Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this~ day of December, 2007, I did send a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct 
postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox; 
or by causing the same to be hand-delivered. 
Michael Gaffney 
Lance Schuster 
Beard St. Clair Gaffney, McNamara Calder 
2105 Coronado St. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Mark R. Fuller 
Daniel R. Beck 
Fuller & Carr 
P.O. Box 50935 
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935 
ORDERS 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Clerk of the District Court 
Bonlleville County, Idaho 
BYKs I Deputy Clerk 
Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558 
Lance J. Schuster, ISB No. 5404 
Jeffrey D. Bmnson, ISB No. 6996 
Jolm M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438 
Beard St. Clair Gaffney P A 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 





Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
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SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK 
O\VNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE 
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL 
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
Case No.: CV-06-7097 
ORDER RE: STIPULATION FOR 
PROTECTIVE ORDER 
The Comt having considered the parties' signed StipUlation for Protective Order, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
The pmties shall not release, disclose, or otherwise cause to be released or 
r:'"''J J..." .J 
Order Re: Stipulation for Protective Order Page 1 
fj 
, I 
disclosed Plaintiff, Printcraft Press, Inc. 's financial infonnation, to any person not a party 
to the pending action between Plaintiff and the Defendants or to any person not an expert 
witness in the above action, and shall use such information solely for the purposes of this 
litigation. 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
DATED: February 2008. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on February L02008, I served a true and correct copy of the 
ORDER RE: STIPULATION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER on the following by the 
method of delivery designated below: 
Mark Fuller 
Fuller & Carr 
PO Box 50935 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935 
Fax: (208) 524-7167 
Lance Schuster 
leffBrunson 
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Fax: (208) 529-9732 
Clerk of the Court 
By: ')}NY 
Deputy Clerk 
lli.s. Mail 0 Comihouse Box 0 Facsimile 
/ 
[gU.S. Mail 0 Comihouse Box 0 Facsimile 
Order Re: Stipulation for Protecti ve Order Page 2 
MARK R. FULLER (ISB No. 2698) 
DANIEL R. BECK (ISB No. 7237) 
FULLER & CARR 
410 MEMORIAL DRIVE, SUITE 201 
P.O. Box 50935 
IDAHO FALLS, iDAHO 83405-0935 
TELEPHONE: (208) 524-5400 
\)ISfHiCT ! 
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SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an Idaho ) 
corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK) 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an) 
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE) 
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL) 





Case No. CV-06-7097 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
RE: SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES' BREACH 
OF CONTRACT CAUSE OF ACTION 
COMES NOW, the Defendants, Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc. ("Sunnyside 
Utilities") through its counsel of record, Daniel R. Beck of Fuller & Carr, and moves the 
Court pursuant to IRep 56(b) for Partial Summary Judgment on Sunnyside Utilities 
Cause of Action for Breach of Contract. 
Sunnyside Utilities is entitled to Summary Judgment on its Cause of Action for 
MOTION FOR SUtvltvl}\,RY JUDGMENT RE: SUNNYSIDE ES' 
BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSE OF ACTION -
Breach of Contract because, there is no dispute that a contract was formed, the contract 
is unambiguous, and Printcraft violated the contract. 
The Motion is based upon this Motion, the Notice of Hearing, the Brief in Support 
of Motion for Summary Judgment RE: Sunnyside Utilities' Breach of Contract Cause of 
Action, the Affidavit of Doyle Beck, dated March 10, 2008, and the Affidavit of Daniel R. 
Beck, dated March 14, 2008. 
y~"" 
DATED this \ '\ day of March, 2008. 
\ 
Daniel R. Beck 
Fuller & Carr 
JV10TION FOR SUJVlf\lARY JUDGI\1ENT RE: SUNNYSIDE UTILI ES' 
BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSE OF ACTION 
~'''"\t"'\ 
!J~ .~; 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
HEREBY CERTIFY that I served a true and correct copy of the following 




Michael D. Gaffney, Esq. 
BEARD ST. CLAIR 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, 10 83404 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
RE: SUNNYSIDE UTIL TilES' BREACH 
OF CONTRACT CAUSE OF ACTION 
)( U.S. Mail 
Facsimile 
__ Hand Delivery 
Daniel R. Beck 
FULLER & CARR 
['10TION FOR SUJVIMARY JUDGMENT RE: SUNNYSIDE LI :LES' 
BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSE Of ACTION - 3 
MARK R. FULLER (IS8 No. 2698) 
DANIEL R. BECK (ISB No. 7237) 
FULLER & CARR 
410 MEMORIAL DRIVE, SUITE 201 
P.O. Box 50935 
IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO 83405-0935 
TELEPHONE: (208) 524-5400 
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SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an Idaho ) 
corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK) 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an) 
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE) 
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL) 




Case No. CV-06-7097 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: 
SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES' BREACH 
OF CONTRACT CAUSE OF ACTION 
COMES NOW, the Defendant, Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., ("Sunnyside Utilities") 
through its counsel of record, Daniel R. Beck of Fuller & Carr, and submits this Brief in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment RE: Sunnyside Utilities' Breach of Contract 
Cause of Action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On September 12, 2005, CTR Development, LLC and Sunnyside Utilities entered 
BRSIF IN SUPPORT Of MOTION FOR SDt1Mlmy ,JUDGMENT 
SUt~NYSI UTILITIES' BREl\.CH OF CONTRACT CAUSE OF l\CTION 
into an agreement for Sunnyside Utilities to provide sewer services to the building 
located at Lot 1, Block 5, Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Park Subdivision. 
See Amended Complaint, para. 25. 
2. On January 23, 2006, CTR Development sold the building and its right to use the 
sewer system to J&LB Properties. See Amended Complaint, para. 24(0). 
3. Sunnyside Utilities never promised Printcraft Press, Inc. (hereafter "Printcraft") any 
sewer services prior to Printcraft's occupancy of the building. See Deposition of 
Travis Waters, pg. 109, In. 25 through pg. 110, In. 2. 
4. J&LB Properties never promised Printcraft any sewer services. See Amended 
Complaint, para. 26 and Lease Agreement, para. 6, attached as Exhibit J to the 
Amended Complaint. . 
5. Printcraft moved into the building in January of 2006 and began discharging water 
softener brine, hazardous wastes, processed water and excessive flows of 
wastewater into the system in violation of IDAPA 58.01.03.004.03. See 
Memorandum Decision and Order, dated August 31,2007. 
6. In June of 2006, Sunnyside Utilities' sewer system experienced a temporary 
overload. 
7. Printcraft admitted that prior to September 26, 2006 it discharged illegal processed 
wastes into Sunnyside Utilities' sewer system. See Response to Request for 
Admission, No. 21. 
8. On September 20, 2006 Sunnyside Utilities offered to provide Printcraft with sewer 
services upon certain terms and conditions, however, Sunnyside Utilities refused 
RREIF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMM..F"RY RE: 
SUNNYS DE UTILITIES' BREACH OF CONTRACT Cz\USE 0;:;" l'.CTION -
to accept any "processed wastes". See Letter of Mark Fuller, dated September 
20, 2006, attached as Plaintiff's Response to Request for Admission, No.6. 
9. On September 26, 2006, Printcraft accepted Sunnyside Utilities' offer and 
specifically promised to cease all discharges of "processed waste" into the sewer 
system. See Letter of Lane Erickson, dated September 26, 2006, attached as 
Plaintiff's Response to Request for Admission, No.7. 
10. Despite the agreement, Printcraft continued discharging water softener brine into 
the sewer system after September 26, 2006 through December 15, 2006. See 
Deposition of Travis Waters, pg. 200, In. 21 through pg. 201, In. 5. 
11. Printcraft continued discharging inks into the sewer system after September 26, 
2006 through December 15, 2006. See Luzier Deposition, pg. 69, In. 25 through 
pg. pg. 71, In. 6. 
12. Printcraft continued discharging processed waste from its air conditioner units into 
the sewer system after September 26, 2006 through December 15, 2006. See 
Deposition of Travis Waters, pg. 190-191. 
13. Printcraft continued discharging processed wastes from its prepress area and its 
flexographic printing area from September 26, 2006 through December 15, 2006. 
See Deposition of Terry Luzier, pg. 39, In. 25 through pg. 40, In. 22. 
14. Printcraft was specifically warned by a Sunnyside Utilities' representative, in 
October of 2006, that the sink where Printcraft was discharging its ink was a 
serious concern. See Travis Waters Deposition, pg. 192, In. 23-24. 
15. On December 10, 2006, Doyle Beck, a Sunnyside Utilities' representative, 
BREIF IN SUPPORT OF t,;JOTION FOR Sm'lt,;JARY cTUDG1,;JENT RE: 
SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES' BREACH OF CONTRl\CT CAUSE OF ACTlON -
personally observed "processed waste" being discharged from the building 
occupied by Printcraft. See Affidavit of Doyle Beck, para. 3, dated March 10, 
2008. 
16. On December 13, 2006, Sunnyside Utilities' attorney demanded that Printcraft 
cease all discharges of water softener brine. See Deposition of Travis Waters, 
pg. 199, In. 5 through pg. 201, In. 5 and Exhibit 18. 
17. Despite the warnings and demands, Printcraft continued discharging ink, water 
softener brine, and other "processed wastes" into the sewer system. See 
Deposition of Travis Waters, pg. 200, In. 21 through pg. 201, In. 5. These facts 
have been established as a matter of law by this court. See Memorandum 
Decision and Order dated August 31,2007. 
18. On December 15, 2006, Sunnyside Utilities severed the sewer connection to the 
building occupied by Printcraft. See First Amended Complaint, para. 53. 
19. Sunnyside Utilities incurred damages in the amount of $2,648.64 in order to 
disconnect the building occupied by Printcraft from Sunnyside Utilities sewer 
system. See Affidavit of Doyle Beck, para. 5 and 6, dated March 10, 2008. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
This Court's standard in considering Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment was addressed in G & M Farms v. Funck Irr. Co., 119 Id. 514, 808 P.2d 851 
(1991): 
It is well established that "[A] motion for summary judgment shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
BREI F IN SUPPORT OF tJjOTION FOR SUMi''lARY JUDGtclENT RE: 
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any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law." IRCP 56(c); Olson v. Freeman, 117 Idaho 706,791 P.2d 
1285 (1990); Rawson v. United Steelworkers of Am., 111 Idaho 630,726 
P.2d 742 (1986); Boise Car & Truck v. Waco, 108 Idaho 780,702 P.2d 818 
(1985); Schaefer v. Elswood Trailer Sales, 95 Idaho 654,516 P.2d 1168 
(1973). Upon a motion for summary judgment, all controverted facts are 
liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party. Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 
113 Idaho 37,740 P.2d 1022 (1987); Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466,716 
P.2d 1238 (1986); Kline v. Clinton, 103 Idaho 116, 645 P.2d 350 (1982). 
Likewise, all reasonable inferences which can be made from the record 
shall be made in favor of the party resisting the motion. Tusch Enters. v. 
Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022 (1987); Doe V. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 
466,716 P.2d 1238 (1986); Meridian Bowling Lanes, Inc. v. Meridian 
Athlete Ass'n, Inc., 105 Idaho 509,670 P.2d 1294 (1983); Anderson v. 
Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 651 P.2d 923 (1982); Kline v. Clinton, 103 Idaho 
116,645 P.2d 350 (1982). The burden at all times is upon the moving party 
to prove the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Petricevich v. 
Salmon River Canal Company, 92 Idaho 865, 452 P.2d 362 (1969). 
However, the plaintiff's case must be anchored in something more than 
speculation and a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a 
genuine issue. kL See also Nelson v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409,797 P.2d 117 
(1990). If the record contains conflicting inferences or reasonable minds 
might reach different conclusions, a summary judgment must be denied. 
Kline v. Clinton, 103 Idaho 116, 645 P.2d 350 (1982); Farmer's Ins. Co. of 
Idaho v. Brown, 97 Idaho 380, 544 P.2d 1150 (1976). All doubts are to be 
resolved against the moving party, and the motion must be denied if the 
evidence is such that conflicting inferences may be drawn therefrom, and if 
reasonable people might reach different conclusions. Doe v. Durtschi, 110 
Idaho 466,716 P.2d 1238 (1986); Ashby v. Hubbard, 100 Idaho 67,593 
P.2d 402 (1979). 
119 Id. at 516-7. If any genuine issue of material fact remains, after all reasonable 
inferences have been made in favor of the non-moving party, the Motion for Summary 
Judgment must be denied. 
Under Rule 56(a), the moving party has the initial burden of showing that it is 
entitled to judgment. In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 US 317,106 S. Ct. 2458 (1986) the 
Supreme Court held that a party moving for Summary Judgment, and not bearing the 
BREIF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR Sm1MARY cTIJOGI'1ENT RE: 
SIJNNYSIOE UTILITIES' BREACH OF CONTRJI,CT CA(]SE OF ACTION - 5 
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burden of proof at trial, need not negate the opposing party's case. Rather, the moving 
party could discharge its initial burden by demonstrating the absence of an essential 
element of the case of the opponent, who bears the burden of proof at trial. The 
Supreme Court in Celotex, supra, stated: 
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary 
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who 
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 
essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof 
at trial. In such a situation, there can be 'no genuine issue as to any material fact', 
since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-
moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving 
party is 'entitled to a judgment as a matter of law' because the non-moving party 
has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with 
respect to which she has the burden of proof. 
477 US at 321, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. "The language and reasoning of Celotex has been 
adopted by the Appellate Courts of Idaho." Dunnick v. Elder, 126 Id. 308, 312, 882 P.2d 
475 (Ct.App. 1994). 
ARGUMENT 
I. EXISTENCE OF A CONTRACT 
The parties entered into a binding agreement on September 26, 2006. "Formation 
of a valid contract requires that there be a meeting of the minds as evidenced by a 
manifestation of mutual intent to contract." Heritage Excavation, Inc. v. Briscoe, 141 Idaho 
40,43, 105 P.3d 700 (Ida. App. 2005). "This manifestation takes the form of an offer and 
acceptance." Id. 
On September 20,2006, through its attorney, Sunnyside Utilities offered to accept 
Printcraft's human waste into Sunnyside Utilities' sewer system, only if Printcraft agreed 
BREIF SUPPORT OF [VlOTION FOR SUMIVlARY JUDGMENT 
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not to discharge any "process wastewater" into Sunnyside Utilities sewer system. See 
Letter of Mark Fuller, dated September 20, 2006, attached to Printcraft's Response to 
Request for Admission NO.6. The letter specifically advised Printcraft that "the sewer 
system is only designed to accommodate human waste and is not designed to handle 
'processed waste.'" Id. The letter also states that "Printcraft Press must cease any flows 
of process water into the system." Id. Finally, the letter states: "These issues are not 
negotiable." Id. (Emphasis Added). 
On September 26, 2006, through its attorney, Printcraft unconditionally accepted 
Sunnyside Utilities' offer. Specifically, Printcraft "agreed to make arrangements to collect 
and dispose of what you [Sunnyside Utilities in Fuller's September 20, 2006 letter] classify 
as 'processed waste. '" See Letter of Lane Erickson, dated September 26, 2006, attached 
to Printcraft's Response to Request for Admission NO.7. 
In this case there is a clear manifestation in the form of an offer and acceptance. 
There is no material issue of fact that a contract between the parties existed after 
September 26, 2006. 
II. INTERPRETATION OF THE CONTRACT 
The contract is unambiguous and only subject to one interpretation: Printcraft was 
only entitled to discharge human waste into the sewer system and any discharge of 
"processed waste" violated the terms of the contract. 
"Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law; and if the contract is not 
ambiguous its meaning is also a question of law." Shacocass Inc. v. Arrington Canst. Co., 
1161daho 460,462,776 P.2d 469 (lda.App. 1989). The Idaho Supreme Court has set 
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forth the following rules for construction of a contract: 
When the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, its interpretation and 
legal effect are questions of law. An unambiguous contract will be given its plain 
meaning. The purpose of interpreting a contract is to determine the intent of the 
contracting parties at the time the contract was entered. In determining the intent 
of the parties, this Court must view the contract as a whole. If a contract is found 
ambiguous, its interpretation is a question of fact. Whether a contract is ambiguous 
is a question of law. A contract is ambiguous if it is reasonably subject to conflicting 
interpretations. 
Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLC, 141 Idaho 185, 190, 108 P.3d 332 (2005). 
The September 20, 2006 letter, containing the terms of the contract, is not reasonably 
subject to conflicting interpretations. The letter clearly states: "the sewer system is only 
designed to accommodate human waste and is not designed to handle 'processed 
waste.'" See Letter of Mark Fuller, dated September 20, 2006, Attached to Plaintiff's 
Responses to Requests for Admission, No. 6.The letter also indentifies any "chemicals" 
and "large amounts of water" specifically as substances Sunnyside Utilities considered to 
be "processed wastes." Id. Reading the letter as a whole it is clear that only human waste 
would be allowed to be discharged by Printcraft under the terms of the letter. Id. 
Furthermore, the letter specifically includes the statement that "[t]hese issues are not 
negotiable." Id. 
Finally, in Printcraft's acceptance letter, Printcraft's attorney acknowledges that he 
was been unable to find a definition of "processed waste" in IDAPA, so instead Printcraft 
agreed to abide by the definition of "processed waste" contained in the September 20, 
2006 letter. See Letter of Lane Erickson, dated September 26, 2006, attached to 
Printcraft's Responses to Request for Admission NO.7. Regardless of any other possible 
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definition of "processed waste," it is clear that the mutual intent of the parties was to follow 
the definition of "processed waste" contained in the September 20, 2006 letter. Id. 
The agreement between the parties was not ambiguous because it is only subject 
to one reasonable interpretation. Printcraft was only entitled to discharge human waste 
into the sewer system and was not entitled to discharge any "processed wastes". 
III. BREACH OF THE CONTRACT 
Because Printcraft was only entitled to discharge human waste into the sewer 
system, and was specifically prohibited from discharging "processed waste" under the 
agreement, the discharge of any quantity of "processed waste" constituted a breach of 
the agreement. "A breach of contract may occur through affirmative noncompliance with 
the terms of the contract (i.e. 'misfeasance'), as well as by a failure to perform at all (i.e. 
'nonfeasance')." Wickstrom v. North Idaho College, 111 Idaho 450,452,725 P.2d 155 
(1986). 
The Court has already determined that "Printcraft discharged water softener brine, 
hazardous wastes, processed water and excessive flows of wastewater into the system in 
violation of IDAPA 58.01.03.004.03." See Memorandum Decision and Order, pg. 5, 
entered August 31, 2007. There is no dispute that Printcraft continued discharging water 
softener brine into the sewer system until the disconnection occurred. See Deposition of 
Travis Waters, pg. 200, In. 21 through pg. 201, In. 5. Mr. Waters testified that Printcraft 
did not divert air compressor water out of the sewer system. See Deposition of Travis 
Waters, pg. 190-191. Printcraft's general manager testified that on December 15th , 2006, 
Printcraft was discharging diluted chemicals from Printcraft's prepress area, and 
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discharges from Printcraft's flexo department. See Deposition of Terry Luzier, pg. 39, In. 
25 through pg. 40, In. 22. Luzier also testified that ink being washed off of trays continued 
to be discharged into Sunnyside Utilities' sewer system until December 15th , 2006. See 
Luzier Deposition, pg. 69, In. 25 through pg. pg. 71, In. 6. Luzier testified that in response 
to the agreement reached in September of 2006, Printcraft took steps to minimize the 
amount of ink flowing into the system, however, the ink continued to be washed down the 
sink and into the system on a daily basis until the disconnection. See Luzier Depostion, 
pg. 74, In. 16-24. Mr. Waters acknowledged that in October, Kirk Woolf inspected the 
property and informed Printcraft that the ink "sink is going to be a concern." See Travis 
Waters Deposition, pg. 192, In. 23-24. Mr. Waters also acknowledged that despite the 
warnings from Mr. Woolf about the sink and the necessity to comply with the agreement "I 
kind of blew it off. I didn't take it too serious." See Travis Waters Deposition, pg. 193, In. 
4-6. 
On December 10, 2006, Doyle Beck observed significant quantities of "processed 
waste" being discharged from the building occupied by Printcraft. See Affidavit of Doyle 
Beck, para. 3, dated March 10, 2008. Mr. Beck removed the clean out cover in front of the 
Printcraft Press building and observed that significant amounts of "processed waste" were 
flowing through the sewer system. Id. Para. 4. Mr. Beck then checked the upstream 
manhole and discovered that no "processed waste" was flowing through the sewer 
system at that location. Id. 5. Mr. Waters acknowledged that on December 10th , 2006 it 
was possible that the water softener system ran and discharged its brine into the system. 
See Deposition of Travis Waters, pg. 195, In. 10 through pg. 195, In. 21. Mr. Waters 
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acknowledged that on December 13, 2006 Printcraft received a letter which specifically 
identified water softener brine as expressly prohibited by Idaho Code, yet the water 
softener brine continued to be discharged into the system until the disconnection on 
December 15, 2006. See Deposition of Travis Waters, pg. 199, In. 5 through pg. 201, In. 
5 and Exhibit 18 ("0. [Mark Fuller] Was there any change made to the discharge of water 
softener brine into the Sunnyside system in response to this letter? A. [Travis Waters] No. 
Q. You continued to discharge into the system. A. Yes."). 
There is no issue of material fact which would prevent Summary Judgment. 
Printcraft clearly violated the terms of the September 20, 2006 letter by discharging water 
softener brine, ink, and other chemicals into the system up until the day of disconnection. 
The breaches of the agreement were confirmed by Printcraft's President, Travis Waters; 
Printcraft's General Manager, Terry Luzier; and an officer of Sunnyside Utilities', Doyle 
Beck. Furthermore, despite a specific demand for compliance on December 13, 2006, 
Printcraft continued to refuse to comply and cease discharging "processed waste" into the 
system. Sunnyside Utilities is entitled to Summary Judgment on its cause of action for 
Breach of Contract. 
IV. DAMAGES 
Sunnyside Utilities has suffered damages in the amount of $2,648.64 as a result of 
Printcraft's breach of the contract, because Sunnyside Utilities was forced to sever the 
sewer connection to the building occupied by Printcraft on December 15th , 2006. 
On December 15th , 2006, Sunnyside Utilities severed the sewer connection to the 
building Printcraft occupied. See Amended Complaint, para. 53. The Court in this case 
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previously decided: 
Printcraft has not offered any evidence rebutting Sunnyside Utilities' evidence that 
Printcraft violated IDAPA 58.01.03.004.03 by discharging water softener brine, 
hazardous wastes, processed water and excessive flows of wastewater into the 
system. Accordingly, the Court finds that there is no issue of material fact that 
Printcraft discharged substances into the sewer system in violation of state law. 
Sunnyside Utilities was justified in severing Printcraft's sewer connection in 
light of this illegality. 
See Memorandum Decision and Order, pg. 9, entered August 31,2007. (Emphasis 
Added). Because Sunnyside Utilities was justified in severing Printcraft's sewer 
connection as a result of Printcraft's illegal discharges, and Printcraft's breaches of the 
contract, Sunnyside Utilities is entitled to recover the costs it incurred in severing the 
sewer connection. 
Sunnyside Utilities incurred costs in the amount of $1 ,228.64 for a backhoe and 
operator to perform the disconnection. See Affidavit of Doyle Beck, para. 6, dated March 
10,2008. Sunnyside Utilities also incurred costs in the amount of $1 ,420.00 for 
inspection and supervision of the disconnection. Id. Para. 7. As a result Sunnyside 
Utilities is entitled to damages in the amount of $2,648.64 which were incurred as a 
direct and proximate result of Printcraft's breach of the contract. 
CONCLUSION 
On September 20,2006 Sunnyside Utilities offered to provide Printcraft with sewer 
services upon very specific terms and conditions. One of those conditions was that 
Sunnyside Utilities would only accept human waste and would not accept any "processed 
waste" from Printcraft. On September 25, 2006, Printcraft agreed to the terms of the 
September 20, 2006 letter, specifically agreeing to follow the definition of "processed 
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waste" set forth in Sunnyside Utilities' letter. During the months following, Printcraft 
continued discharging water softener brine, ink and other "processed wastes" in violation 
of the agreement and in violation of state law, despite warnings from Sunnyside Utilities 
and a specific demand that such discharges cease from Sunnyside Utilities' attorney. 
On December 15th , 2006, Sunnyside Utilities was forced to sever the sewer 
connection to the building occupied by Printcraft. In order to complete the severance of 
the sewer connection, Sunnyside Utilities incurred damages in the amount of $2,648.64. 
There are no issues of fact as to the terms of the agreement, that the agreement 
was breached, or the amount of Sunnyside Utilities' damages. As a result, Sunnyside 
Utilities is entitled to Summary Judgment on its cause of action for Breach of Contract 
and is entitled to damages in the amount of $2,648.64. 
i I \\'" DATED this ~day of March, 2008. 
-Daniel R. Beck 
Fuller & Carr 
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Case No. CV-06-7097 
AFFIDAVIT OF DOYLE BECK IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: SUNNYSIDE 
UTILITIES' BREACH OF CONTRACT 
CAUSE OF ACTION 
Doyle Beck, being first duly sworn upon his oath states and 
alleges as follows: 
AFFIDAVIT OF DOYLE BECK IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUlV1MARY JUDGMENT 
RE: SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES' BREACH OF CONTRP.CT CAuSE OF ACTION - 1 
1. Affiant is a resident of Bonneville County, State of 
I and executes this Affidavit upon his personal knowledge. 
2. Affiant is an officer of Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc. 
3. On December 10, 2006 Affiant personally observed 
si ficant quantities of processed waste being discharged from 
the building occupied by Printcraft. 
4. Affiant confirmed on December 10, 2006 that the 
processed wastes were coming from Printcraft's building by 
removing the clean out cover in front of Printcraft's building and 
watching the processed wastes flow down the sewer lines toward 
Sunnyside Utilities septic tanks. 
5. Affiant also confirmed on December 10, 2006 that the 
discharges were not coming from upstream in the sewer lines by 
checking the manhole upstream from Printcraft's building and 
determining that no processed wastes were flowing through the 
sewer lines upstream from Printcraft's building. 
6. On December 15, 2006 affiant rented a backhoe and hired 
an operator to perform the disconnection for a total cost of 
$1,228.64. 
7. On December 15, 2006 affiant and other members of 
Sunnyside Utilities supervised the disconnection and performed an 
inspection of the disconnection to verify that it had been 
properly disconnected for a total cost of $1,420.00. 
8. Further this Affiant sayeth naught. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DOYLE BECK IN SuPPORT OF MOTION FOR SuM~~RY JUDGMENT 
RE: SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES' BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSE OF ACTION - 2 
G::; 
~ 
DATED this Ie) day of March, 2008. 
11LuLL/ 
Doyle BE\4::k '" 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
'f-t.-..., 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I served a true and correct copy of the 
following described pleading or document on the attorneys listed 
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Case No. CV-06-7097 
AFFIDAVIT OF DANIEL BECK IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE:SUNNYSIDE 
UTILITIES' BREACH OF CONTRACT 
CAUSE OF ACTION 
Daniel Beck, being first duly sworn upon his oath states and 
alleges as follows: 
1. Affiant is a resident of Bonneville County, State of 
daho and executes this Affidavit upon his personal knowledge. 
AFFIDAVI OF DANIEL BECK IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
RE: SUNNYS DE UTILITIES' BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSE OF llDTION - 1. 
2. Affiant lS an attorney licensed in the State of Idaho 
and represents Sunnyside Park utilities, Inc., in t smatter. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit A are true and correct 
copies of Plaintiff's Responses to Requests for l\dmission No. 6 
(with Fuller letter dated September 20, 2006), No. 7 (with 
Erickson letter dated September 26, 2006), and No. 21. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit B are true and correct copies 
of excerpts of the Deposition of Travis Waters, pgs. 109-110, 190-
193, 195, 199-201 and Exhibit 18 (letter of Mark Fuller, dated 
December 13, 2006. 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit C are true and correct 
copies of excerpts of the Deposition of Terry Luzier, s. 39-40, 
69-71, and 74. 
6. Further this Affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this I ~*~ day of March, 2008. 
~1 8L. 
oanel Beck 
SUBSCRIBED AND S~'JORN to before me this day of JVIarch, 
AFFIDAVI OF DANIEL BECK IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMlvlARY JUDGt"lENT 
RE: SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES' BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSE ACT I Ol\i -
C:7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I served a true and correct copy of the 
foll described pleading or document on the attorneys listed 
belO\Y on this day of 
Document Served: 
Attorneys Served: 
Jeffrey D. Brunson, Esq. 
Michael D. Gaffney, Esq. 
BEARD ST. CLAIR 
105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, 10 83404 
~~ __ ~_~ ________________ , 2008: 
AFFIDAVIT OF DANIEL BECK IN 
SUPPORT OF J'vl0TION FOR SiJIvJMARY 
JUDGMENT RE: SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES' 
BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSE OF 
ACTION 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 




SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC. an Idaho 
cOIporation, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CY-06-7097 
PLAINTIFF PRINTCRAFT PRESS~ 
RESPONSES TO DEFENDANT'S 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
141 004 
COMES NOW the PlaintiffPRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC. an Idaho cOIporation (hereafter 
"Printcraft"), by and through its counsel of record, Lane V. Erickson, and pursuant to Idallo' S 
Rules of Civil Procedure hereby Responds to Defendant's First Set of Requests for Admission. 
To the extent that the definitions and instrnctions contained jn Defendant's First Set of 
Discovery to Plaintiffs contlict with, vary from, or add to the requirements of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs do hereby object to the same and state that their answers herein are 
made without regard to such definitions and instructions. 
PLAINTIFF PRINTCRAFT PRESS' RESPONSES TO 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
Page I 
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between Travis Waters as President of Plaintiff and Doyle Beck as representative of Defendant, 
Travis Waters again informed Mr. Beck that Defendant's inspectors were welcome to inspect the 
. ..... 
sewer service to Plaintiffs property whenever Defendant desired. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.4: Deny. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.5: Admit that during the inspection of the sewer 
. ~. . .. -.. ... . . - . 
service by Defendant's representative, Kirk Woolf, on or about October 5, 2006, Plaintiff's 
President, Travis Waters, again invited Defendant's :inspectors to visit and inspect Plaintiff's 
property and the sewer service connections whenever Defendant des:ired. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.5: Deny_ 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.6: Admit that Exhibit "A" attached hereto as a true 
and correct copy of the letter dated September 20, 2006, sent by Defendant's counsel to Plaintiff's 
counseL 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.6; Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO_ 7: Admit that attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a tme 
and correct copy of the letter dated September 26, 2006, sent by Plaintiff's counsel to Defendant's 
counseL 
RESPONSE TO REOUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.7: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.8: Admit that attached hereto as Exhibit «C" is a true 
and correct copy of the letter dated December II, 2006, sent by Defendant's counsel to Plaintiffs 
counsel, setting forth three options available to Printcraft Press to allow sanitary sewer service to 
continue. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO_ 8: Plaintiff admits that Exhibit "e" is 
a true and correct copy of the letter dated December 11, 2006, sent by Defendant's counsel to 
PLAINTIFF PRTNTCRAFT PRESS' RESPONSES TO 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
Page 3 
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 20: Admit that since December 18, 2006, Plaintiff has 
refused to pennit Defendant to perform any inspections on Plaintiff's business located at 3834 
.... ,~ . 
South Professional Way, Idaho Falls, Idaho_ 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 20: Admit 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO_ 11: Admit that prior to September 26,2006, Plaintiff 
. . ~ .. 
put cooling water, reverse osmosis water and water softener brine into the sanitary sewer service 
connected to Plaintiff's business premises. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 21: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 22: Admit that the sewer service connected to 
Plaintiff's business premises is designed only to accept of blackwater and blackwaste as defined by 
Article I of the Rules and Regulations attached as Exhibit '·B" to Plaintiffs Verified Complaint. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 22: Plaintiff was not involved in the 
construction of the sewer system in question and therefore does not have the requisite lmowledge to 
either admit or deny Request fOT Admission No. 22 and therefore denies the same. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 23: Admit that Printcraft Press discharged 
substances into Sunnyside's sewer system beyond what the sewer was intended to receive from 
the partiCUlar parcel that Printcraft Press is located upon. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 23: Plaintiff was not involved in the 
construction of the sewer system in question and therefore does not have the requisjte knowledge to 
either admit or deny Request for Admission No. 23 and therefore denies the same. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 24: Admit that Printcraft Press discharged an 
excessive volume of flow into Sunnyside's sewer system. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 24: Deny_ 
PLAlNTIFF PRINTeRAFT PRESS' RESPONSES TO 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTS FOR ADM1SSION 
Page 6 
Mark R. Fuller 
Steven E. Carr" 
Daniel R. Beck-Associate 
• Also Licensed in Utah 
VIA FACSIMILE: 232-6109 
Lane V. Erickson, Esq. 
FULLER & CARR 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
410 Memorial Drive. Suite 201 
P.O. Box 50935 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0935 
September 20,2006 
RACINE OLSEN NYE BUDGE & BAILEY 
201 East Center Street 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
RE: Sanitary Sewer Facility and Process Waste Disposal 
Your File No. 33712 





Our office represents Sunnyside Park Utilities, LLC, and we have been asked to respond to your letter of 
September 18, 2006. 
As stated in the September 6,2006 letter, the sewer system is only designed to accommodate human 
waste and is not designed to handle "processed waste." By putting its processed waste into the system, 
Printcraft Press causes a violation of IDAPA 58.01.03.004.04 which states: "Unless authorized by the 
Director, no person shaff provide for or connect additional black waste or wastewater sources to any 
system if the resulting flow or volume would exceed the design flow of the system." 
You are correct that Sunnyside is in discussions with District 7 Health regarding the existing sewer 
system. In large part, as a result of excessive flows from Printcraft Press, District 7 Health believes that 
Sunnyside Park Utilities has been exceeding the maximum permitted volume, and sanctions are being 
threatened. Sunnyside Park Utilities cannot allow the actions of Printcraft Press to cause Sunnyside Park 
Utilities to violate the law. Sunnyside Park Utilities is not equipped to neutralize chemicals injected by 
Printcraft Press, nor is the system capable of handling large amounts of water. Printcraft Press is 
violating Idaho Administrative Code 58.01.03.004.03 (system limitations). 58.01.03.004.04 (increased 
flows). and 58.01.03012.02 (system operation). See attached copies. 
Printcraft Press was advised when the water was shut off on two weekends to allow repair to the sewer 
system. After the shut off, Mr. Waters promised to cease using the wastewater for humidification, but he 
continued to do so. After the second shut off, Mr. Waters again promised that he would cease injecting 
excess wastewater causing Sunnyside's system limitation problem. The problem continues, in violation of 
Idaho law. 
Sunnyside Park Utilities will continue to accept sewer water, but will not accept process wastewater. 
Sunnyside Park Utilities will not partiCipate in violation of Idaho law. Therefore, Printcraft Press must 
cease any flows of process water into the system by 5:00 p.m. September 22,2006. If Printcraft does not 
cease injecting excess wastewater and process wastewater, absent a court order, Sunnyside Utilities will 
be forced to physically disconnect all flows from Printcraft Press, and will seek to recover a/l damages ,... .' (") 
Ut:......... . [","rHT t'J.. 
.}dil0! .'1 
September 20, 2006 
Page 2 
which result from Printcraft Press's actions. These issues are not negotiable. Our discussions with 
District 7 will not be complicated by the continued violations of Printcraft Press. 
A meeting to discuss these issues is advisable at the earliest convenient time so that we can resolve 
these serious issues. We have requested and Sunnyside is locating copies of all documents, contracts, 
agreements and the like having to do with the utility services that Sunnyside Park Utilities, LLC has been 
providing to Printcraft Press. 
Very truly yours, 
:;;li/;:1L 
Mark R. Fuller 
Attorney at Law 
~- '"""0 '} 
tit-.J 
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Re: The Sanitary Sewer Facility and Process Waste Disposal with Sunnyside Park 
Utilities, LLC 
Our File No. 33712 
Dear Mark: 
In following up to our meeting, Travis Waters has informed me that he had an additional 
conversation with Doyle Beck yesterday evening about 7:00 p.m. Travis agreed with Doyle that 
Printcraft Press will no longer be putting the RO water into the sewer system. Additionally, Travis 
agreed to make arrangements to collect and dispose of what you classify as "processed waste." 
It should be noted that in my review of the IDAP A regulations, I do not see any definition 
of''processed waste." However, in an effort to assist Doyle inbis negotiations with the DEQ, Travis 
has agreed to operate as outlined above. I would appreciate your keeping me informed as to Doyle's 
negotiations with the DEQ. Should you have any questions or concerns, do not hesitate to contact 
me. 
LVElltz 
r"" '-. ,~ 
U I .... :,( 
Transcript of the Testimony of: 
Travis Waters 
Date: Aprll 25, 2007 
Volume: I 
Case: PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC. v. SUNNYSIDE 
UTILITIES, INC. 
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1 was provided by you. Is this a copy of the canceled 
2 check that you were referring to? 
3 A. No. 
4 Q. Do you know what this is? 
5 A. I don't. It looks like a statement out 
6 oTQuickbooks or something. 
7 MR. ERICKSON: For the record, Mark, I think 
8 we actually provided you a copy of the check along 
9 with these documents is my recollection. I'm 
10 certainly willing to go back and take a look again at 
11 what we produced. My recollection was seeing it and 
12 providing it in connection with these documents. 
13 MR. FULLER: We'll check again. I think 
14 this is the only one we've been able to locate. It 
15 actually has what I think is the check number written 
16 up here in the comer. 
17 MR. ERICKSON: What you'll find unusual is 
18 it wasn't printed by a computer. It says Sunnyside 
19 Utilities, Incorporated in handwriting. That's 
20 probably what you'll need to look for. I'll go back 
21 and double-check on that as well. 
22 Q. BY MR. FULLER: All I'm trying to 
23 establish is that Printcraft Press itself paid 
24 nothing for the cost of connection; isn't that 
25 correct? 
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1 A. Correct. I have a copy of that check. 
2 I'm sure I could find it if you want. 
3 Q. If you wouldn't mind, that would be 
4 great. 
5 MR. ERICKSON: I'll double-check, too, Mark. 
6 I kept a complete copy of everything that I sent to 
7 you. 
8 MR. FULLER: Let's stop for just a minute. 
9 (A break was taken from 12:02 p.m. to 
10 12:03 p.m.) 
11 Q. BY MR. FULLER: We've gone off the 
12 record for just a minute, Mr. Waters. You provided 
13 me with a copy of check number 5896, which is now 
14 page 3 of Exhibit *-009; is that correct? 
1 5 A. Correct. 
16 MR. FULLER: By stipulation of counsel, 
1 7 we've agreed to just attach that as an additional 
18 page of Exhibit *-009; is that correct, Counsel? 
19 MR. ERICKSON: That is correct. 
20 Q. BY MR. FULLER: Just to finalize this, 
21 am I correct that the connection fees were paid by 
22 CTR Development, LLC, and that Printcraft Press paid 
23 no portion of the connection fee? 
24 A. That's correct. 
25 Q. Why did CTR Development pay the fee? 
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1 A. They were the owner ofthe building. 
2 Q. Did CTR Development know what kind of 
3 sewer service Printcraft Press would need when it 
4 subleased the property to Printcraft? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. Can you explain for me what was 
7 discussed between Printcraft and CTR Development 
8 about the needs of Print craft at the time that 
9 sublease was agreed to? 
lOA. That they'd need four bathrooms, a drain 
11 for the Roland 305, a water heater, a break room with 
12 a sink in it, and a wash-up area for the flexo area. 
13 Q. Was there any discussion about the kind 
1 4 of chemicals that would be discharged by Printcraft 
15 with its processed waste? 
1 6 A. There was no need for a discussion, 
1 7 because there was nothing of any alarm. 
18 Q. It wasn't discussed? 
1 9 A. Huh-uh. 
20 Q. Who would be the participants in this 
21 conversation on behalf of Printcraft? 
22 A. Travis Waters. 
23 Q. Who would be the participant in that 
24 conversation on behalf of CTR Development? 
25 A. Lawry Wilde. 
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1 Q. Do you recall a specific conversation 
2 regarding the needs? 
3 A. No. There was hours and hours and hours 
4 of conversations and details concerning the building. 
5 Q. Did CTR Development make any promises to 
6 Printcraft regarding the type of sewer services that 
7 would be available? 
8 A. No. There was an assumption that there 
9 was sewer and water. 
10 Q. On what was that assumption based? 
11 A. That that subdivision had sewer and 
12 water. 
13 Q. Anything else? 
14 A. No. 
15 Q. Was there any investigation made by 
1 6 Printcraft Press regarding the services provided by 
1 7 Sunnyside Park Utilities before construction of the 
18 building began? 
19 A. No. 
20 Q. Was there any investigation made by 
2 1 Printcraft Press regarding the services provided by 
22 Sunnyside Park Utilities before Printcraft began 
2 3 occupancy? 
24 A. No. 
25 Q. Did Sunnyside promise anything to 
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1 Printcraft before Printcraft began occupancy? 
2 A. No. 
3 Q. Did Sunnyside promise anything to CTR? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. What? 
6 A. Sewer and water service. 
7 Q. To whom were those promises made at CTR 
8 Development? 
9 A. I'd say Travis Waters and Lawry Wilde. 
10 Q. By whom were those promises made by 
11 Sunnyside? 
12 A. I would say it's through a document 
13 that's tiled at Bonneville County that says that 
14 Sunnyside will provide sewer and water. 
15 Q. Which document are you referring to? 
16 A. I think it's the development agreement, 
17 the plat has that on there. I think there's multiple 
18 documents, actually, that have the commitment between 
19 Sunnyside Utilities, Sunnyside Industrial Park and 
20 Bonneville County and District Seven. 
21 Q. My question was, what promises were made 
22 by Sunnyside Utilities to CTR. You had indicated 
23 that CTR was promised sewer and water and that those 
24 promises were made to Travis and Lawry. 
25 My next question was, who at Sunnyside 
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1 made those promises? Can you identify any verbal 
2 statements, or are you relying only upon the written 
3 documents you've referred to? 
4 A. I don't recall any verbal. 
5 Q. We're just talking about the written 
6 docwnents? 
7 A. Correct. 
8 Q. Was there any direct correspondence, 
9 letters, between Sunnyside Utilities and CTR 
10 promising specific services? 
11 A. I don't know, not that I know of. 
12 Q. Okay. So we're talking about the 
13 development agreement, the plat. What other 
14 documents did CTR rely upon regarding sewer and water 
15 services? 
16 A. The CCNRs, the development agreement, 
17 the plat, anything that we would have gotten at 
18 closing. 
19 Q. Did Sunnyside participate in preparing 
20 any of those closing documents? 
21 A. Yeah. It's got your name on a lot of 
22 those documents. 
23 Q. This is the documents by which the 
24 property was acquired from Miskin, right? 




















































Q. Those are the closing documents you're 
referring to? 
A. Right. And you prepared some of those 
documents and then filed them with the county. Then 
the title company requested a copy of those filed 
docwnents and provided them to us. 
Q. Did you keep a copy of your closing 
documents, your closing file? 
A. Yes. I'm sure I've got that. 
Q. Do you have those? 
A. No. 
Q. Would you have those available to bring 
back with you after lunch? 
A. No. 
Q. They are available to produce to your 
attorney? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who was the closing title office? 
A. I don't recall. 
MR. FULLER: I think that's a good place for 
us to stop at lunch. Why don't we start back up 
again at 1: 15. 
(A break was taken from 12:11 p.m. to 
1 :33 p.m.) 
Q. BY MR. FULLER: We're back on the record 
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after a lunch break. You understand, Mr. Waters, 
that you're still under oath? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I want to ask you for just a minute 
about a document we had already discussed this 
morning. I'm handing you what's been marked 
Exhibit *-007. Is this the document that you 
actually dropped off to Mr. Beck? You indicated 
there was also a fourth page to it? 
A. I dropped off full size blueprints in a 
roll, not an 8 112-by-II representation of that. 
Q. How large would they have been? 
A. 24-by-36. 
Q. This size? 
A. I dropped those off as well. 
Q. You're saying they were bigger than 
this? 
A. Yeah. There should have been a set that 
was bigger than that that had the site plan with it 
from Mountain River Engineering and a full, just like 
I gave to the county that would reside on the 
premises during construction. 
Q. Can you tum to the second page of 
Exhibit *-007 for me? There's some handwriting on 
the lower left; is that your handwriting? 
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1 s ink and letting that half a pint of food grade ink 1 (Exhibit *-0\6 marked.) 
2 go down the drain, we deposit it in the 55 gallon 2 Q. BY MR. FULLER: Did you have any 
3 dntm and then wash the residue out in the sink. 3 communication with Mr. Beck or any other 
4 Q. It was never your intention to cease 4 representative of Sunnyside Park Utilities between 
5 washing the trays directly in the sink and allowing 5 September of2006 and December of2006--
6 that to drain into the sewage system? 6 A. i believe--
7 A. Repeat that. 7 Q. -- with regard to these issues? 
8 (The record was read.) 8 A. Somewhere in there is when Kirk Wolf and 
9 THE WITNESS: No. 9 I met. 
10 Q. BY MR. FULLER: You continued to do so 10 Q. In October, I think you had a meeting 
11 until the system was disconnected? 11 with Mr. Wolf. Describe for me how that meeting 
12 A. Yes. 12 went. 
13 Q. What actual changes did you make after 13 A. I don't remember how the contact was 
14 the meeting and the letter in September of 2006? 14 made, ifit was you contacting Lane saying that 
15 A. I diverted the reverse osmosis water, 15 Sunnyside Utilities wanted to do an inspection. I 
16 collected the water from the prepress area. I think 16 don't recall how that was. Anyway, Kirk Wolf came to 
17 that's pretty much it. 17 the facility. We did a walk-through. I answered any 
18 Q. Did you make any change to the water 18 questions. I explained what we did. I felt like he 
19 softener? 19 was not quite up to speed with some of the things 
20 A. No. 20 that Doyle had talked about, so we discussed some 
21 Q. At what point did you divert the air 21 things at length to bring him up to where he could 
22 compressor water out of the sewage system? 22 return and report to Doyle. 
23 A. It's still in the sewage system. 23 He said, that sink is going to be a 
24 Q. Did you ever divert that away from the 24 concern. I showed him everything else, showed him 
25 system until it was disconnected? 25 how we plumbed it, showed him where it came outside. 
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1 A. No. There again, [ felt Mr. Beck wa<; 1 As he was leaving, he kind of gave me a -- I don't 
2 concerned about volume, and that's not a lot of 2 know. I should have taken it more serious. It was 
3 volume, a few gal/ons a week. 3 more of a warning about Doyle Beck and how I probably 
4 Q. It was not your understanding that water 4 didn't want to cross him. I got the impression it 
5 softener brine was a concern to Sunnyside Utilities? 5 was kind of a potentate mentality, so I kind of blew 
6 A. Well, it's in the letters, but I felt 6 it off. I didn't take it too serious. 
7 like he was concerned about volume, not quality. 7 Q. You considered it a warning by Mr. Wolf? 
8 Q. You made no change with regard to the 8 A. A little bit, that I didn't know who I 
9 water softener brine? 9 was messing with, make sure he's appeased. 
10 A. No. [showed that to Mr. Wolf during 10 Q. Anything else? 
11 the inspection. 11 A. I think that's it. 
12 Q. Can I get you to look at Exhibit *-013, 12 Q. Did you acknowledge that Sunnyside had a 
13 the second page? The next to the last full 13 right to come in and inspect the premises to verifY 
14 paragraph, the last sentence states, we expect the 14 that you had made the changes that you had stated? 
15 areas where you have been injecting processed waste 15 A. I wouldn't say they had a right. I 
16 will be pennanently altered to prohibit the 16 acknowledged that I'm trying to do what they asked me 
17 accidental disposal of your employees of any 17 to do and have been very open and friendly to finding 
18 processed waste into our sewer facility. What steps 18 a solution all along. I just felt like I told them I 
19 did you take to comply with that directive? 19 would do it, and I wanted to show them I had done it. 
20 A. They were pennanently -- those 20 Q. They had previously been grant ed an 
21 corrections that I made were pennanent. They were 21 inspection back in September when we had the meeting 
22 hard plumbed, as you can see by your pictures. 22 in that building, we walked through the premises, and 
23 Q. Was there any accidental disposal, to 23 you showed us the set-ups at that time; do you recall 
24 your knowledge, after you made those changes? 24 that inspection? 
25 A. No. 25 A. Yeah. I remember walking through the 
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building so that everybody knew what we were talking 
about. 
Q. Do you recall extending an invitation to 
return for further inspections if they wished? 
A. I'm sure that I wouldn't have said you 
can't call me and come back and look at it. Why 
would I say that? 
Q. Do you recall saying words to the 
affect, we've got nothing to hide, you're welcome any 
time? 
A. Sure. 
Q. Do you recall saying the same things to 
Mr. Wolfwhen he came through with that inspection on 
October 30th? 
A. I think all along I've let it be known, 
contact me, ['II show you what we're doing, I have 
nothing to hide. 
Q. I'm now handing you what's been marked 
as Exhibit *-016. Can you indicate for me what led 
to -- I'd like to hear your understanding of what 
happened that preceded the issuance of this letter 
during the early portions of December 2006. Let me 
ask it this way: Why did you bury the water meter? 




























Q. Were you in the building and observed 
Mr. Beck attempting to uncover the water meter to 
veritY the quantity of water that flowed from the 
building? 
A. On December 10th? 
Q. Uh-huh. 
A. IfI'm not there, how could [ have done 
that? 
Q. You were not present that day at all? 
A. Correct. He's made reference to my 
personal vehicle being there, but I'm not sure -- he 
doesn't get specific on what my personal vehicle is, 
but I think he's mistaken. 
Q. Do you have records that would indicate 
what was going on on December 10th in that building? 
A. I could probably piece some things 
together. ['m sure we had some mechanics working on 
that press on that day. 
Q. Would that cause a flow of water to come 
from the building? 
A. Sure. Mechanics use break rooms and 
toilets just like anyone else. 
Q. It wouldn't be anything other than human 
waste, toilet water? Q. Why was it buried? 
~~-~~.-~-~ ..... -... -.~+.- .. ~~~ .~ ......... -. 
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1 A. Because my kids were doing some 
2 landscaping in the front and had -- didn't clear the 
3 dirt away from the lid to the water meter. It had 
4 two or three or four inches of dirt. They were 
5 bringing that area up to grade. It wasn't an 
6 intentional act. My kids are not very vindictive. 
7 Q. How old are you children that were doing 
8 this landscaping? 
9 A. 14 and 12. 
1 0 Q. Were you present at the Printcraft Press 
11 facility on the afternoon of December lOth, 2006? 
12 A. No. 
13 Q. Do you know what operations were going 
14 on on December lOth, 2006 in the Printcraft Press 
15 building that would have caused water to flow into 
16 the Sunnyside sewer system? 
1 7 A. There may have been somebody using the 
18 toilet. There may have been somebody washing their 
1 9 hands. There may have been somebody doing dishes. 
2 0 There may have been -- the water softener may have 
21 ran. There's any number of things. 
22 Q. Wac; the reverse osmosis system still 
2 3 connected to the sewer system on December 10th of 
24 2006? 
25 A. No, it was not. Mr. Wolf saw that prior 
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1 A. They could have been washing dishes, 
2 getting a drink, any number ofthings. 
3 Q. You can see on the second page ofthis 
4 document it contains several options in order to 
5 resolve the continuing dispute between Printcraft 
6 Press and Sunnyside Utilities. Can you explain for 
7 me why neither of these first two options were 
8 acceptable to Printcraft? 
9 A. Number one, I had a pretty good feel of 
10 what my flows were and didn't feel like I needed to 
11 spend $10,000 to confirm what I already knew because 
12 Mr. Beck didn't believe me. That's a lot of money. 
13 Number two, at this point I felt like 
14 Sunnyside Utilities was being unrealistic. They were 
15 looking for an excuse. They were not wanting to work 
1 6 with me anymore. They weren't satisfied with the 
1 7 changes that I had made, and I felt this was just 
18 another way for them to get more aggressive. I 
19 just -- I didn't see this being a solution to give 
20 them permission to send me a $1,000 bill whenever 
21 they felt like it, after some of the experiences I 
22 had, that didn't make very good sense. 
23 Q. What was your response to this letter? 
24 A. Do you want me to answer number three? 
25 Q. If you'd like. The third really isn't 
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an option, it's a disconnect. What was your response 1 
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that plastic tub next to the canister and that to get 
with regard to the third option? 2 water softener brine into the sewer, you'd have to 
A. I definitely didn't want that to happen. 3 tip that over into a drain or bucket it out. So I 
I didn't want to take that option. 4 thought -- part of it was I found it -- I could see 
Q. What did you do to respond to this 5 that's a high concentration of salt, maybe that's a 
letter? 6 concem. 
A. If! remember right, I called Lane, and 7 I later found out that it's actually 
we talked about it, and I think he responded with a 8 water softener brine cycling through and coming out 
of that tube. There was some ignorance on my part 
not really understanding what was considered water 


















(Exhibit *-017 marked.) 10 
Q. BY MR. FULLER: This is a letter dated 11 
December 12, 2006 from Mr. Erickson. I'm just 12 brine was and then not comprehending why the State of 
Idaho would disallow water softener brine, because looking at the first paragraph, the last sentence. 13 
My clients state that they have conformed in every 14 it's in every residential house going into septic 
way with my letter dated September 26, 2006, wherein 15 tanks, I didn't even think that was what they were 
talking about. we agreed that Printcraft Press would no longer put 16 
the RO water in the sewer system and that Travis 1 7 Q. What did you do with regard to water 
softener brine after receipt of this letter? Waters would make arrangements to collect and dispose 18 
of what you classifY as processed water. 19 A. Started researching what this was all 
about. Is that an accurate statement by your 20 
attorney? 21 Q. Was there any change made to the 
discharge of water softener brine into the Sunnyside 
system in response to this letter? 
A. Yeah, I think it's accurate. I think 22 
the whole processed waste, processed water thing has 23 
been bantered back and forth. I think we're 2 4 A. No. 
switching back to water. It's been waste, and water. 25 Q. You continued to discharge into the 
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1 We felt like we were complying, and we brought 
2 Mr. Wolf in and didn't hear back from Mr. Beck or 
3 Wolf, so we assumed everything was fine. 
4 (Exhibit *-018 marked.) 
5 Q. BY MR. FULLER: I'm handing you what's 
6 been marked as Exhibit *-018. 111is, again, discusses 
7 the flow of water coming from the Printcraft Press 
8 and states in the second paragraph -- do you recall 
9 seeing this letter? 
lOA. Yes. 
11 Q. In the second paragraph it states, 
12 because of the nature of the flow, my client believes 
13 the most likely source is the water softener system 
14 installed by Printcraft Press. The discharge of 
1 5 water softener brine into the central system operated 
16 by my client is expressly prohibited by the Idaho 
1 7 Administrative Code, IDAPA 58.01.03.004.03. 
1 8 Is this the first time you became aware 
1 9 that depositing water softener brine in the central 
20 system operated by Sunnyside was prohibited by the 
21 Idaho Administrative Code? 
22 A. I wouldn't even say that I realized it 
23 at this point. I was confused on what water softener 
24 brine was. My understanding prior to this that water 
25 softener brine was the water and salt mixture inside 
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1 system? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Until the day the system was 
4 disconnected? 
5 A. That's correct, out of ignorance. 
6 Q. At this point, by the time you received 
7 this letter, you weren't ignorant? 
8 A. What I considered or what I thought was 
9 water softener brine was the stuff in with the salt, 
10 not the water coming out of the tube. 
11 Q. Did you consult with any professionals, 
12 any water softener companies? 
1 3 A. Yes, I did. 
14 Q. Who did you consult with? 
15 A. Culligan Water. 
16 Q. Was the result ofthat inquiry that 
1 7 report we've already reviewed? 
18 A. Yeah. And they pointed me to some 
1 9 research that I did on the intemet. 
20 Q. What steps did you take after the septic 
21 system was disconnected to contact the media? 
2 2 A. The media found Printcraft. I don't 
23 recall what the steps were. We had mUltiple 
24 organizations coming in, news media coming in, I met 
25 with Paul Menser for an interview. I declined to 
I 
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FULLER-&-CARR-
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201 
P.O. Box 50935 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0935 
December 13, 2006 
RACINE OLSEN NYE BUDGE & BAILEY 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello,lD 83204-1391 
Facsimile Number: 232-6109 
RE: My Client: Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc. 
Your Client Travis Waters dba Printcraft Press 







This responds to your letter of December 12, 2006. For your information, the Notice Cif Intent to Re-
impose Sanitary Restrictions issued by District Seven Health Department has no bearing or effect upon 
Printcraft Press. My client rejects the assertion of Printcraft Press that "there was no RO wateror process 
water being used or coming from the Printcraft Press building" on the afternoon of Sunday, December 10, 
2006. My client observed the flow personally by removing the cleanout cover in front of the Printcraft 
Press building. Anticipating that your clients would deny that the flow was coming from their building, he 
next examined the downstream manhole and verified that the same flow was passing that location. He 
then removed the upstream manhole cover and found that no flow whatsoever was passing that location. 
Your client's assertion that no water was flowing from their location that day is simply wrong. 
Because of the nature of the flow, my client believes the most likely source is the water softener system 
installed by Printcraft Press. The discharge of water softener brine into the central system operated by my 
client is expressly prohibited by the Idaho Administrative Code, IDAPA 58.01.03.004.03-System 
Limitations. 
Cooling water, backwash or back flush water, hot tub or spa water, air conditioning water, 
water softener brine, groundwater, oil, or roof drainage cannot be discharged into any 
system unless that discharge is approved by the director. 
In addition, the next section, IDAPA 58.01 .03.004.04 prohibits excessive flow being placed in the system: 
Unless authorized by the director, no person shall provide for or connect additional black 
waste or wastewater sources to any system if the resulting flow or volume would exceed 
the design flow of the system. -
G =: ~~ 
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I 
In order to determine the quantity of water flowing into the Printcraft Press facility, my client has examined 
the water meter records from September 1, 2006. The average water used by Printcraft Press in 
September was 893 gallons per day. The average use for October 1000.323 gallons per day. Because 
Mr. Waters covered the water meter, itwas not possible to obtain a reading solely for November. 
However, the water usage from November 1 through December 12, 2006, averaged 664 gallons per day. 
These readings are for every calendar day, so business days are likely much higher. Other than the small 
amount of water consumed by drinking on the premises, it is expected that all of the water flowing in the . 
Printcraft Press building also flows out, on a monthly basis. As an example, during the month of October, 
2006, Printcraft Press produced outflow equal·to fifty percent (50%) of the total water which can be 
discharged by the entire subdivision into the central septic system as designed. The excessive discharge 
simply must cease. 
Your letter indicates an intention to proceed with a temporary restraining order in the event my client fulfills 
its promise to disconnect the Printcraft Press building. My client has requested a "dig line" search which 
should be completed between now and noon Friday, December 15, 2006. This process will locate other 
adjacent utilities to prevent damage to those utilities by the backhoe needed to disconnect the Printcraft 
Press building from the septic service. Disconnection will occur upon completion of the dig line search. 
The Sewer Rules and Regulations previously provided to you, adopted by Sunnyside Park Utilities, Article 
IV, Penalties, provide as follows: ( 
Section 1: Written Notice.' Any person found to be violating any provision of these rules 
and regulations or JDAPA 58.01.03, may be served by the company with written notice, 
stating the nature of the violation and providing a reasonable time for the satisfactory 
correction thereof. The offender shall, within the period of time stated in such notice, 
permanently cease all violations. 
Section 2: Liability for Violation. Any person violating any of the provisions of these rules 
and regulations or IDAPA 58.01.03, shall become liable to the company for all expense, 
loss, fines, charges, or damage occasioned the company by reason of such violation. 
Section 3: Refusal of Service. The company reserves the right to refuse to provide 
service to persistent violators of these rules and regulations. 
Notice of the violations of Printcraft Press was submitted September 6, 2006,in a letter directed to Travis 
Waters. Your letter of September 18, 2006, acknowledged receipt of that notice. Nearly ninety (90) days 
has passed, which is clearly a reasonable time to allow Printcraft Press to satisfactorily correct the 
violations and permanently cease all violations. The failure of Printcraft Press to address these issues, 
and its continued actions constitute persistent violations of these rules and regulations and the company 
exercised its right to refuse to provide service. Sunnyside cannot allow Printcraft Press to continue to 
violate both the law and the applicable rules and regulations. 
You indicate an intention to seek a "temporary restraining order" to prevent disconnection of the sewer 
service. Pursuant to IRCP 65(b) this letter will inform you that our office demands notice of any motion for 
a temporary restraining order so that we may be heard in opposition to such a petition. Pursuant to IRCP 
65(c), we intend to demand a bond in the sum of not less than $450,000, which will be Sunnyside's 
antiCipated damage in the event of continued violations by Printcraft Press. Any further violations could 
. result in enforcement action by the Department of Environmental Quality, possibly mandating annexation 




by my client will not cause great or irreparable injury to Printcraft Press, as your client needs only agree to 
compliance and payment of reasonable monitoring costs in order to avoid further action. Your client's 
refusal to accept any of the options expressed in my earlier correspondence leaves my client with no 
alternatives but to proceed. . 
Please contact my office if you have any further questions. Our office will acknowledge service of any 
Complaint, Summons, or Notice of Hearing issued with regard to this matter. 
c: client 
Chuck Holmer, Counsel for" Luke Boyle 
MRF:kss 
Very truly yours, 
FULLER & CARR 
Mark R. Fuller 
Attorney at Law 
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1 the septic system? 1 I think was December 15th--
2 A The system must have not been changed 2 A Yes. 
3 at that point. It must have been changed after that 3 Q -- on that day Terry Luzier was general 
4 date. 4 manager and production manager? 
5 Q Okay. After you went down there and 5 A Correct. 
6 turned the system off, you told Doyle, "I've shut it 6 " What were your responsibilities as \.I 
7 off"? 7 production manager regarding chemical and other 
8 A Correct. 8 discharge into the sewer system? 
9 Q What did Doyle say? 9 A As far as I know, there were no raw 
10 A I do not remember what his reply was to 10 chemicals being discharged into the system. There 
11 that. 11 was, I guess you would call it, wastewater from our 
12 Q Okay. 12 prepress department that was going into the septic 
13 A That was five -- well, that was six or 13 system, that was being discharged from our building. 
14 seven months ago now. 14 The chemicals that are used in that are diluted and 
15 Q Okay. You remember what you said to 15 not harmful to the system. 
16 him but you don't recall his statement to you? 16 Q Okay. Only the discharge from the 
17 A I remember telling him that I had 17 prepress room was going into the septic system? 
18 turned it off 18 A Along with our day-to-day use and the 
19 Q And did he say -- did he give you any 19 flexo cleaning of the flexo equipment. 
20 instructions, that you recall, as to whether or 20 Q So there was discharge from the flexo 
21 not -- what to do with that soft water brine? 21 department, too? 
22 A I do not remember, no. 22 A Yes. 
23 Q But your testimony is that certainly by 23 Q Was their discharge from the Iitho-
24 the end -- would you agree that by the end of 24 press department going into the sewer system? 
25 September both the water softener brine discharge 25 A No. 
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1 and the reverse osmosis discharge had been rerouted 1 Q Okay. How do you know that? 
2 so that it was impossible for them to flow into the 2 A Because our employees did not put 
3 septic system. 3 anything down the system. 
4 Is that accurate? 4 Q Okay. So your testimony is that there 
5 A I would say, yes, that by the end of 5 were no litho-press chemicals going into the system 
6 September it had been rerouted. 6 in December of2006? 
7 Q We were talking about your anticipated 7 A That's correct. 
8 testimony regarding the physical inspections by Wolf 8 Q Okay. As production manager, were you 
9 and Beck. 9 over both the litho-press and the flexo-press rooms. 
10 Did you have anything else that you 10 A That's correct. 
11 anticipated testifYing about that inspection? 11 Q And the prepress room? 
12 A No. 12 A Yes. 
13 Q Was there more than one inspection? 13 Q And the bindery? 
14 A Yes. I believe there was another 14 A Yes. 
15 inspection after that. I believe it was the end of 15 Q It all stopped with you, all of those 
16 September or the first part of October they came 16 departments were under your jurisdiction? 
17 back through, and we showed them the corrections 17 A Yes. 
18 that we had done. 18 Q As production manager, who was your 
19 Q Okay. I want to go back to your -- you 19 immediate supervisor? 
20 testified that when you -- throughout the time 20 A Travis Waters. 
21 period leading up to the disconnection of the 21 Q Okay. As general manager, who was your 
22 service, you were the production manager; is that 22 immediate supervisor? 
23 correct? 23 A Travis Waters. 
24 A Correct. 24 Q Okay. I am -- I want to talk a minute 
25 Q On the day of the disconnection, which 25 just about 2006. 
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1 paragraph 2, is a chemical called Performa plate 1 Q Okay. So does it go down into the 
2 developer. 2 septic system? 
3 Do you know what that chemical is? 3 A No. 
4 A That chemical is used in our plate 4 Q Do you know if there are any records 
5 processor. When a metal plate is made, it's sent 5 retained as to how the Speedy Dry is disposed of? 
6 through the plate processor. This helps develop -- 6 A No. 
7 to clean the plate up so that it could be used on 7 Q And then there is a chemical on the 
8 the press. 8 next page, the top one here, referred to as Aqua 
9 Q Okay. Do you know how Printcraft 9 Prime. 
10 disposes of this chemical? 10 Are you familiar with that chemical? 
11 A It goes into the system. 11 A Yes, I am. 
12 Q Okay. And prior to the disconnection 12 Q What is that used for? 
13 of the system by Sunnyside, this was flowing into 13 A That is a printing ink that is used in 
14 the septic system? 14 our flexo department -- or could be used in our 
15 A Correct. 15 flexo department. Let me clarifY that. That 
16 Q Okay. And the Photo fix was also 16 chemical or that product has never been used. It 
17 flowing into the septic system? 17 was sent to Printcraft as a sample to try, and it 
18 A Correct. 18 has never been used. 
19 Q Okay. Do you know if there are any 19 Q Okay. Is it still on site? 
20 records kept regarding disposal of this material? 20 A To my knowledge, I could not answer yes 
21 A Not to my knowledge. 21 or no. 
22 Q Okay. With regard to all three of 22 Q Okay. It was just a sample. Do you 
23 these chemicals that we talked about, were you ever 12 how Printcraft disposed of it? 
24 involved in infonning Sunnyside that these chemicals 12 A I don't know if it has been disposed 
25 were being discharged into the septic system? 12 
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1 A When they came for a tour, we showed Q Who would know? 
2 them how it was being pumped out of the building, 2 A I don't know if anybody -- 1 don't 
3 how it pumps into the drain system. 3 know. 
4 Q Okay. Until they came to inspect, did 4 Q Where would this chemical -- this is 
5 you ever send them any kind of notice either oral or 5 just an MSDS? 
6 in writing, "These are the chemicals we're 6 A Right. 
7 discharging"? 7 Q I would indicate, we received an MSDS 
8 A No. 8 sheet on this chemical. 
9 Q The next chemical referred thereunder, 9 A Right. You received it, but 1 don't 
10 I think it's identified as paragraph -- let's go 10 know if we even still have that product on the 
11 down to 3b, stuff called Speedy Dry. 11 shelf. Ifit isn't, I would not know who disposed 
12 A Correct. 12 ofit. 
13 Q Are you familiar with what that 13 Q Where would it likely be located? 
14 chemical is used for? 14 A In the flexo department. 
15 A Yes. 15 Q Okay. And, at the time, those involved 
16 Q What is that used for? 16 in the flexo room were Travis Waters and -- I am 
17 A That chemical is mixed with the 17 sorry. Travis Peterson and Mike Bennek? 
18 printing inks to help it dry harder. 18 A No. They are in the litho-press room. 
19 Q Okay. Do you know how that chemical is 19 Q So it would be Rick Boyck or Sandan? 
20 disposed of by Printcraft? 20 A No. They are in the prepress 
21 A That is put into the sanitary landfill 21 department. 
22 through our garbage system. 22 Q Which employees, then, would know where 
23 Q So does this -- this is not a liquid 23 the Aqua Prime might be located? 
24 chemical? 24 A That might be Todd Landon. 
25 A No. 25 Q Has Printcraft ever discharged ink 
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1 directly into Sunnyside's sewer? 1 Q What is the red substance on the bottom 
2 A They have discharged the flexo inks, 2 of the sink? 
3 which are water-based inks. 3 A That would be ink. 
4 Q Okay. 4 Q And your testimony, the source of this 
5 A They don't dump the ink down directly. 5 ink is from cleaning the equipment? 
6 It's into the system through the cleaning process 6 A Yes. That's correct. 
7 when they need to clean the equipment. 7 Q What steps are taken to prevent flexo 
8 Q Could you explain that for me in a 8 ink from entering the sewer system? 
9 little more detail. 9 A No steps. 
10 A On the flexo printing press, you have 10 Q Okay. 
11 fountains or containers that they pour the ink into. 11 A The only steps that are taken from it 
12 It's about as thin as water, maybe a little bit 12 entering is the excess that cannot be put into the 
13 thicker than water. 13 gallon jugs is put into a 55-gallon drum that is 
14 When the printing process is done, they 14 right next to the sink. 
15 are done printing that project, they take the excess 15 Q Okay. After you received 
16 ink and pour it back into the gallon containers as 16 correspondence from Mr. Beck with regard to the 
17 much as they possibly can. 17 chemicals that were going into the sink, did you 
18 If it's contaminated inks, which can 18 take -- into the system, did you take any steps with 
19 happen occasionally, they dump it into a 55-gallon 19 regard to ink? 
20 drum. The remaining ink that is on that piece of 20 A Yes, we did. We were dumping as much 
21 equipment that goes in the press is then cleaned 21 of the excess as we could into the 55-gallon drum 
22 with water. 22 prior to rinsing the rollers and the equipment that 
23 Q Where is it cleaned? 23 is used to hold the ink. 
24 A In a sink. 24 Q But you were already doing that before 
25 Q Where does the flow from the sink 25 you got the letter from Mr. Beck? 
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1 discharge into? 1 A No, we were not. 
2 A Into the system. 2 Q You were just allowing -- you were just 
3 Q Okay. Until the system was 3 washing it all down the drain? 
4 disconnected on December 15th of 2006, those flexo 4 A That's correct. 
5 inks were flowing into Sunnyside's septic system? 5 Q Okay. I am turning back to Exhibit 13. 
6 A That's correct. 6 Attached to that exhibit is the third page. It's a 
7 Q Okay. Do you know how much ink is 7 letter from Mike Lund, Benton Engineering. 
8 disposed of into that septic system? 8 Have you read that letter before? 
9 A I could not give you a number, no. 9 A This is the first time that I have seen 
10 Q Okay. I am showing you what was marked 10 it. 
11 as Exhibit 3, page 2, Picture D. Right here. 11 Q Why don't you take a minute and review 
12 A Correct. 12 it. 
13 Q What is this picture of? 13 A (Witness complies.) 
14 A That is a picture of one of the sinks 14 Q You have not seen that letter before 
15 in the flexo department. 15 today? 
16 Q How many sinks are there? 16 A No. 
17 A Two-- 17 Q But you had seen this, letter Exhibit 
18 Q Okay. 18 13? 
19 A -- that are joined together. 19 A Yes. 
20 Q Okay. What do you mean they are 20 Q Can read for me the first line of 
21 "joined together"? 21 Exhibit 13. 
22 A It's one sink. One counter, basically, 22 A "Enclosed is a letter dated August 28, 
23 with two sinks in it. 23 '06, in response to our inquiry from our engineer." 
24 Q Do both flow into the septic system? 24 Q There is the letter that's referred to. 
25 A Yes. 25 A Okay. 
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1 Q When you saw this, letter Exhibit 13 1 Q What accessibility -- the conference 
2 from Mr. Beck, you were not given a copy of the 2 room is upstairs in the building? 
3 attached letter from Mr. Lund? 3 A And open to all the employees. 
4 A No, I was not. 4 Q Are there are meetings held in that 
5 Q Okay. Do you know why not? 5 conference room? 
6 A I do not. 6 A Yes. 
7 Q From whom did you receive your copy of 7 Q Prior to the request for this MSDS 
8 Exhibit 13 that you did review, addressed to 8 sheet from Sunnyside, which you said came in August 
9 Mr. Waters. 9 of 2006, were these MSDS sheets available to 
10 A If I remember right, it was from 10 Printcraft employees? 
11 Mr. Waters. 11 A Yes. 
12 Q Okay. Did you ask him why the 12 Q How were they made available before 
13 attachment referred to on the first line of the 13 August? 
14 letter was not provided to you? 14 A They were in a three-ring binder. 
15 A No, I did not ask. 15 Q Okay. As I recall your testimony --
16 Q But your testimony is that, even after 16 well, let me back up. 
17 you had seen Exhibit 13, there were no steps taken 17 Am I correct that before August the 
18 to prevent ink from running into the septic system? 18 only MSDS sheets that you had were the ones that 
19 A We had taken steps to minimize the 19 were voluntarily provided by the suppliers? 
20 amount of ink going into the system, yes. 20 A Correct. 
21 Q But there was still ink flowing into 21 Q Were those located in the binder at 
22 the system on a daily basis until it was 22 that time? 
23 disconnected by Sunnyside on December 15? 23 A Yes. 
24 A Yes. 24 Q And after the request was received from 
25 Q Okay. I am going to refer to some 25 Sunnyside, an effort was made to gather all of the 
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1 additional MSDS sheets, which have also been 1 MSDS sheets on all of the chemicals; correct? 
2 provided to us by Printcraft Press. They have 2 A Correct. 
3 already been marked as Exhibit 10 to these 3 Q And remind me, who did that? 
4 depositions. 4 A It was a combination of people that did 
5 The first 1 would like you to look at 5 that. I requested some, and Jonathan Hope requested 
6 for me is a material called, if! am reading right, 6 some. 
7 On-The-Run-Plate Cleaner. 7 Q Okay. What is Jonathan Hope's 
8 Do you see right here? 8 responsibilities or title? 
9 A Uh-huh. 9 A He is estimator and purchasing. 
10 Q Mr. Waters has testified that 10 Q Okay. Did you and he work together to 
11 Printcraft was discharging this substance into the 11 be certain that you would acquire all of them? 
12 sewer system. 12 A I believe we had, yes. 
13 Do you know how much of this substance 13 Q Explain that process for me of 
14 Printcraft uses per day? 14 verifying that you had them all. 
15 A I do not. 15 A I basically delegated it to Jonathan to 
16 Q Do you know what they do with this? 16 check to see what chemicals we were using through 
17 A I do not. 17 our purchasing system and requested the MSDS sheets 
18 Q Do you know how this MSDS sheet is made 18 on all of them. 
19 available to Printcraft's employees. 19 Q Okay. Did you do anything to verify 
20 A It's in the folder. 20 that they were all acquired? 
21 Q Okay. The folder is in a file drawer? 21 A I did not, personally, no. 
22 A It's in a -- it's in a binder. When I 22 Q Okay. Do you know who did? 
23 call it a folder, it's actually a binder -- a 23 A I believe Travis Waters checked into 
24 three-ring binder. I believe it's in the conference 24 that. 
25 room at this time. 25 Q Okay. And then all of those MSDS 
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SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE 
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL 
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
Case No.: CV-06-7097 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
FOURTH MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
The plaintiff, Printeraft Press, Inc. (Printeraft) submits the following 
memorandum in opposition to defendant's fourth motion for summary judgment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This is the fourth motion for summary judgment that the defendants (Sunnyside) 
have filed in this case. There are numerous issues of fact that prevent summary 
judgment. In ruling on Smillyside's second motion for summary judgment this Comi 
found: 
Woolf and Beck knew the nature of Print craft's business and the types of 
substances it would discharge into the system as a result of the blueprints 
Smillyside Utilities had received previously. Despite its prior acceptance of 
Printcraft's discharges, SUill1yside Utilities asked Printcraft to either eliminate 
various discharges or change the points of discharge. Printcraft complied with 
the requests and Sunnyside Utilities, through Woolf, approved of the alterations 
in early October 2006. 
Mem. Dec. and Order, August 31, 2007, pp. 5-6 (emphasis added). Sunnyside has moved 
for summary judgment on the very issue previously decided by this Court. As already 
determined by this Court, Printcraft complied with Sunnyside's requests to eliminate 
various discharges. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
oflaw." IDAHO R. CIv. P. 56(c); G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 516-
17, 808 P.2d 851, 853-54 (1991). The moving party bears the burden of establishing the 
lack of a genuine issue of material fact. Tingly v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 867 P .2d 
960 (1994). 
When assessing the motion for summary judgment, Idaho courts liberally 
construe all disputed facts in favor ofthe non-moving pmiy, and draw all reasonable 
inferences and conclusions supported by the record in favor of the party opposing the 
C,~ J 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Fomih Motion for Summary Judgment Page 2 
motion. Cookv. State. Dep'tolTran~l)., 133 Idaho 288, 294, 985 P.2d 1150,1156 (1999). 
If reasonable people could reach different conclusions or draw conflicting inferences 
from the evidence, the motion must be denied. Id. However, the plaintiffs case must be 
"anchored in something speculation and a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to 
create a genuine issue." G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 516-17, 808 
P.2d 851,853-54 (l991)(intemal citation omitted). If the evidence reveals no disputed 
issues of material fact, the trial court should grant the motion for summary judgment. 
Cook, 133 Idaho at 294,985 P.2d at 1156. 
FACTS 
The facts have previously been submitted in opposition to Smmyside's other 
motions for summary judgment. Printcraft fully incorporates those facts here. The 
following facts are particularly relevant to the present motion: 
1. In September 2005, before the construction or occupancy of the building that 
Printcraft occupies, Travis Waters met with Doyle Beck and Kirk Woolf to discuss 
construction of the building. In those meetings at the request of Sunnyside, Printcraft 
provided several versions of the blueprints and drawings for the building that Printcraft 
would occupy. Affidavit of Travis Waters, filed August 2, 2007 (Waters August Aff.) ~ 
20. 
2. In January 2006, Printcraft moved from its previous building to its current 
location in Sunnyside Industrial Park and began operating its printing business. Waters 
August Aff. ~ 31. 
3. In June 2006, Sunnyside's septic system failed. Waters August Aff. ~ 32. 
4. Despite their previous acceptance of all of Smmyside's waste without 
limitation, on September 6,2006, Smmyside sent a letter to Printcraft advising Printcraft 
C.:~: 
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for the very first time that SUlmyside's system was "designed only to accept human 
waste". Waters August Aff. ,r 37, Ex. R. 
5. The letter attached cOlTespondence from Sunnyside's engineer suggesting 
that, "Ink is not considered human waste and could very easily be deposited into a 
separate seepage pit on site without even a permit by District Seven Health and would 
thereby not overload the septic system." Waters August Aff. ~ 37, Ex. R. 
6. At the time Printcraft received the September 6, 2006 letter, it was completely 
unaware of any of prior cOlTespondence, issues, or demands that had existed and had 
been made by the District Seven Health Department to SUlmyside. Waters August Aff. ~ 
37. 
7. On September 18, 2006, counsel for Printcraft, Lane Erickson, sent a letter 
responding to the September 6, 2006 letter suggesting a meeting to discuss the issues 
raised. Brunson Aff. Ex. A. 
8. The letter also requested all documents dealing with the utility services 
Sunnyside had been providing Printcraft. 
9. On September 20,2006, counsel for SUlmyside, Mark Fuller, responded. The 
letter threatens to disconnect Printcraft and recommends a meeting to resolve the issues. 
Daniel Beck Aff. Ex. A. 
10. On September 25,2006, Printcraft and Sunnyside met on Printcraft's 
premises. Mark Fuller was present at the meeting. During the meeting, Printcraft took 
Sunnyside and Mark Fuller around the premises and showed them each process, 
operation, and station located within the facility. Several suggestions were made by 
Sunnyside with regard to either eliminating the discharges or changing the location of 
those discharges. Waters August Aff. ~ 40. 
(' Ui 
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11. Early in October 2006, after Printcraft made all of the suggested changes, Kirk 
Woolf on behalf of Sunnyside met with Printcraft at its facility. They went through the 
building and inspected the changes and alterations made by Printcraft pursuant to the 
recommendations from the earlier meeting. At this meeting, after inspecting the changes, 
Woolf approved the changes which had been made. The only concern Woolf raised was 
with regard to the rinsing of trays which held inks used in the Flexo printing press area. 
Printcraft explained to Woolf that inks used were aqueous in nature and not hannful. Mr. 
Woolf approved the alterations and changes. Printcraft operated its printing business as 
inspected and approved by Sunnyside. Waters August Aff. ,-r 4l. 
12. Despite operating under the changes approved by SUilllYside, on December 
11, 2006, SUill1yside sent another letter setting additional conditions and requirements. 
Waters August Aff. ,-r 45, Ex. X. 
13. On December 12, 2006, Printcraft responded and reminded Sunnyside that 
Woolf had inspected the facility and approved the actions taken by Printcraft. Waters 
August Aff.,-r 46, Ex. Y. 
14. On December 15,2006, Sunnyside disconnected Printcraft from the system. 
15. In a letter dated December 13, 2006 and stamped received December 15, 
2006, Sunnyside responded to Printcraft's December 12, 2006 letter and for the first time 
raised an issue with the soft water brine being allegedly discharged into the system. The 
letter additionally states, "Your client's refusal to accept any o.fthe options expressed ill 
my earlier correspondence leaves my client with 110 alternatives but to proceed." Daniel 
Beck Aff. Ex. B (Waters Dep. Ex. 18). 
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ARGUMENT 
I. A CONTRACT \V AS NOT FORMED BETWEEN SUNNYSIDE AND 
PRINTCRAFT. 
There was no mutual intent to contract. F0D11ation of a valid contract requires 
there be a meeting of the minds as evidenced by a manifestation of mutual intent to 
contract. Heritage Excavation, Inc. v. Briscoe, 141 Idaho 40,43, 105 P.3d 700, 703 eCt. 
App.2005). This manifestation takes the form of an offer and acceptance. !d. An offer 
is a manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another 
person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it. Id. 
An offer standing alone is not sufficient to form a contract. Id. 
The Idaho jury instructions are instructive on the definition and elements of a 
contract. The relevant jury instructions provide as follows: 
A contract is an agreement between two or more paliies to do or not do 
something that is supported by consideration. There are four elements to 
complete a contract. Every contract must have these four elements. The 
four elements are: 
1. Competent paIiies; 
2. A lawful purpose; 
3. Valid consideration; and 
4. Mutual agreement by all parties to all essential terms. 
IDJI2d 6.01.1. 
A promise is not enforceable as a contract unless something of value was 
given or was agreed to be given in exchange for it. In law, the giving of 
value or agreement to give value is called "consideration." Consideration is 
the benefit given or agreed to be given by one party in exchange for the other 
party's performance or promise to perfOlm. 
Id. 6.04.1 
"It is elementary that a promise to do, or doing of, what one is already bound 
by contract to do, is not a valid consideration." Indep. Sch. Dist. v. MUtry, 39 Idaho 
282, 289 (1924). 
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The elements of a contract cannot be established here. SUlmyside argues that on 
September 20, 2006, I through Mark Fuller, Sunnyside offered to accept Printcraft's 
human waste only if Printcraft agreed not to discharge any process wastewater into 
Sunnyside's sewer system. The language of the letter belies this argument. The 
threatening nature of the September 20th letter is the complete opposite of a 
"manifestation of a willingness to enter a bargain." There simply was no "offer" by 
Sunnyside that Printcraft could accept. Additionally, there was no consideration for such 
a purported offer since Sunnyside was already bound to provide sewer services to 
Printcraft as an occupant in the subdivision. See Mem. Dec. and Order at I 1 ("Printcraft 
is clearly an intended beneficiary of the Agreement.") Finally, there was no acceptance. 
Sunnyside undisputedly stated, "[Printcraft's] refusal to accept any of the options 
expressed in my earlier correspondence leaves my client with no alternative but to 
proceed." Daniel Beck Aff. Ex. B. As a matter oflaw, there was no contract formed. At 
a minimum, there are genuine issues of material fact. 
Further, in the September 6th letter, Doyle Beck suggested to Printcraft that they 
bury the inks into the ground without a permit. See Waters Aff. Ex. R (Benton 
Engineering letter attached to exhibit). District Seven Health representative Kellye Eager 
testified regarding this suggestion as follows: 
Q. It states, ink is not considered human waste and could very easily be deposited 
into a separate seepage pit on-site without even a permit from District Seven 
Health and would thereby not overload the septic system. 
Do you agree with that statement? 
A. I disagree. 
Q. vVhy? 
I Sunnyside omits the two letters preceding the September 20th letter the September 6th letter from Doyle 
Beck and the September 18th letter from Lane Erickson. 
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A. We're not supposed to separate out wastes. It should have been going into the 
original system. If there is another pit, it would have had to have been permitted 
through us. 
Q. They can't just dig a hole and bury it? 
A. Correct. 
Eager Dep. 158:20-159:24, Ex.30. Sunnyside was attempting to have Printcraft separate 
wastes without a pernlit. Such an attempt was unlawful and could not have been the 
basis for a contract pursuant to Idaho law. Thus, the alleged contract was not based on a 
lawful purpose and there was no contract as a matter of law. At a minimum, there are 
genuine issues of fact. 
II. EVEN IF THERE IS A CONTRACT, THE TERMS ARE AMBIGUOUS. 
Even if one assumes there is a contract, the terms of the contract are ambiguous. 
The alleged contract is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations. Sunnyside 
argues that "Printcraft was only entitled to discharge human waste into the sewer system 
and any discharge of 'processed waste' violated the tenns of the contract." At the outset 
this statement is problematic because "processed waste" is not defined in any of the 
correspondence. SUlTIlyside seeks to box Printcraft in based on its attorney's September 
26, 2006 letter providing that Travis agreed to make arrangements to collect and dispose 
of what Sunnyside classified as "processed waste." However, no reference is made to the 
September 20,2006 letter (as argued by Sunnyside) but rather to a meeting involving 
Printcraft and Sunnyside at Printcraft's facility. Review ofthe September 20, 2006 letter 
does not establish what constitutes "processed waste." 
If any contract exists, the only way it could have been formed was during the 
meeting that occurred at Printcraft's facility and follow up meeting that occurred between 
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Waters and Doyle Beck. At Printcraft's 30(b )(6) deposition Waters was explicitly asked 
about processed waste. He testified as follows: 
Q .... The next para!6Taph says, in light of all ofthe above, we will not accept 
processed waste in our sewer facility. Can I ask how you responded when you 
received that directive2 from Mr. Beck? 
A. I tried to get clarification on processed waste and couldn't find it. 
Q. Tell me what steps you took to obtain that clarification. 
A. Somewhere in all of this, IDAPA code was mentioned. I referred to the 
IDAPA code in the glossary portion, definitions portion, sorry. Under the 
definitions, there is not anything called processed waste. I think it's something 
that Mr. Beck created. 
Q. Did you consider the chemicals that you were disposing in the Sunnyside 
sewage system to be human waste? 
A. I considered it to be wastewater with human waste in it. 
Waters Dep. 184:6-185:4. Waters continued by discussing what occurred at the 
September 25th meeting when he was asked about the September 26th letter: 
Q. Travis agreed with Doyle that Printcraft Press will no longer be putting the RO 
water into the sewer system. Do you recall making that commitment? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Additionally, Travis agreed to make arrangements to collect and dispose of 
what you classify as processed waste. Did I read that correctly? 
A. Dh-huh. 
Q. Did you make such agreement? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you understand that your counsel was confirming that you would collect 
and dispose of what Sunnyside Utilities classified as processed waste? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did you understand that term to mean on September 26th? 
f""' , :~o! 
\j": ... { 
2 Interestingly, Sunnyside's own counsel does not refer to that as an "offer" but rather as a directive. 
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A. Those things that had been brought to our attention by Mr. Beck. 
Q. Can you identify those for me? 
A. The water coming from the film processor, the plate processor, excess inks 
from our flexo area, the RO system. There was some discussion about the wash-
up sinks, but I didn't agree to divert that or catch that. That's what I recall. 
Waters Dep. 185:6-189:6. 
Unlike the September 20th letter, Water's deposition is very clear on what Waters 
understood and what he was agreeable to doing. At a minimum, Waters' testimony 
generates an issue of fact at to what the tenns of the alleged contract were. 
If there is an issue as to what was said at the September 25th meeting it has not 
been adequately raised by Sunnyside. 3 Sunnyside's reliance on the September 26th letter 
to somehow bind Printcraft to the September 20th letter is misleading and inappropriate. 
The September 26th letter expressly references the meeting that took place between the 
parties and their counsel and the follow meeting between Waters and Doyle Beck. The 
only testimony before the Court as to what happened during that meeting and what was 
agreed to if anything is contained in the deposition of Travis Waters. 
A complete review of the entire series of correspondence reveals that the terms of 
the alleged contract i.e. the demands of Sunnyside, were unclear and were constantly 
changing. The December 11 th letter gives three new options to Printcraft. Waters August 
Aff. ,r 45, Ex. X. The December l3th letter, which was not received until December 15th, 
raises soft water brine as an issue for the first time. Sunnyside's strategy of refusing to 
define "processed waste" so that Sunnyside could continually add to its definition should 
f~ 1; ,."" 
lJ ....... -.J 
) Significantly, Mark Fuller was present at the meeting and has now interposed himself into the middle of 
the dispute as a witness. Rule 3.7 of the Idaho Rules o I' Professional Conduct provides: "A lawyer shall 
not act as an advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness .. ," The rule goes 
on to list three exceptions none of which apply here. Sunnyside is on notice that Printcraft will object to 
Mr. Fuller serving as trial counsel and that Printcraft intends on deposing Mr. Fuller to ascetiain his 
recollection of what occurred at the September 25th meeting, 
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not be given approval by this Court. Thus, summary judgment is not appropriate as the 
alleged contract is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations. 
III. EVEN IF THERE IS A CONTRACT, IT WAS NOT MATERIALLY 
BREACHED BY PRINTCRAFT. 
Even if there is a contract, there was no material breach by Printcraft. A material 
breach of contract is a breach so substantial that it defeats the object of the parties in 
entering the contract. Alountain Rest. Corp. v. Parkcenter Mall Assoc., 122 Idaho 261, 
265,833 P.2d 119, 123 (Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted). There is no material breach 
of contract where substantial perfomlance has been rendered. ld. Substantial 
perfomlance is performance which despite deviance or omission provides the important 
and essential benefits of the contract to the promissee. ld. Whether a breach of contract 
is material is a question of fact. !d. (emphasis added). 
A breach of contract may be total or partial. Enter., Inc. v. Nampa City, 96 Idaho 
734,740,536 P.2d 729, 735 (1975) (citing Restatement Contracts § 312 (date)). A total 
breach of contract is non-perfomlance of a duty that is so material and important as to 
justify the injured party in regarding the whole transaction as at an end. Id. (citing 4 
Corbin on Contracts § 946 (1951 )). 
Not only was there no breach here, there was no material breach. This Court 
previously found: 
Woolf and Beck knew the nature of Print craft's business and the types of 
substances it would discharge into the system as a result of the blueprints 
SUlmyside Utilities had received previously. Despite its prior acceptance of 
Printcraft's discharges, Sunnyside Utilities asked Printcraft to either eliminate 
various discharges or change the points of discharge. Printcraft complied with 
the requests and SUllnyside Utilities, through Woolf, approved o.fthe alteratiol1s 
ill ear(v October 2006. 
,... .~ /l. 
U -.I. .. ) 
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Mem. Dec. and Order, August 31, 2007, pp. 5-6 (emphasis added). There are no new 
facts justifying this COUli to deviate from Judge St. Clair's previous ruling in this regard. 
As explained in the previously submitted Waters August Affidavit, after the 
September 25th meetings Waters met with Sunnyside to allow them to inspect what had 
been done.4 Sunnyside thoroughly re-inspected everything and approved of it. 
Sunnyside cites Judge St. Clair's previous finding that "Printcraft discharged 
water softener brine, hazardous wastes, processed water and excessive flows of 
wastewater into the system in violation oflDAPA 58.01.03.004.03." While Printcraft 
strongly disagrees with Judge st. Clair's previous finding,S it is immaterial to the present 
motion for summary judgment. In reaching this ruling the Court was looking at whether 
Printcraft could maintain its own breach of contract claim. Here, the question is whether 
Sunnyside is entitled to prevail on its breach of contract claim as a matter of law. There 
are numerous factual issues preventing summary judgment in favor of Sunnyside and 
those issues were correctly relied on by Judge St. Clair in determining: "Printcraft 
complied with the requests and Sunnyside Utilities, through Woolf, approved of the 
alterations in early October 2006." Based on this language there is no room for a finding 
that Printcraft breached the contract as a matter of law. 
Sunnyside argues that by discharging soft water brine, air compressor water, 
diluted chemicals from the prepress area, discharges from the flexo department, and inks 
being washed offtrays a breach occurred as a matter oflaw. Printcraft unequivocally 
4 Significantly. this process was expressly contemplated by Sunnyside in its September 6th letter where it 
states: "[W]e will conduct an on site inspection of your facility. We expect the areas where you have 
been injecting processed waste will be permanently altered to prohibit the accidental disposal by your 
employees of any processed waste into our sewer facility." 
5 With all due respect to Judge st. Clair, his ruling completely ignores whether discharging soft water brine 
constitutes a material breach of contract which in turn justified the disconnection. Of course, this is a 
fact question to be determined by the trier of fact. Further, Judge St. Clair misapplied IDAP A in 
reaching his ruling. Printcraft anticipates filing a motion to reconsider after additional expert discovery 
is completed. ~ ~ G 5 J ~ 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Fourth Motion for Summary Judgment Page 12 
testified that Sunnyside represented that they were concerned about volume and that they 
approved ofthe changes that were made. See Waters Aff. "40, 41; Waters Dep. 184: 11-
199:3. At the meeting and subsequent inspection, Printcraft dealt with SUill1yside's 
specific concerns and Sunnyside agreed to the changes that were made. At a minimum, 
there are genuine issues of fact. 
Printcraft argues that Doyle Beck personally witnessed "processed waste" flowing 
through the sewer system. Not only does Doyle Beck fail to define processed waste, he 
completely fails to identify what was allegedly flowing in the sewer, what it looked like, 
how much there was, or how he knew it was processed waste. 6 Even ifhis testimony is 
admissible, it does not generate an issue that Printcraft needs to respond to. 
Notwithstanding, Waters testified that the flows could have been human waste, toilet 
water, washing dishes, or getting a drink. Waters Dep. 194:18-197:2. The December 
12th letter sent by Printcraft through counsel clearly refutes Doyle Beck's allegations 
since a new printing press was being installed and there was no RO water or process 
water coming from Printcraft. Waters Aff. Ex. Y. 
Sunnyside argues that Waters acknowledged that "despite the warnings from Mr. 
Woolf about the sink and the necessity to comply with the agreement 'I kind of blew it 
off. I didn't take it too serious. '" Sunnyside complete misstates Waters' testimony. 
Waters actually testified: 
As he was leaving, he kind of gave me a I don't know. I should have taken it 
more serious. It was more a warning about Doyle Beck and how I probably didn't 
want to cross him. I got the impression it was kind of a potentate mentality, so I 
kind of blew it off. I didn't take it too serious. 
Q. You considered it a warning by Mr. Wolf? 
A. A little bit, that I didn't know who I was messing with, make sure he's 
appeased. 
C,r.:; A v.~ 
(, Printcraft has moved to strike Doyle Beck's affidavit pursuant to Rule 56( e) filed contemporaneously. 
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Q. Anything else? 
A. I think that's it. 
Waters Dep. 193: 1-11. The warning Waters should have taken more serious was that 
Doyle Beck was vindictive and it would be a mistake to cross him. It had nothing to do 
with the sink or statements Woolf made regarding complying the agreement. In fact, 
there is absolutely no evidence that Woolf said anything about complying with any 
agreement. Waters testimony regarding the sink is clear: 
Q. What were you going to do with regard to the sink in which the ink is 
deposited in the photographs? 
A. Leave it hooked up. There's not I shouldn't say that. We put a 55 gallon 
drum in there to collect an extra quart of ink a month. 
Q. You did agree to divert that away from the sewage system? 
A. No. I agreed to collect any contaminated ink and put it into 55 gallon drum 
and then wash the minor amount that's in the pans out in the sink. 
Q. The sink was never disconnected from the sewer system? 
A. I never committed to do it. I never agreed to do it. 
Q. And never did it? 
A. And never did it. And discussed it with Kirk Wolf as we walked through. 
Waters Dep. 188: 13-189:6. Printcraft's practice after the October inspection was 
consistent with what they said they would do to help Sunnyside out. 
Sunnyside also attempts to make much of the alleged disposal of the soft water 
brine. Sunnyside first claims that Printcraft acknowledged receipt of the December 13th 
letter on December 13th. However, unlike the September 20th letter, the December 13th 
letter does not indicate it was sent via fax and is stamped received December 15th. 
Daniel Beck Affidavit Ex. B (Ex. 18 to Waters Dep.). The only inference that can be 
(-., r- '-, 
lJ J ... 
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drawn is that Printcraft's attorney did not even get the letter until the day Sunnyside 
disconnected Printcraft. 7 The December 13th letter is the first time soft water brine is 
mentioned anywhere. This is likely because the soft water issue was so inconsequential 
to the real issue that Sunnyside was having (volume) that it was not brought to 
Printcraft's attention. Waters was repeatedly asked about soft water brine during 
Printcraft's deposition. He testified as follows: 
Q. When was that last modification made? 
A. Within the last coup Ie of months. 
Q. After the service was disconnected? 
A. Correct. 
Q. The water softener now drains outside to the landscaping on the south side of 
the building? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Why did you wait until after the service was disconnected before you ceased 
discharging water softener brine into the system? 
A. I understood Mr. Beck's issue to be volume coming out of my RO system, not 
water softener brine. I solved the water coming from my RO system, which I 
thought would satisfy Mr. Beck and Mr. Wolf, and that's why I showed the system 
fixed that way to Mr. Wolf, and Mr. Wolf approved it as he saw it. 
Waters Dep. 67: 1 17. 
A. I showed that system and the corrections that were made to Mr. Wolf, and it 
satisfied him, which I took to mean Mr. Beck and Mr. Wolf were fine with the 
adjustments I made. 
Q. My question is, did the water softener brine from Printcraft continue to 
discharge directly into the Sunnyside septic system until the day Sunnyside 
disconnected the building? 
A. Yes, with Kirk Wolf's approval. 
Waters Dep. 71:12-20. 
7 Even if the letter was received before the 15th there is no indication when Waters got the letter. 
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Q. If you understood that water softener brine discharge was a concem prior to 
disconnection, why did you take no steps to modify the discharge of water 
softener brine into the septic system? 
A. I didn't understand. That's why I didn't. It's a simple 10 minute fix. I would 
have done it in a heartbeat if I knew it was an issue. 
Waters Dep. 72:3-9. The reason Waters did not understand it was a concem is because it 
was not communicated to Waters as a concern by Sunnyside. Waters further testifies that 
once he did receive the December 13th letter he was still confused as to what soft water 
brine was and what the concern was. See Waters Dep. 199:5-201:19. 
Even if there was a contract, something as trivial as soft water brine, which is 
discharged by residences and businesses across the state, is not a material breach of the 
alleged contract. At a minimum, there are genuine issues of a material fact. 
IV. DAMAGE IS A FACT QUESTION TO BE DETERMINED BY THE JURY. 
Even ifthere was a contract and it was materially breached, damages is a fact 
question for the jury to decide. A jury must decide the amount of money that will fairly 
and reasonably compensate a plaintiff. Where damages are shown to have resulted, 
fixing the amount is for the trier of fact. Smith v. Daniels, 93 Idaho 716, 718,471 P.2d 
571,573 (1970): Conley v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 74 Idaho 416, 423, 263 P.2d 705, 
709 (1953). The amount of damages here is a question that should be decided by the jury 
and not as a matter oflaw. 
Additionally, the affidavit submitted by Doyle Beck is not admissible on several 
grounds. First, it fails to identify who performed the work. Second, it fails to attach any 
invoices demonstrating what was in fact paid. Third, it fails to establish why a backhoe 
was needed. Fourth, it fails to include how much time was spent utilizing the backhoe. 
Fifth, it attempts recovery for time spent inspecting the work done without identifying 
,- ,.- :It 
G v .... · 
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who paliicipated in the inspection, what their qualifications were, how much time it took 
them, the hourly value of their time, or how the $1,420 amount was otherwise calculated. 
Even if the affidavit were admissible, it would be up to a jury to determine if the amount 
is reasonable. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the toregoing, Printcraft respectfully requests that Sunnyside's motion 
for summary judgment be denied. 
DATED: April 1, 2008. 
Of Beard st. Clair Gaffney P A 
Attorneys for Printcraft Press, Inc. 
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:31 
The plaintiff, Printcraft Press, Inc. (Printcraft), through counsel of record, Beard 
St. Clair Gaffney PA, respectfully moves this Comi for an order granting its motion to 
amend pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
This motion is supported by the Memorandum in SuppOli of Plaintiff's Motion to 
Amend (Rule 15( a). Oral argument is requested. 
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SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE 
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL 
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
Case No.: CV-06-7097 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND 
(RULE 15(a)) 
The plaintiff, Printcraft Press, Inc. (Printcraft), through counsel of record Beard 
St. Clair Gaffney P A, respectfully submits the following Memorandum in support of its 
Motion to Amend pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. An 
affidavit of counsel is submitted with this memorandum. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Printcraft's water has been shut off in breach of its contract with the defendant, 
SUlU1yside Utilities, Inc. (Sunnyside). Sunnyside agreed to provide Printcraft with water 
and Sunnyside's unreasonable and unilateral conduct in shutting offPrintcraft's water 
constitutes a breach of the parties' agreement for water. Printcraft should be allowed to 
amend its complaint against Sunnyside to include a breach of contract claim for 
Sunnyside's conduct. 
Further, Doyle Beck and Kirk Woolf should be personally liable for the fraud they 
committed in failing to disclose to Printcraft the sewer limitations. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15, a party is required to seek leave from the 
Court to amend in the circumstances present in this case. It is within this Court's sound 
discretion whether to grant such an amendment. See Carl H Christensen Family Trust v. 
Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 871, 993 P.2d 1197,1202 (1999). Rule 15 also states that 
"leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." IDAHO R. CIY. P. IS (2007). Idaho 
has adopted the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the comparable federal rule. 
In the absence of any apparent or declared reason-such as undue delay, bad faith 
or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies 
by amendment previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by 
virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of the amendment, etc.-the leave 
sought should, as the rules require, be freely granted. 
See id. (citation omitted). "In the interest of justice, district courts should favor liberal 
grants of leave to amend a complaint." Jd.; see also Wick5trom v. N. Idaho College, III 
Idaho 450, 453, 725 P.2d 155, 158 (1986). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In April 2002, Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc. and Sunnyside Park Owners 
Associations, Inc. entered into the Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement (the 
Agreement). 
2. In the Agreement, Sunnyside covenanted to provide a water supply system for the 
purpose of supplying water to the businesses and occupants of the Sunnyside Industrial 
and Professional Park. 
3. In August 2007, Judge Richard T. st. Clair ruled that Printcraft is an intended 
beneficiary of the Agreement. 
4. In November 2007, Sunnyside unilaterally cut-offPrintcraft's water supply in 
breach of its obligations under the Agreement. 
5. In September 2005, before the construction or occupancy of the building that 
Printcraft occupies, Travis Waters met with Doyle Beck and Kirk Woolf to discuss 
construction of the building. In those meetings at the request of Sunnyside, Printcraft 
provided several versions of the blueprints and drawings for the building that Printcraft 
would occupy. Affidavit of Travis Waters, filed August 2,2007 (Waters August Aff.) ~ 
20. 
6. Beck and Woolf failed to disclose to Waters or Printcraft the severe limitations of 
the Sunnyside sewer system and the restrictions that had been imposed by District Seven 
Health. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Printcraft's claim for bre~ch of contract is a viable claim in Idaho and does 
not prejudi~e Sunnyside. ) cyJ- -;, 
Printcraft has a legitimate legal basis for adding a breach of contract claim against 
SUilllyside. The Court has previously held that Printcraft is an intended beneficiary of the 
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Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement (the Agreement). (Mem. Dec. Order 11, 
August 31,2007.) The Agreement is intended to benefit "the present and future owners 
or occupants of all and each of the properties, buildings, and other improvements which 
are now or may hereafter be served by the water supply systems." (Counsel Aff. Ex. D, 
Def. Resp. PI. Req. Prod. 42.) In the event that a party breaches the provisions of an 
Agreement, the third party beneficiaries are entitled to sue for breach of contract. Just's 
v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 466,583 P.2d 997, 1001 (1978). This appears to 
be a long standing rule in Idaho and Printcraft is entitled to allege a claim for breach of 
contract against Sunnyside. 
In this case, SUill1yside cut-offPrintcraft's water supply in violation of its 
obligations under the Agreement. Section 2 of the agreement clearly shows that 
Sunnyside covenanted to supply "at all times and under adequate pressure for the use of 
the properties duly connected to its water supply system a sufficient quantity of water to 
meet the reasonable needs of each ofthe properties duly com1ected to said water supply 
systems." (Counsel Aff. Ex. D, Def. Resp. PI. Req. Prod. 42.) Sunnyside breached its 
obligation to Printcraft to supply water and has damaged Printcraft. Whether Sunnyside 
has a defense to Printcraft's claim for breach of contract is a substantive question not 
appropriately considered on a motion to amend. See Dt(ffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement 
Ass 'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1013, 895 P.2d 1195, 1206 (1995). A court may consider 
whether the allegations sought to be added to the complaint state a valid claim in 
determining whether to grant leave to amend the complaint. Black Canyon Racquetball 
Club, Inc., v. Idaho First Nat'l BankN.A., 119 Idaho 171,175,804 P.2d 900,904 (1991). 
A court, however, may not consider the sufficiency of evidence suppOliing the claim 
sought to be added in detem1ining leave to amend because that is more properly 
G '" -', \,..I ..... 
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determined at the summary judgment stage. Thomas v. Medical Ctr. Physicians, P.A., 
138 Idaho 200,210,61 P.3d 557,567 (2002). Since Idaho recognizes that an intended 
beneficiary can allege a breach of contract claim, Printcraft has satisfied its burden to 
justify an amendment to its complaint. 
Allowing Printcraft to amend its complaint to include a breach of contract claim is 
in the interests of justice. Printcraft's claim has recently arisen and is intrinsically related 
to the claims that are presently before the Court in this suit. Adding a breach of contract 
claim would allow the Court to fully and completely adjudicate all of the present disputes 
between the parties. Leave is to be liberally granted to parties seeking to amend their 
claims. Wickstrom v. N. Idaho College, 111 Idaho 450, 453, 725 P.2d 155, 158 (1986). 
This case is no different and the Court should appropriately apply the law and exercise its 
discretion in granting Printcraft's motion to amend. Amending the complaint does not 
prejudice Sunnyside since discovery is ongoing, the case is developing, and the issues 
involved in the breach of contract claim are known to the parties. Sunnyside cannot point 
to any real prejudice beyond the usual inconvenience of civil litigation. 
Printcraft's motion to amend for breach of contract should be granted. 
II. Printcraft should be allowed to add Doyle Beck and Kirk Woolf as parties 
and allege counts of fraud against them. 
Printcraft also seeks to amend its complaint to include counts of fraud against 
Doyle Beck (Beck) and Kirk (Woolf). These two individuals, who are principals in 
Sunnyside, committed the intentional tort of fraud against Printcraft. Both Beck and 
Woolf intentionally failed to convey key facts and information to Printcraft. As a 
consequence, Printcraft should be allowed to add them both as parties and allege claims 
of fraud. 
f"" 1' ...... rJ. 
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In Idaho, both federal and state courts generally adhere to the rule that corporate 
officers and directors are not individually liable for the conduct of their corporation. See 
Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400,848 P.2d 984 (Ct. App. 1992); L.B. Indus., Inc. v. 
Smith, 631 F.Supp. 922, 925 (D. Idaho 1986); L.B. Indus., Inc. v. Smith, 817 F.2d 69, 71 
(9th Cir. 1987).1 Nevertheless, this general rule is subject to an impOliant exception 
courts have recognized. 
According to the Eliopulos court, "If a director or officer commits or participates 
in the commission of a tort, whether or not it is also by or for a corporation, the director is 
personally liable to third persons injured thereby, and it does not matter what liability 
attaches to the corporation for the tort." Eliopulos, 123 Idaho at 404-05 (citation 
omitted). 2 This position is consistent with the L.B. Industries court, which held, "If an 
officer or agent of a corporation directs or participates actively in the commission of a 
tOliious act or an act from which a tort necessarily follows or may reasonably be expected 
to follow, he is personally liable to a third person for injmies proximately resulting 
therefrom." L.B. Industries, Inc., 631 F. Supp., at 925 (citations omitted). 
Crucial to a determination of whether individual officer liability exists is whether 
the officer has overseen, approved of, acquiesced to, or directly participated in the 
tortiolls conduct giving rise to a particular cause of action. It is insufficient to impose 
individual liability on a corporate officer merely on the basis that the officer knew of or 
I The latter two cases cit~d are the Distlict Court's and the Tenth Circuit's opinions in the same matter.' In 
the District Court's L.B. Industries v. Smith opinion, the court, relying on two Idaho state cases, stated 
"Idaho has adopted the general rule that corporate officers and directors are not individually liable for the 
conduct oftlle corporation." In the Tenth Circuit's review of the District Court's ruling, the Tenth Circuit 
corrected the District Court, indicating that although Idaho courts had recognized that corporate officers are 
generally not individually liable for the contracts of the corporation, they had not yet addressed individual 
officer liability for fraud. Despite the distinction the Tenth Circuit identified, it nevertheless appears that 
corporate officers are generally not liable, absent an applicable exception, for tortious conduct of their 
corporation, especially in light of the court's decision in EliojJulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400 (Idaho Ct. App. 
1992). 
1 This case is found at 848 P .2d 984, but Lcxis apparently cannot provide pinpoint citations for the Pacific 
RepOlier Second in this case. r: r> .1 
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was aware of the corporation's tortious conduct. See id. at 926. Instead, "Specific 
direction or sanction of, or active participation or cooperation in, a positively wrongful 
act of commission or omission which operates to the injury or prejudice of the 
complaining party is necessary to generate individual liability and damages of an officer 
or agent of a corporation for the tort of the corporation." ld. (citations omitted). This 
inquiry, however, is a fact issue and one that does not need to be passed on by the Court 
at the amendment stage of litigation. It is sufficient for purposes of amending the 
complaint to show that there is a basis in the law to allege claims of fraud against 
corporate officers. 
Rule 9(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the circumstances 
giving rise to a claim for fraud be stated with particularity. IDAHO R. elY. P. 9(b). 
Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred 
generally. ld. The elements of fraud are: 
1. A representation of fact; 
2. Its falsity; 
3. Its materiality; 
4. The speaker's knowledge of its falsity; 
5. The speaker's intent that the representation will be acted upon in a reasonably 
contemplated manner; 
6. The listener's ignorance of its falsity; 
7. The listener's reliance on the t111th of the representation; 
8. The listener's right to rely on the truth of the representations; and, 
9. The listener's consequent and proximate injury. 
C:3 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Amend (Rule lS(a)) Page 7 
McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 777, 820 P.2d 360, 372 (1991) (McDevitt, J., 
dissenting). The Idaho Supreme COUli later commented: 
It cannot be controverted that actionable fraud or misrepresentation by a vendor 
may be by concealment or failure to disclose a ... material fact, where under the 
circumstances there was an obligation to disclose it during the transaction. If 
deception is accomplished, the form of the deceit is immaterial. And the legal 
question is not affected by the absence of an intent to deceive, for the element of 
intent, whether good or bad, is only important as it may affect the moral character 
of the representation. 
Staff of the Idaho Real Estate Comm 'n v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630, 635-36, 22 P.3d 105, 
110-11 (2001). In this case, the elements of fraud are suppOlied by the evidence and the 
Court has previously found issues of fact on Printcraft's fraud claims against Sunnyside. 
Printcraft now seeks to allege fraud against Beck and Woolf individually. All of 
the elements of fraud are suggested and satisfied in the evidence. Beck and Woolf acted 
as officers of Sunnyside when dealing with Printcraft. Beck and \Voolfboth had an 
obligation to disclose the information they had regarding the blueprints and schematics 
for the industrial park. Both Beck and Woolf were aware of the industrial nature and 
orientation of the business engaged in by Printcraft. (Waters Aff. 'Il'll18-27.)3 Beck and 
Woolf had an obligation to disclose the relevant information contained in the blueprints 
and plans for the industrial park to Printcraft because that knowledge "is so vital that if 
the mistake were mutual the contract would be voidable, and the party knowing the fact 
also knows that the other does not know it." Sowards v. Rathburn, 134 Idaho 702, 707, 8 
P.3d 1245, 1250 (2000). Beck and Woolf knew that their representations, and the 
concurrent omissions, would be relied upon by Printcraft. Beck and Woolf intended for 
Printeraft to rely upon their statements to Printeraft. Printeraft did not know of the 
limitations of the septic system. (Id.) 
3 This affidavit was previously submitted to the COUli. G;:; G 
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As this court previously noted, the issue of reliance is a question of fact. King v. 
Lang, 136 Idaho 905, 42 P.3d 698 (2002). Thus, whether Printcraft reasonably relied on 
the intentional omissions by Beck and Woolf is an issue that the jury will ultimately have 
to decide. This court also previously found that the issue of causation and damages is a 
fact question. 
Since this court previously found issues of material fact on Printcraft's fraud 
claims, the fact that Beck and Woolf, as Sunnyside officers, failed to disclose the 
pertinent infonnation to Printcraft make them liable for that fraudulent conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
As a result of the foregoing, Printcraft respectfully request that the Court exercise 
its discretion and allow it to amend its claims against Sunnyside and Woolf and Beck 
individually. 
r,A""" 
1I ~ ;' 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 




SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC. an 
Idaho corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE 
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL 
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: S8 
County of Bonneville ) 
Case No. CV~06-7097 
AFFIDA VIT OF LAWRY WILDE 
(CTR MANAGEMENT, LLC.) 1N 
OPPOSITION TO 
THE DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
LA WRY WILDE, after first being duly sworn on oath, deposes and states as follows: 
P. 03 
1. I am over the age of 18 and, am competent to testify and the information 
contained in this affidavit is made upon my own knowledge; 
AFFIDAVIT OF LAWRY WILDE (em DEVELOPMENT, LLC) 
IN OPPOSITION TO THE DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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3. On or about J6llWl1"Y 23, 2006, 1h~ OWllM of the property, WllO is identified as 
" J&r;B Prol'lcrties, ltw.~ entered into 4 'Mitten LCSB8 Asreement with CTR. Managemetlt) LLC) 
" ,wilb regan!! to leMing the ~isct. 
4. T,lle 1.Ulderntaiidingl b(:tweerl J&LB. C'I1t EI.l1d the above Qaptione4 Pla.intiff was 
: thAt the lessees w~w, be riJBpo~ible to pay for U1d obtaiD. a SI.'MCIt' (;Ol1I1eCtion. from the 
wbdhision which ltad already DCCUlTed • 
, FUR'l1lER. SArI'H AFFIANT NAUOHT. 
Datt=d this .:!::::.. day of Au~t. 2007. 
I , 
SOBSCRIaE'O AND ~WaRN TO befbte me at1 this ~ day of A1l4:USt. :;t001. 
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Case No. CV-06-7097 
REPLY OF SUNNYSIDE PARK 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN 
RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW, the Defendant, Sunnyside Park Owners Association, an Idaho 
corporation ("SPOA"), through its counsel of record, Mark R. Fuller of Fuller & Carr, and 
submits this Reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Response to Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
REPLY OF SUNNYSIDE PARK OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. 
TO PLAINTIfF'S lv1EMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO MOTION FOF 
SUMt1}\RY ,JUDGlV1ENT - 1 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF FACTS RELATED TO SPOA'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1. Plaintiff has repeatedly relied upon the statements given by Doyle Beck, during the 
May 30,2007, Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., as though 
such statements were admissions by Defendant SPOA. Defendant SPOA asserts 
that Doyle Beck provided testimony in response to a 30(b )(6) subpoena to 
Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., and Doyle Beck was not testifying on behalf of 
Defendant SPOA during such deposition. See Plaintiff's Amended Notice of 
Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Defendant pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6). SPOA 
was not a party to this case until July 5, 2007. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BREACH OF THIRD PARTY UTILITY AGREEMENT 
A. Defendant SPOA has no obligations to provide sewer services to 
Printcraft llnder the Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement. 
Printcraft has not disputed that SPOA has no obligations to provide sewer services 
under the Third Party Beneficiary Contract. Printcraft has provided no case law which 
would allow Printcraft to recover under a breach of contract theory for SPOA's failure to 
provide sewer services when SPOA did not undertake any such obligations under the 
Third Party Beneficiary Contract. "A breach of contract occurs when there is a failure to 
perform a contractual duty." Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 32280, pg. 6 (Idaho 
5-24-2007). (A copy of this decision is attached for the convenience of the court). In Paz, 
the Court held: "The plaintiffs failed to exercise the purchase option per the contract's 
REPLY OF SUNNYSIDE PARK OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. 
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terms. Therefore, Paz had no contractual obligation to sell the property to the plaintiffs 
and did not breach the contract by failing to do so." Id., pg. 8. (Emphasis added). 
Because SPOA had no obligation to provide sewer service to the Plaintiff, SPOA did not 
breach the contract by failing to do so. SPOA is entitled to Summary Judgment on 
Printcraft's Cause of Action for Breach of the Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement. 
8. Printcraft is not entitled to enforce the alleged oral agreement against 
SPOA 
Printcraft is not entitled to enforce any alleged oral agreement for sewer services, 
because there is no issue of material fact that Printcraft's discharges were in violation of 
state and federal rules and regulations. See Order RE: Pending Motions, entered July 3, 
2007. Defendant SPOA re-alleges and incorporates Defendant Sunnyside Utilities' 
argument regarding any oral agreement for sewer services from SPOA alleged by 
Printcraft. SPOA is entitled to Summary Judgment regarding Printcraft's attempt to 
recover under breach of any alleged oral agreement for Printcraft to receive sewer 
services. 
II. CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD 
Printcraft's two causes of action for Constructive Fraud must fail because Printcraft 
has produced no evidence of a relationship of trust and confidence between SPOA and 
Printcraft. Under Mitchell v. Barendregt, the Court held that "[b]ecause no legally 
enforceable relationship of trust and confidence existed between Mitchell and Berendregt, 
no action for constructive fraud can arise from their dealings." 120 Idaho 837, 844, 820 
P.2d 707 (Ida. App. 1991) (Emphasis Added). Printcraft's allegation of a two constructive 
REPLY OF SUNNYSIDE PARK mVNERS ASSOCIATION, 
TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUlvJ IN RESPONSE TO j\jOTION FOR 
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fraud claims without any evidence of a relationship of trust and confidence between 
SPOA and Printcraft was frivolous. 
III. FAILURE TO DISCLOSE ANDIOR MISREPRESENTATION AND CONSTRUCTIVE 
FRAUD 
A. Duty to Disclose 
Defendant SPOA had no duty to disclose any information regarding Sunnyside 
Park Utilities, Inc.'s sewer system to Printcraft Press because there was no relationship 
whatsoever between SPOA and Printcraft prior to Printcraft's occupancy of the building. 
Printcraft claims the following actions by SPOA created a duty for SPOA to disclose 
information to Printcraft: 
(1) SPOA's failure to record the Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement; 
(2) SPOA's alleged creation and recordation of a plat map and CC&Rs for the 
subdivision: 
(3) SPOA's receipt of the April 15, 2002 letter from District Seven Health Department; and 
(4) SPOA's alleged involvement in meetings with Printcraft prior to construction of the 
building Printcraft now occupies. See Plaintiff's Memorandum, pg. 25-27. 
SPOA re-alleges and incorporates by reference the arguments and case law set 
forth in Sunnyside Utilities' reply brief regarding the duty to disclose as if set forth fully 
herein. 
None of the facts asserted by Printcraft created a duty for SPOA to disclose 
information to Printcraft. Printcraft has not disputed that neither Printcraft, nor any of the 
REPLY OF SUNNYSIDE PARK OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. 
TO PLAINTIFF'S j\jEMORANDUlVl IN RESPONSE TO lVIOTION FOR 
SUl1j\1ARY JUDGMENT - 4 
prior owners or occupants of Block 1, Lot 5 are members of SPOA. See Affidavit of Kirk 
Woolf, para. 3. Printcraft has not disputed that neither Printcraft, nor any of the prior 
owners or occupants of Block 1, Lot 5 ever paid any type of consideration to SPOA. Id. 
para. 4. There has been no evidence produced by Printcraft of a relationship of 
confidence and trust between SPOA and Printcraft. There is no evidence of even a direct 
contractual relationship between SPOA and Printcraft prior to Printcraft's occupancy of 
the building pursuant to the oral month-to-month lease between Printcraft and CTR 
Management. 
There is no evidence that SPOA created or recorded the plat map for the property 
or created or recorded the CC&R's for the subdivision. The plat map was created and 
recorded in 1999 on behalf of Defendant SIPP. See Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, 
para. 12. The CC&Rs referenced by Printcraft specifically state that they were created by 
SIPP and the only signature on the CC&Rs is specifically on behalf of SIPP. See CC&Rs 
attached as Exhibit "H" to the Affidavit of Travis Waters. Even if the Court were to find that 
SPOA was involved with the plat map and the CC&Rs, those documents do not justify 
creation of an affirmative duty because they do not create any relationship between 
SPOA and Printcraft. See SIPP's reply brief regarding the plat and the CC&Rs. 
SPOA re-alleges and incorporates by reference the arguments set forth by 
Sunnyside Utilities regarding receipt of the April 15, 2002 letter and SPOA's alleged 
attendance at meetings with Printcraft prior to the construction of the building Printcraft 
now occupies pursuant to an oral month-to-month lease. 
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Because there was no relationship between SPOA and Printcraft prior to 
Printcraft's decision to occupy J&LB Properties' building, SPOA had no duty to disclose 
any information regarding Sunnyside Utilities' sewer facilities. 
B. Materiality, Reliance, and Damages 
SPOA re-alleges and re-asserts the argument of Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., set 
forth in its Reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum regarding materiality, reliance, and damages 
as if set forth fully herein. 
CONCLUSION 
Printcraft Press is not entitled to enforce or collect damages for breach of contract 
against SPOA because (1) SPOA had no obligation to provide sewer services under the 
Third Party Beneficiary Agreement and cannot be in breach of that agreement for failing 
to provide sewer services; and (2) Printcraft is not entitled to enforce any agreement for 
sewer services because of Printcraft's violation's of state and federal rules and 
regulations. Therefore, SPOA is entitled to Summary Judgment on Printcraft's cause of 
action for Breach of Contract. 
Printcraft Press is not entitled to recovery for its causes of action for non-disclosure 
and/or misrepresentation or constructive fraud because there was no relationship 
between Printcraft and SPOA. Printcraft has not proven that any non-disclosures were 
material to its decision to occupy J&LB Properties' building, that Printcraft was justified in 
relying on any alleged non-disclosure, and Printcraft has not suffered any damages as a 
direct and proximate result of any alleged non-disclosure. 
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SPOA requests Summary Judgment against Printcraft on all of Printcraft's causes 
of action. 
DATED this q day of --¥--if-'=-"':-_-' 2007. 
Mark R. Fuller 
Fuller & Carr 
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ensued whereby Pastor orally agreed that the Church would put $5,000 
down on the property, with the balance of the purchase price to bear 9.5 
percent interest and be paid in monthly installments of $550. The 
Church paid $2,500 on April 27, 2000, and Paz proceeded to purchase the 
subject property on May 18, 2000. 
The parties did not execute a written agreement regarding the subject 
property until June 22, 2000, when they signed a contract furnished by 
Paz. The written contract differed from the parties' prior oral 
agreement in that it did not provide for a down payment. Additionally, 
the contract stated it was a lease with an option to purchase; however, 
Pastor, who could not read or write English, signed with the belief that 
it was a simple sale contract in accordance with the terms of their oral 
agreement. The contract provided that should the Church wish to exercise 
its option to purchase the subject property, it must do so between May 
18, 2001 and May 28, 2001 by: (1) paying an additional $550; (2) 
entering into a long term purchase agreement with Paz; and (3) utilizing 
Alliance Title of Caldwell as the closing agency. The plaintiffs began 
making what they believed to be monthly purchase payments of $550 on 
July 1, 2000. Paz contends the payments were rent payments under the 
terms of the lease. The plaintiffs subsequently presented Paz with a 
second payment of $2,500 on July 5, 2000. Then, in Mayor June of 2001, 
the plaintiffs allege Paz informed Pastor that state regulations 
prohibited him from selling the subject property until two years had 
lapsed from when he sold the commercial property to the City of 
Caldwell. 
In the spring of 2003, the Church came up with sufficient funding to 
payoff the remaining balance of the purchase price and Pastor 
approached Paz to acquire title to the 
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subject property. At that time, Paz informed him that the Church had not 
exercised its option to purchase the property pursuant to the terms of 
the contract. Paz did, however, indicate that he would be willing to 
sell the subject property to the Church for $70,000. He further stated 
that he would credit against the new asking price the $5,000 payment 
made by the plaintiffs, $1,294 the plaintiffs paid to keep the building 
insured, $1,837.49 they paid in property taxes, and $108.81 they paid 
for irrigation assessments, bringing the requested purchase price down 
to $61,759.70.[fnl] 
The plaintiffs sued for breach of contract, claiming they had a 
contractual right to purchase the subject property for $52,500. Paz 
denied the plaintiffs' claim, and filed a counterclaim seeking a quiet 
title jUdgment. Paz then filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing 
that the contract executed by the parties constituted a lease agreement 
with an option to purchase and that the plaintiffs had failed to 
exercise the option. Although the district court found that the contract 
unambiguously constituted a lease agreement with an option to purchase, 
it initially denied Paz' motion on the ground that a material factual 
dispute might exist concerning the statement allegedly made by Paz in 
Mayor June of 2001, regarding his ability to sell the property. On 
reconsideration, the district court found that Paz' alleged statement 
was immaterial and granted his motion for summary judgment, holding that 
the plaintiffs never exercised their contractual option to purchase. The 
district court subsequently quieted title to the property in Paz' name. 
The plaintiffs appeal. 
II. 
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The following issues will be addressed in this opinion: (1) whether 
the district court erred in finding that the parties' written contract 
was a lease with an option to purchase and subsequently granting Paz' 
motion for summary judgment, and (2) whether either party is entitled to 
attorney fees or costs on appeal. 
A. 
When reviewing a summary judgment order, this Court applies the same 
standard as the district court. Foster v. Traul, Idaho 890, 892, 
(2005). Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, 
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together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." loR.C.P. 56(c). "If there is no genuine 
issue of material fact, only a question of law remains, over which this 
Court exercises free review." Infanger v. Ci ty of Salmon, Idaho 45, 
, 44 P.le! , 1102 (2002). This Court will construe all disputed 
facts liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable 
inferences will be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Hayward v. 
Jack's Pharmacy Inc., 141 Idaho 622, 625, 115P.3d713, 116 (2005). If 
the facts are such that reasonable persons could reach differing 
results, summary judgment is improper. Id. 
B. 
At dispute in this case is whether the plaintiffs have an ownership 
right in the subject property pursuant to the parties' written contract. 
Paz argues, and the district court found, that the parties' contract 
constituted a lease agreement with an option to purchase and that the 
plaintiffs failed to exercise the option. The plaintiffs maintain that 
the contract constituted a contract for sale of the subject property, 
which Paz breached by failing to transfer title when presented with the 
purchase price. In the alternative, they argue that even if the Court 
finds the contract to be a lease agreement with an option to purchase, 
they exercised the option by paying Paz $2,500 on July 5, 2000. 
Finally, the plaintiffs argue that the doctrine of quasi-estoppel 
precludes summary judgment in this case. 
i. 
As an initial matter, this Court must determine the legal effect of 
the parties' written contract. "The interpretation of a contract begins 
wi th the language of the contract i tsel f." Independence Lead Mines Co. 
v. Hecla Mining Co., 143 Idaho 22, 26, 1311>.30409, 413 (2006). If the 
language of the contract is unambiguous, then its meaning and legal 
effect must be determined from its words. Shawver v. Huckleberry 
Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354, 361, 931'.30685, 692 (2004). "A contract 
is ambiguous if it is reasonably subject to conflicting 
interpretations." Lamprecht v. Jordan, LLC, 139 Idaho 182, 185, 
743, 746 (2003). Determining whether a contract is ambiguous is a 
question of law over which this Court exercises free review. 
Id. 
5 
The express terms of the parties' contract unambiguously provided that 
it was a lease agreement with an option to purchase. Paragraph five of 
the contract, which delineated the pricing terms, stated that the total 
purchase price of the subject property was to be $52,500 with nothing 
; (,0 
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down, and that the "[bJalance of the purchase price to be paid as 
follows: LEASE WITH AN OPTION TO PURCHASE AT $52,500." Paragraph eight 
provided additional terms and conditions, it stated in relevant part: 
THE TENANTS ARE TO HAVE POSSESSION OF THE 
PROPERTY AND LEASE AT $550.00 A MONTH. LEASE 
PAYMENTS ARE TO BE PAID AT THE BEGINNING OF EACH 
MONTH. THE TENANT IS TO EXERCISE THE PURCHASE 
OPTION BETWEEN MAY 18TH 2001 AND MAY 28TH 2001 BY 
PAYING $550.00 AND ENTERING INTO THE LONG TERM 
PURCHASE AGREEMENTS. 
THE CLOSING AGENCY IS TO BE ALLIANCE TITLE OF 
CALDWELL, ID. 
THE TENANTS ARE TO PAY FOR ALL MAINTENANCE, 
UPKEEP, UTILITIES AND PROVIDE THEIR OWN 
INSURANCE. 
The language of the contract indicates it is not an absolute agreement 
to sell, as suggested by the plaintiffs. Rather, the language grants the 
plaintiffs an option to purchase the property at a specified time for 
the specified price of $52,500. A reading of the contract's plain 
language establishes that the parties executed a lease agreement with an 
option to purchase. 
The plaintiffs contend that Pastor believed he was signing a simple 
sale contract in accordance with the parties' prior oral agreement and 
intended to purchase, not lease, the subject property. Pastor's 
subjective belief is inconsistent with the plain language of the 
contract. The parties do not dispute that Pastor did not review the 
terms of the contract at the time of signing due to his inability to 
read English. Pastor's erroneous belief that he was signing a sale 
contract will not excuse his failure to read the contract's terms prior 
to signing, nor will it allow him to avoid the contract's terms on the 
ground that he did not understand them. [fn2] Constantine v. 
McDonald, 25 Idaho 342, 344, 137 P. 531, 531 (1913) (a person who cannot 
read the language in which a contract is written has a duty to procure 
someone to read and explain it to him before signing). 
6 
Further, the plaintiffs' contention that the parties' written contract 
was merely a reproduction of the parties' previous oral agreement and 
should be enforced as such is misplaced. Paragraph 22 of the contract 
contained a merger clause, the purpose of which is to establish that the 
writing constituted the parties' entire agreement and superseded all 
prior informal understandings. Howard v. Perry, 141 Idaho 139, 142, 
106 (2005). Any informal oral agreement the parties may have 
reached regarding the subject property was superseded by the written 
agreement and cannot now be relied upon to alter or change its plain 
language. 
Last, the plaintiffs argue that the document's heading 
"Commercial/Investment Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement" 
indicates that the agreement was a contract for sale. When interpreting 
contractual provisions, the agreement must be viewed as a whole to 
determine the parties' intent. Lickley v. Max Herbold r Inc., 
133 Idaho , 211, 984P.2d697, 699 (1999). If, after viewing the contract in 
its entirety, it appears that preprinted portions of the form conflict 
with written portions, "the written parts control the printed parts, and 
,. 1"' .... ~ 
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the parts which are purely original control those which are copied from 
a form, and if the two are absolutely repugnant, the latter must be so 
far disregarded." I.C. § 29-109. In this case, the written contractual 
provisions establish it was a lease agreement with an option to 
purchase. 
In sum, though Pastor may have thought he was signing a sale contract, 
the plain language established that it was a lease agreement with an 
option to purchase. "Courts do not possess the roving power to rewrite 
contracts in order to make them more equitable." Shawver, 
at693. The district court did not err in holding that the 
parties' written contract was a lease agreement with an option to 
purchase. 
ii. 
Similarly, the district court did not err in finding that Paz did not 
breach the contract. "A breach of contract occurs when there is a 
failure to perform a contractual duty." Shawver, 140 Idaho 361, 
93 at692. The plaintiffs contend that Paz had a contractual 
obligation to convey the subject property when Pastor approached him in 
2003 with the balance of the purchase price. This argument is 
inconsistent with the contract's terms, which established that the 
Church was merely a lessee upon signing. Paz did not have an obligation 
to sell the property pursuant to the contract until the 
Page 7 
plaintiffs exercised the option in the manner prescribed in the parties' 
contract. See Sutheimer v. Stoltenberg, 127 Idaho 81, 86, 8961".2<1989, 
(Ct .App. 1995) (optionors have no duty to convey title unless and 
until the option is exercised, "until then, no bilateral sale contract 
exist[sl"). By failing to exercise the option within the specified time 
period the plaintiffs allowed the option to expire, thereby relieving 
Paz of any potential contractual duty to sell the property. 
The plaintiffs argue that even if this Court interprets the contract 
to embody a lease with an option to purchase, they exercised the option 
by making a $2,500 payment on July 5, 2000. The plaintiffs' position 
that the $2,500 dollars they put down exercised the option to 
purchase the property - is likewise contrary to the terms of the 
contract. Assuming that a portion of the $2,500 payment could be 
attributed to the $550 that was to be paid between May 18, 2001 and May 
28, 2001, it is still undisputed that the plaintiffs did not execute any 
long-term purchase agreements as required by the contract, nor did they 
close the purchase through Alliance Title per the contract's terms. 
Last, the plaintiffs allege that in Mayor June of 2001, Paz informed 
Pastor that state regulations prohibited him from selling the subject 
property until two years had lapsed from the time he sold his commercial 
property to the City of Caldwell. The plaintiffs do not state what they 
allege the legal effect of Paz' statement was. Paz' statement did not 
become a part of, alter, or modify the contract as there was no meeting 
of the minds between the parties that such would be the case. See Barry 
v. Pacific West Canst., Inc., 140 I<laho 827, 831, 103P.3d440, 444 
(2004). The plaintiffs do not allege mistake in their pleadings, nor do 
they seek any relief in the form of reformation. Furthermore there is no 
indication (1) that the plaintiffs tried to exercise their option at the 
time provided in the agreement or at any time within the next year, or 
(2) that Paz ever withdrew the option, or took any action precluding the 
plaintiffs from exercising the option during the time prescribed. 
Therefore, the district court correctly held that Paz' alleged statement 
, ,...., r, 
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was immaterial and did not preclude summary judgment. 
iii. 
On appeal, the plaintiffs argue for the first time that the district 
court erred in granting summary judgment because it did not consider the 
doctrine of quasi-estoppel. 
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An issue raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered by 
this Court. McPheters v. Maile, Idaho 391, 397, 64P.3d317, 323 
(2003) . 
c. 
Paz seeks attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121, alleging that the 
action was brought frivolously. Paz is not entitled to an award because 
the plaintiffs did not act frivolously or unreasonably in this matter. 
Paz additionally seeks attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3), 
which provides that the prevailing party shall recover attorney fees in 
a civil action to recover on a contract relating to the purchase or sale 
of goods or services and in any commercial transaction.[fn3] Paz does 
not seek attorney fees on the basis that the case involved a commercial 
transaction. Rather, Paz characterizes the case as a contract action. 
However, the contract branch of Idaho Code § 12-120(3) pertains only to 
contracts for the purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or 
services. By its own terms, it does not apply to contracts for the 
rental or purchase of real property. Because Paz merely cites to Idaho 
Code § 12-120(3) and does not provide any argument justifying an award 
under that section, his request is denied. Craig Johnson Const., LLC v. 
Floyd Town Architects, P.A., 142 Idaho 797, 803, 134P.3d ,654 
(2006) . 
III. 
The district court is affirmed. The parties' written contract 
unambiguously constituted a lease agreement with an option to purchase. 
The plaintiffs failed to exercise the purchase option per the contract's 
terms. Therefore, Paz had no contractual obligation to sell the property 
to the plaintiffs and did not breach the contract by failing to do so. 
Costs, but not attorney fees, are awarded to Paz. 
Justices TROUT and BURDICK CONCUR. 
[fnl] Plaintiffs did not seek to recover the taxes and assessments they 
paid, which appear to be the responsibility of Paz under the contract, 
nor do they seek to recover for certain improvements they made to the 
building. 
[fn2] Plaintiffs did not allege that Paz fraudulently induced Pastor to 
sign the contract by affirmatively misrepresenting its contents. 
[fn3] Of interest is the fact that Paz was awarded attorney fees below. 
In its written decision on the matter, the district court recited that 
"[t]he parties are in agreement that the defendant is the prevailing 
party and entitled to recover reasonable attorneys based on I.C. § 
12-120(3) and under the terms of the agreement between the parties." 
There is nothing in the record to indicate whether the award under 
"1"\'-" 
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§ 12-120(3) was based on the contract provision or the commercial 
transaction provision. On appeal, however, Paz does not assert a right 
to fees under either the agreement between the parties or under the 
commercial transaction provision. 
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Justice EISMANN, concurring in the result in part and dissenting in 
part. 
I concur in the result in Parts II.A and B. I do so not because I 
disagree with the reasoning, but because the issues addressed were not 
properly raised on appeal. I agree that Respondent did not properly 
request attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) because he did not 
contend that this was a commercial transaction. However, because I 
believe he is entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code 
§ I respectfully dissent as to that portion of Part II.C. 
Attorney fees on appeal are awardable under Idaho Code § 12-121 if the 
appeal was brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. 
Gustaves v. Gustaves, 138 Idaho 64, 57 P.3d 775 (2002). The appeal in 
this case certainly qualifies. 
We have consistently held that issues on appeal must be raised in the 
opening brief. Rowley v. Fuhrman, 133 Idaho 105, 982 P.ld 940 (1999). 
"In order to be considered by this Court, the appellant is required to 
identify legal issues and provide authorities supporting the arguments 
in the opening brief. A reviewing court looks to the initial brief on 
appeal for the issues presented on appeal." Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. 
Co., Idaho ,50S, 95 P.3d 917, 990 (2004) (citations omitted). 
This Court will not address an issue raised only in the reply brief. 
Hogg v. Wolske, Idaho , 130 P.3d 10S7 (2006); Suitts v. Nix, 
, ll1P.3dll0 (2005); Hernandez v. State, 1271da110685, 
(1995); State v. Killinger, 126 Idaho 137, 890P.2d323 (1995); 
State v. Raudebaugh, Idaho 758, 763, 864P.2d596, 601 (1993). 
In their opening brief, the Appellants did not list any issues on 
appeal. They did not dispute that the contract they signed was a lease 
with an option to purchase. In fact, that is what they repeatedly stated 
it was.[ful] They presented argument on only two issues: 
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(1) the district court should have considered the doctrine of 
quasi-estoppel and (2) the district court should have found that the 
Appellants exercised their option to purchase the property. The first 
issue was not raised in the trial court, and therefore the majority 
rightfully did not address it on appeal. Interestingly, that is the only 
issue on which the Appellants provided any authority in their briefing. 
With respect to the second issue, the Appellants entire argument in 
their opening brief was as follows: 
Further under the facts, the court should have 
found with respect to the lease/option which 
respondent had appellant Pastor sign, that the 
appellants had exercised the option to purchase, 
the respondent having received $5,000 on the 
transaction for which he never gave any credit in 
writing, or orally informed the appellants that 
that was consideration for his having leased the 
Darigold property to appellants with the option 
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to purchase. (Opening brief, pp. 17 18) 
In arguing that the district court should have found that they had 
exercised the option to purchase, the Appellants did not even address 
the contractual requirements for doing so. The contract states, "The 
tenant is to exercise the purchase option between May 18th 2001 and May 
28th 2001 by paying $550.00 and entering into the long term purchase 
agreements." The Appellants totally ignored the additional requirement 
that they enter into a long-term purchase agreement. The agreement also 
states, "The closing agency is to be Alliance Title of Caldwell, Id." 
The Appellants also ignore the fact that there was no closing. 
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In their reply brief, the Appellants responded to Respondent's 
argument that they had not exercised their option to purchase. In doing 
so, they simply reiterated that they had paid the $550. They did not 
address the other requirement that they also execute a long-term 
purchase agreement, nor did they mention the lack of any closing. Their 
entire argument was as follows: 
Was the option exercised? It is Appellants' 
contention that it was. By the terms of the 
option to exercise it, the payment of $550.00 
was to have been made between May 18, 2001 and 
May 28, 2001. Actually, the $550.009 had already 
been paid. The payment was acknowledged when the 
agreement was executed. Reference is made to 
paragraph 6 "EARNEST MONEY". As much as the 
receipt of July 5, 2000 acknowledges the payment 
of $2,500.00 on the building, why was such 
payment required of Appellants if it did not 
apply to the purchase of the building and, 
certainly, many times over exceeded the $550.00 
payment to exercise the option in 2001. 
It was only in their reply brief that the 
Appellants made a half-hearted effort to argue that 
the agreement may be ambiguous, and they did so 
only in response to the Respondent's argument that 
it was unambiguous. The Appellants admit, "This 
Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement form was 
converted into a lease option by a realtor employed 
by Mr. Paz." (Reply brief, p. 4) They then argued 
that the document's heading, without reading its 
contents, could cause one to believe it was a 
purchase contract. "The agreement of June 22, 2000 
upon examination without study gives the impression 
that it was a 'Commercial/Investment Real Estate 
Purchase and Sale Agreement', as it is identified 
and not a lease." (Reply brief, p. 5; emphasis 
added) Even then, the Appellants admitted it was a 
lease. They continued, "Mr. Paz could have 
explained to Mr. Pastor that it was not a purchase 
and sale agreement as it appeared, but a lease with 
an option to purchase." (Reply brief, p. 5) 
The only issue properly raised by Appellants on appeal was whether 
they had exercised their option to purchase. In arguing that issue, they 
do not even address the contractual requirements for doing so. In my 
opinion, this appeal was brought and pursued frivolously, unreasonably, 
. '"' .~ 
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and without foundation. 
Chief Justice SCHROEDER CONCURS. 
[fnl] For example, they stated: 
Respondent did not tell appellant Pastor that 
the aqreement was a lease/option and not an 
agreement selling the property with a down 
payment and monthly installments as stated 
before. (Opening brief, p. 5) 
An examination of the agreement shows 
appellants were to have exercised the option by 
making an additional payment of $550 between May 
18, 2001 and May 28, 200l. (Opening brief, p. 7) 
The discovery by the appellants that the 
agreement signed by appellant Pastor was not an 
agreement for sale and purchase, but a 
lease/option, did not occur until appellants had 
arranged to pay the balance of the purchase price 
owed respondent. (Opening brief, p. 12) 
It appears the reason respondent, instead of 
having prepared an agreement for purchase and 
sale, had the agreement of lease and option 
prepared because he wanted to defer the income 
taxes he would have to pay by reason of his sale 
of property to the City of Caldwell. 
Under the provisions of the Internal Revenue 
Code relating to the exchange of properties, and 
the income tax advantages for respondent, he knew 
he could not immediately sell the property to the 
church, which he thought was for one year, and 
which he provided in the lease/option agreement 
he had appellant Pastor sign. (Opening brief, p. 
13 ) 
In this case respondent to the disadvantage of 
appellants by making the agreement between the 
parties a lease/option was inconsistent with the 
position he had taken that he was purchasing the 
Darigold property and selling it to appellant 
church. (Opening brief, p. 16) 
In this case, the respondent reaped an 
unconscionable advantage and appellants suffered 
an unconscionable disadvantage by respondent's 
changing his position from selling to the 
appellant church the Darigold property and having 
appellant Pastor sign a lease with an option to 
purchase. (Opening brief, p. 17) 
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REPLY OF SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL 
AND PROFESSIONAL PARK TO 
PRINTCRAFT'S MEMORANDUM 
IN RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW, the Defendant, Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Park, an 
Idaho limited liability corporation ("SIPP"), through its counsel of record, Mark R. Fuller of 
Fuller & Carr, and submits this Reply to Printcraft Press, Inc.'s ("Printcraft") Memorandum 
in Response to Motion for Summary Judgment. 
REPLY OF SUNNYSIDE INDllSTRIJl,L AND PROFESSIOl'JJl.L P!-iRK 
TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDU]\1 IN RESPONSE TO ~10TION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF FACTS RELATED TO SIPP'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1. Plaintiff has repeatedly relied upon the statements given by Doyle Beck, during the 
May 30,2007 Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., as though 
such statements were admissions of Defendant SIPP. Defendant SIPP asserts 
that Doyle Beck provided testimony in response to a 30(b)(6) subpoena directed 
solely to Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., and Doyle Beck was not testifying on behalf 
of Defendant SIPP during such deposition. See Plaintiff's Amended Notice of 
Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Defendant pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6). SIPP 
was not a party to this case until July 5,2007. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BREACH OF THIRD PARTY UTILITY AGREEMENT 
A. Defendant SIPP is not a party to the Third Party Utility Agreement 
Despite filing a claim for breach of the Third Party Utility Agreement against SIPP, 
Printcraft now acknowledges that "the Defendant SIPP is not a party to the written Third 
Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement and therefore has no liability thereunder." See 
Plaintiff's Memorandum, pg. 18, fn. 1. Printcraft's filing of a claim for Breach of the Third 
Party Beneficiary Agreement against SIPP was patently frivolous. 
B. Printcraft is not entitled to enforce the alleged oral agreement against 
SIPP 
Printcraft is not entitled to enforce any alleged oral agreement, because there is no 
issue of material fact that Printcraft's discharges were in violation of state and federal 
REPLY OF SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL PARK 
TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR 
Sm1MARY JUDGMENT - 2 
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rules and regulations. See Order entered July 5, 2007. Defendant SIPP re-alleges and 
incorporates Defendant Sunnyside Utilities' argument regarding the oral agreement now 
alleged by Printcraft. SIPP is entitled to Summary Judgment regarding Printcraft's attempt 
to recover under breach of any alleged oral agreement for Printcraft to receive sewer 
services. 
II. CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD 
Printcraft's two causes of action for Constructive Fraud must fail because Printcraft 
has produced no evidence of a relationship of trust and confidence between SIPP and 
Printcraft. Under Mitchell v. 8arendregt, the Court held that "[b]ecause no legally 
enforceable relationship of trust and confidence existed between Mitchell and Berendregt, 
no action for constructive fraud can arise from their dealings." 120 Idaho 837,844,820 
P.2d 707 (Ida. App. 1991) (Emphasis Added). Printcraft's allegation of a two constructive 
fraud claims without any evidence of a relationship of trust and confidence between SIPP 
and Printcraft was frivolous. 
III. FAILURE TO DISCLOSE ANDIOR MISREPRESENTATION 
A. Duty to Disclose 
Defendant SIPP had no duty to disclose any information regarding Sunnyside Park 
Utilities, Inc.'s sewer system to Printcraft Press because there was no relationship 
whatsoever between SIPP and Printcraft. Printcraft claims the following actions by SIPP 
created a duty for SIPP to disclose information related to Sunnyside Utilities' sewer 
facilities to Printcraft: 
REPLY OF SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL PARK 
TO PLAINTIFF'S MEt10RANDUM IN RESPONSE TO l'10TION FOR 
SUlvjMARY ,JUDGMENT - 3 
(1) SIPP named the subdivision "Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Park" (this 
includes placement of a sign by the entrance to the subdivision, creation and recordation 
of a plat map, and creation and recordation of CC&Rs for the subdivision); 
(2) the receipt by SIPP of the April 15, 2002 letter from District Seven Health Department; 
and 
(3) SIPP allegedly was involved in meetings with Printcraft prior to the construction of the 
building Printcraft now occupies. See Plaintiff's Memorandum, pg. 25-27. 
SIPP re-asserts and incorporates by reference the arguments and case law set 
forth in Sunnyside Utilities' reply brief regarding the duty to disclose as if set forth fully 
herein. 
Printcraft claims that by naming the subdivision "Sunnyside Industrial and 
Professional Park," SIPP had the duty to inform Printcraft that Sunnyside Utilities' sewer 
system was not capable of treating Printcraft's discharges of hazardous chemicals, inks, 
water softener brine, and other discharges from Printcraft's printing processes. Printcraft's 
claim is without merit. 
Printcraft asserts that Travis Waters read the sign for the subdivision near the 
entrance to the subdivision which stated: "Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Park" 
and that as a result Printcraft believed that the subdivision would be an ideal location for 
Printcraft's "commercial printing business." See Affidavit of Travis Waters, para. 16 and 
19. Printcraft asserts that "This sign, all by itself, led Plaintiff to believe that 'industrial' 
businesses using 'industrial' processes were and could be occupants of the subdivision." 
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See Plaintiff's Memorandum, pg. 25. Printcraft has not presented any evidence that 
"industrial" businesses using "industrial" processes are not and cannot be occupants of 
the subdivision. There simply is no such restriction. However, just because an "industrial" 
business can occupy the subdivision does not entitle the "industrial" business to 
discharge any substances into Sunnyside Utilities' sewer system. An "industrial" 
business can operate in the subdivision without discharging "processed" wastes into 
Sunnyside Utilities' sewer system. Corporate Express is an example, in that Corporate 
Express, which occupies four lots in the subdivision, is an "industrial" business with its 
own sewer system. See Deposition of Sunnyside Utilities, pg. 216, I. 4-14. Miskin 
Scraper Works, which occupies the largest parcel in the subdivision, is another example, 
in that Miskin Scraper works is an "industrial" business connected to the City of Idaho 
Falls sewer system. See Deposition of Sunnyside Utilities, pg. 240, I. 13-16. Printcraft was 
not mislead by the sign because the sign accurately states that "Industrial and 
Professional" businesses can operate within the subdivision in compliance with state and 
federal law. 
Printcraft claims that it is entitled to rely on descriptions of uses in the CC&Rs for 
the subdivision. However, Printcraft failed to note that the property governed by the 
CC&Rs does not include Lot 5 of Block 1 of the subdivision, the parcel occupied by 
Printcraft. See Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, attached as Exhibit "H" to the 
Affidavit of Travis Waters. The legal description of the property governed by the CC&Rs 
is: 
REPLY OF SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL lum PROFESSIONAL PARK 
TO PLAINTIFF'S MElVIORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO Iv]OTION FOR 
SUMt1ARY JUDGMENT 5 
Lots 6-10, Block 1; Lots 4-5, Block 2; Lots 1-7, Block 3, and Lots 1-8, Block 4, 
Sunnyside Professional and Industrial Park, Division 1, Bonneville County, Idaho, 
according to the plat thereof, recorded August 4, 1999, as Bonneville County 
Instrument Number 1003568; all located in the northwest % of Section 36, T2N, R 
37 EMB. (the "Development Area."). 
Id. Creation and recordation of CC&Rs for property in the same general vicinity as 
Printcraft does not give rise to any duty to disclose to occupants of a parcel not governed 
by the CC&Rs. 
The creation and recordation of the plat map does not create a duty to disclose 
either. Printcraft claims that the plat map and the CC&Rs, by indicating that the 
subdivision can be used for commercial and industrial purposes, "create the very 
ambiguity contemplated by Krebs, that requires additional disclosure by the Defendants in 
order to avoid misleading occupants of the subdivision about what is and what is not 
allowed as a sewer discharge." See Plaintiff's Memorandum, pg. 26. Nothing on the plat 
map indicates that Printcraft is automatically entitled to discharge any sewage in 
whatever manner Printcraft chooses. See Plat map. Contrary to Printcraft's assertion, 
there was no need to inform Printcraft about "what is and what is not allowed as a sewer 
discharge" when Printcraft had no right to discharge any sewage. 
Printcraft, like all other tenants in the subdivision, had four options to make 
arrangements for discharge of its sewer prior to Printcraft's occupancy of the building: 
OPTION 1: Contract for sewer services from Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., an 
independent utility company; 
OPTION 2: Contract for sewer services from the owner of the property; 
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OPTION 3: Install an on-site, individual system (like Corporate Express); or 
OPTION 4: Contract for sewer services from the City of Idaho Falls (like Miskin 
Scraper Works). 
Printcraft did not exercise option 1. See Deposition of Printcraft Press, pg. 109, In. 
25 through pg. 110, In. 2. (Q: "Did Sunnyside promise anything to Printcraft before 
Printcraft began occupancy? A: No."). Printcraft did not exercise option 2. See Affidavit of 
Luke Boyle, para. 5. ('The understanding between J&LB, CTR, and the Plaintiff was that 
the lessees of the premises would be responsible to pay for and obtain a sewer 
connection from the subdivision ... ") 1 There is no evidence that Printcraft exercised 
options 3 or 4. If Prinlcraft had exercised any of these options, prior to its occupancy of 
the building this litigation likely could have been avoided. 
Printcraft was entitled to and continues to occupy Lot 5 of Block 1 in the 
subdivision and operate an Industrial or Commercial business. Nothing on the plat map, 
the CC&Rs or the sign is misleading regarding Printcraft's illegal dumping of hazardous 
chemicals, inks, water softener brine, large volumes of water, etc. down J&LP Properties' 
drain lines and Sunnyside Utilities' sewer system. 
Because Printcraft has failed to provide any evidence which would support 
imposition of a duty to disclose on SIPP, Printcraft's causes of action for nondisclosure 
and constructive fraud must fail against SIPP. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 US 317, 
321, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). There is simply nothing which would justify 
prior to occupancy. However, eTR Devel 
intcraft Press, obtained sewer services 
obtained a sewer connection 
to eTR Management or 
ide Utili ties. 
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imposition of an affirmative duty to disclose on SIPP. SIPP is entitled to Summary 
Judgment on Printcraft's causes of action for fraud because of Printcraft's failure to 
produce any evidence which would establish a duty for SIPP to disclose information 
regarding Sunnyside Park Utilities' sewer facilities to Printcraft. 
B. Materiality, Reliance, and Damages 
SIPP re-alleges and re-asserts the argument of Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., set 
forth in its Reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum regarding materiality, reliance, and damages 
as if set forth fully herein. 
CONCLUSION 
Printcraft Press is not entitled to enforce or collect damages for a breach of 
contract against SIPP because (1) SIPP was not a party to the Third Party Beneficiary 
Agreement; and (2) Printcraft is not entitled to enforce any oral agreement against SIPP 
because of Printcraft's violations of state and federal rules and regulations. SIPP is 
entitled to Summary Judgment on Printcraft's cause of action for Breach of Contract. 
Printcraft Press is not entitled to recovery for its causes of action for non-disclosure 
and/or misrepresentation or constructive fraud because there was no relationship 
between Printcraft and SIPP and no unusual circumstances have been proven by 
Printcraft. Printcraft has not proven that any non-disclosures were material to Printcraft's 
decision to occupy J&LB Properties' building, or that Printcraft was justified in relying on 
any alleged non-disclosure. Furthermore, Printcraft has not suffered any damages as a 
direct and proximate result of any alleged non-disclosure. 
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SIPP requests Summary Judgment against Printcraft on all of Printcraft's causes 
of action. 
DATED this 1 day of _--,¥:..;:.c' 7f=--'---' 2007. 
Mark R. Fuller 
Fuller & Carr 
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Case No. CV-06-7097 
REPLY OF SUNNYSIDE PARK 
UTILITIES TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW, the Defendant, Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., an Idaho corporation 
("Sunnyside Utilities"), through its counsel of record, Mark R. Fuller of Fuller & Carr, and 
submits this Reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Response to Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. BREACH OF CONTRACT 
A. Third Party Beneficiary 
Printcraft is not entitled to enforce the Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement 
because Printcraft persistently violated Sunnyside Utilities' Rules and Regulations and 
Printcraft violated applicable state and federal rules and regulations. See Order RE: 
Pending Motions entered July 5,2007. These facts are not disputed by Printcraft. 
Furthermore, Printcraft is merely an incidental third party beneficiary to the Third 
Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement and therefore has no rights to enforce the agreement. 
Printcraft argues that because of the title of the Third Party Beneficiary Utility 
Agreement "there has to be a third party somewhere." See Plaintiffs Memorandum, pg. 
22. Sunnyside Utilities admits that there are a virtually unlimited number of third party 
beneficiaries (some are intended beneficiaries and all others are merely incidental 
beneficiaries) under the agreement. However, case law limits the third party beneficiaries 
that can enforce the agreement to the "intended" third party beneficiaries. See Stewart v. 
Arrington Construction Company, 92 Idaho 526, 446 P.2d 895 (1968). 
Printcraft states: "[u]nder the Defendants argument no one in the Sunnyside 
Professional and Industrial Park would be an intended beneficiary despite the title of the 
Third Party Beneficiary Agreement or the language contained therein." See Plaintiffs 
Memorandum, pg. 22. First, there is no requirement that an agreement titled 'Third Party 
Beneficiary Utility Agreement" must have intended third party beneficiaries as opposed to 
merely incidental third party beneficiaries. In addition, there is a clearly defined and 
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limited class of intended third party beneficiaries to the agreement. The "present owners 
and occupants" of the subdivision at the time the agreement was entered into in March 
of 2002, are the intended third party beneficiaries of the agreement. See Third Party 
Agreement, attached as Exhibit "G" to Travis Waters Affidavit. The "future owners and 
occupants" of any of the subdivisions to be served by the company's sewer systems 
are merely incidental beneficiaries of the agreement because such owners constitute a 
vague and unlimited class of beneficiaries. Printcraft did not occupy the building until 
nearly four years after the agreement was entered into by SPOA and Sunnyside Utilities. 
Printcraft as a "future" occupant is only an incidental third party beneficiary to the "Third 
Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement", with no rights to enforce the agreement. 
Sunnyside Utilities is entitled to Summary Judgment because Printcraft has no 
right, as an incidental beneficiary, to enforce the agreement, Printcraft was in persistent 
violation of the agreement, and Printcraft violated applicable state and federal rules and 
regulations. 
B. Printcraft's violations of state and federal rules and regulations precludes 
Printcraft from enforcing any contract for sewer services 
Printcraft's violation of applicable state and federal rules and regulations precludes 
any attempt by Printcraft to recover for breach of an oral contract. Printcraft was in 
continuing violation of state and federal rules and regulations for sewer service up until 
the day that Sunnyside Utilities disconnected Printcraft from the sewer system. See Order 
entered July 5, 2007, and prior briefing. 
Apparently, Printcraft is now claiming that in October, 2006, the Defendants 
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entered into an oral agreement with Printcraft, wherein the Defendants agreed to waive 
compliance with the state and federal rules and regulations and to allow Printcraft to 
continue illegally discharging multiple substances into Sunnyside Utilities' sewer system. 
See Plaintiff's Memorandum, pgs. 20-21. ("In October 2006, the Defendants, by and 
through its officer and/or member Kirk Woolf inspected and approved the changes that 
were made by the Plaintiff. .. Thereafter, Plaintiff operated its printing business as 
inspected and approved by the Defendants for two months without incident.") Defendants 
strongly dispute that such an agreement was ever made. No other oral contract has been 
asserted by the Plaintiff. Even if, for purposes of this motion, the Court assumes that such 
an agreement was reached between the parties, such agreement is unenforceable by 
Printcraft because of its illegality. Printcraft's version of the contract, if believed by a jury, 
would preclude a recovery under a breach of contract claim by any of the parties to the 
agreement, including Printcraft. 
In Idaho, Courts have held that when faced with an illegal agreement, the Court 
will leave the parties as its finds them, and neither party will be entitled to enforce the 
agreement against the other. Barry v. Pacific West Const., 140 Idaho 827, 832, 103 P.3d 
440 (2004). "When the Court 'leaves the parties where it finds them,' it denies recovery to 
either party." Id. 
There is no dispute that Printcraft's discharges were in violation of state and 
federal rules and regulations. See Order, entered July 5, 2007. The direct result of the 
Court's earlier Order is: (1) that Printcraft breached any possible contract by violating 
state and federal rules and regulations; or (2) that any possible contract for sewer 
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service was illegal and unenforceable. Printcraft is not entitled to enforce either an 
illegal contract or a contract which Printcraft has already breached. This Court can and 
should rule as a matter of law that Printcraft is not entitled to a recovery for any breach 
of any sewer services contract. 
C. Amendment of the Complaint 
Plaintiff's argument that the Court would not have allowed amendment of the 
Complaint if Printcraft did not have a valid cause of action for Breach of Contract is 
baseless. The Court made the correct decision to allow the amendment of the Complaint 
even if the Court believed that Printcraft would be unable to support the allegations made 
in Printcraft's Amended Complaint. The Court's decision to allow the amendment has no 
bearing on whether or not the Court should grant a Motion for Summary Judgment to the 
Defendants. 
A court "may not consider the sufficiency of evidence supporting the claim sought 
to be added in determining leave to amend because that is more properly determined at 
the summary judgment stage." Thomas v. Medical Center Physicians, 138 Idaho 200,61 
P.3d 557 (2002) (Emphasis Added). Printcraft's Amended Complaint does state a valid 
claim for breach of a third party beneficiary contract. See Amended Complaint. However, 
stating a valid claim is not the equivalent of proving a valid claim. If the Court had 
considered evidence beyond the mere allegations in the proposed amended complaint, in 
determining whether or not to grant the Motion to Amend, the Court would have exceeded 
the scope of its discretion. The proper time for the Court to consider the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting Printcraft's allegations is the Summary Judgment stage. The Court 
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should now decide whether or not the evidence put forth by Printcraft is sufficient to 
sustain the causes of action that Printcraft alleged in the Amended Complaint. 
II. CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD 
Printcraft's two causes of action for Constructive Fraud must fail because Printcraft 
has produced no evidence of a relationship of trust and confidence between Sunnyside 
utilities and Printcraft. Under Mitchell v. Barendregt, the Court held that "[b]ecause no 
legally enforceable relationship of trust and confidence existed between Mitchell and 
Berendregt, no action for constructive fraud can arise from their dealings." 120 Idaho 
837, 844, 820 P.2d 707 (Ida. App. 1991) (Emphasis Added). Printcraft's allegation of a 
two constructive fraud claims without any evidence of a relationship of trust and 
confidence between Sunnyside Utilities and Printcraft was frivolous. 
III. FAILURE TO DISCLOSE AND/OR MISREPRESENTATION AND CONSTRUCTIVE 
FRAUD 
A. Duty to Disclose 
Printcraft is not entitled to recovery under its various fraud theories because 
Sunnyside Utilities had no duty to disclose to Printcraft. Printcraft claims that Sunnyside 
Utilities' duty to disclose arises from the following circumstances: 
(1) Sunnyside Utilities' failure to record the Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement; 
(2) the receipt by Sunnyside Utilities of the April 15, 2002 letter from District Seven Health 
Department; and 
(3) participation by Sunnyside Utilities in meetings with Printcraft prior to the construction 
of the building Printcraft now occupies (pursuant to an oral month-to-month sub-lease 
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agreement between Printcraft and CTR Management). See Plaintiff's Memorandum, pgs. 
25-27. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated: "Only when a defendant owes a duty to the 
plaintiff does tort liability exist." Summers v. Cambridge Joint School Oist No. 432, 139 
Idaho 953,955, 88 P.3d 772 (2004). The Utah Supreme Court held that "[a] person who 
possesses important, even vital, information of interest to another has no legal duty to 
communicate the information where no relationship between the parties exists." 
Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, 143 P.3d 283, 287 (Utah 2006) (Emphasis 
Added). Idaho's case law is consistent with the Utah Supreme Court holding. The Idaho 
Supreme Court has stated that "one also owes no affirmative duty to act to assist or 
protect another absent unusual circumstances, which justify imposing such an affirmative 
responsibility." Udy v. Custer County, 136 Idaho 386, 389, 34 P.3d 1069 (Idaho 2001). 
Printcraft has not produced evidence that any type of relationship of confidence 
and trust existed between Printcraft and Sunnyside Utilities. See Plaintiff's Memorandum 
and Supporting Documents. The only direct contractual relationship even alleged to exist 
between Printcraft Press and Sunnyside Utilities is an oral contract that was allegedly 
made in September or October of 2006, ten months after Printcraft began occupancy of 
J&LB Properties' building in January, 2006. Id. There was simply no relationship between 
the parties which would justify imposition of a legal duty to disclose prior to Printcraft's 
occupancy of the building. 
Printcraft alleges that "By the terms of the Agreement Defendants SPU and SPOA 
were required to disclose the existence of the Agreement and the Rules and Regulations 
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by recording them." See Plaintiffs Memorandum, pg. 25. Nothing in the Third Party 
Beneficiary Agreement creates a duty to disclose any information to Printcraft. The 
language and terms of the Third Party Beneficiary Agreement do not require recordation 
for the benefit of the owners or occupants of Block 1, Lot 5 of the subdivision, the parcel 
occupied by Printcraft. Printcraft has mistakenly asserted that the Third Party Beneficiary 
Utility Agreement contained terms requiring it to be recorded so that any owner or 
occupant of Block 1, Lot 5 of the subdivision would be given notice of the existence of 
that document. See Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, para. 22. However, the 
provisions of the Agreement that require the Third Party Beneficiary Agreement to be 
recorded are not intended to bind owners and occupiers of the parcels within the 
subdivision, rather they are intended to bind purchasers (1) of the sewer system, (2) of 
the Utility Company or (3) of the lot the sewer facilities are located on, and to put such 
purchasers on notice that the sewer system, the Utility Company, and the lot the sewer 
is located on are encumbered by obligations to serve any buildings connected to the 
sewer facilities. See Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement, Section 1 O(a). The 
Agreement is intended to run with the land identified in Schedule A of the Agreement. 
See §1 O(a) of the Agreement. ("The covenants, reservations, restrictions or conditions 
herein set forth are and shall be deemed to be covenants, reservations, restrictions, or 
conditions imposed and running with the land and properties of the Company as listed 
on Schedule A attached hereto"). The only parcels referred to in Schedule A of the 
Agreement are the parcels of property containing the sewer and water facilities. See Third 
Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement, Schedule A. Schedule A does not include Block 1, 
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Lot 5, the parcel occupied by Printcraft, and owned by J&LB Properties. If a duty to 
disclose did arise from the failure to record the Agreement, the duty would only be toward 
potential purchasers (1) of the sewer system; (2) of the Utility Company or (3) of the lot 
the sewer facilities are located on. 
The April 15, 2002 letter from District Seven Health Department does not give rise 
to a duty to disclose. Printcraft asserts: "The prohibition in this letter constitutes, 
'information that has been acquired which a party knows will make a representation 
untrue or misleading.'" See Plaintiff's Memorandum, pg. 26. See also Watts v. Krebs, 131 
Idaho 616, 620, 962 P.2d 387, 391 (1998). Printcraft fails to identify what prior 
representation by Sunnyside Utilities or either of the other defendants, was made untrue 
or misleading as a result of this letter, even assuming that the letter has the prohibitive 
effect Printcraft claims. Under this part of the Krebs rule recited by Printcraft, before a 
duty will arise to disclose information there must have been a previous affirmative 
representation. It is undisputed that Sunnyside Utilities never promised to provide sewer 
services to Printcraft prior to Printcraft's occupancy of the building. See Deposition of 
Printcraft Press, pg. 109, In. 25 through pg. 110, In. 2. There simply was no previous 
representation by Sunnyside Utilities which was made untrue or misleading by Sunnyside 
Utilities' alleged receipt of the April 15, 2002 letter. Without any prior representations to 
Printcraft, Sunnyside Utilities' receipt of the April 15, 2002 letter is irrelevant. There is no 
duty to correct a statement which was never made. 
Meetings between Sunnyside Utilities and Printcraft also did not give rise to a duty. 
At the time of the meetings there was no relationship between Sunnyside Utilities and 
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Printcraft, nor has any relationship between the parties been alleged. Printcraft never 
purchased any property from Sunnyside Utilities. See Affidavit of Doyle Beck, para. 3. 
Printcraft never paid a connection fee for sewer services. Id., para. 4. Printcraft was never 
promised any sewer services during those meetings. See Deposition of Printcraft Press, 
pg. 109, In. 25 through pg. 110, In. 2. There is simply no reason why Sunnyside Utilities 
would have a legal obligation to provide any information regarding Sunnyside Utilities' 
sewer facilities to Printcraft during the course of the alleged meetings. "A person who 
possesses important, even vital, information of interest to another has no legal duty to 
communicate the information where no relationship between the parties exists." Yazd v. 
Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, 143 P.3d 283, 287 (Utah 2006) 
Because Printcraft has failed to establish that Sunnyside Utilities had a duty to 
disclose any information to Printcraft regarding the sewer system, Sunnyside Utilities is 
entitled to Summary Judgment regarding Printcraft's causes of action for fraud. 
B. Any alleged non-disclosure by the Defendant was not material. 
Printcraft's allegations are not sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to 
whether or not any alleged non-disclosures by Sunnyside Utilities were material to 
Printcraft's decision to occupy J&LB Properties' building. Printcraft attempts to raise 
triable issues of fact by stating, that Printcraft would not have occupied the building if it 
knew the limitations of the sewer system. However, the issues of fact raised by Printcraft 
are not triable issues of fact which preclude Summary Judgment. It is undisputed that 
Sunnyside Utilities did not promise sewer services to Printcraft prior to Printcraft's 
occupancy of the building. See Printcraft Deposition, pg. 109, In. 25 through pg. 110, In. 
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2. It is undisputed that Printcraft was not promised sewer services by J&LB Properties, 
the owner of the building. See Lease Agreement between CTR Management and J&LB 
Properties. See also Affidavit of Luke Boyle, para. 5. Printcraft chose to occupy the 
building without obtaining the right to sewer services from anyone. For Printcraft to claim 
that it would not have occupied the building if Printcraft had known that the sewer 
services Printcraft was not entitled to receive were not capable of meeting Printcraft's 
needs is not sufficient to avoid Summary Judgment. There remain no triable issues of fact 
as to whether any non-disclosure was material to Printcraft's decision to enter into an oral 
month-to-month lease with CTR Management, and therefore Sunnyside Utilities is entitled 
to Summary Judgment on Printcraft's causes of action for fraud. 
c. Printcraft did not have the right to rely on any alleged non-disclosure. 
Printcraft's use of the Watts v. Krebs case to attempt to establish Printcraft's 
justifiable reliance on alleged non-disclosures by Sunnyside Utilities is misplaced. In 
Watts v. Krebs, the Court explicitly found the existence of "a relationship of trust and 
confidence between the cotenants, which in turn gives rise to a duty to disclose." 131 
Idaho 616,620-621,692 P.2d 387 (1998). Only as a result of the relationship of trust 
and confidence between the parties, the Court held that "Watts had a right to rely on 
Krebs' duty to disclose all material facts within his knowledge that may have been 
important to her decision to partition the property." Id. Printcraft has not provided any 
evidence or even argued that a relationship of trust and confidence existed between the 
parties, and there is no evidence in the record from which the Court could find a 
relationship of trust and confidence. Sunnyside Utilities did not even promise to provide 
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Printcraft with any sewer services. See Deposition of Printcraft Press, pg. 109, In. 25 
through pg. 110, In. 2. Printcraft simply had no right to rely on a nondisclosure of 
information by Sunnyside Utilities in making its decision to enter into an oral month-to-
month sublease with CTR Management, LLC. Therefore Sunnyside Utilities is entitled to 
Summary Judgment on Printcraft's causes of action for fraud. 
D. Printcraft has not suffered any damages 
Printcraft has not suffered any damages as a result of any alleged fraud by 
Sunnyside Utilities. Printcraft received the "benefit of the bargain" as it received sewer 
services up until Printcraft breached any agreement for sewer services and Printcraft is 
not entitled to "out-af-pocket" damages because it never paid a connection fee to receive 
sewer services. See Order RE: Pending Motions entered July 3, 2007 and Affidavit of 
Doyle Beck, para. 4. Printcraft simply has not established that it suffered any damages as 
a direct and proximate result of any alleged non-disclosures by Sunnyside Utilities. 
CONCLUSION 
Sunnyside Utilities is entitled to Summary Judgment on Printcraft's cause of action 
for breach of contract because of Printcraft's violation of state and federal rules and 
regulations. Furthermore, Printcraft is not entitled to enforce the agreement because 
Printcraft is merely an incidental beneficiary of the agreement. 
Sunnyside Utilities is entitled to Summary Judgment on Printcraft's causes of 
action for fraud because Sunnyside Utilities had no duty to disclose. Furthermore, any 
non-disclosures by Sunnyside Utilities were not material and Printcraft was not justified in 
relying on any non-disclosures because Printcraft was not promised any sewer services 
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by Sunnyside Utilities. Furthermore, none of the damages that have allegedly been 
suffered by Printcraft were the direct and proximate result of the alleged failures to 
disclose by Sunnyside Utilities. 
DATED this q day Of_.I.4.a""",,~~,---_, 2007. 
Mark R. Fuller 
Fuller & Carr 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 




vs. Case No. CV-06-7097 
SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, 
Defendant. 
On the 16th day of August, 2007, Plaintiff's motion for 
continuance under 56(f), Defendant's motion for summary judgment 
and Plaintiff's motion to strike affidavits hearing came before 
the Honorable Richard T. St. Clair, District Judge, in open court 
at Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Mitch Brown appeared by telephonic connection on behalf 
of the Plaintiff. 
Mr. Mark Fuller appeared on behalf of the Defendant. 
Mr. Brown presented Defendant's motion for continuance under 
56(f). Mr. Fuller argued in opposition to the motion. Mr. Brown 
presented rebuttal argument. Mr. Fuller presented additional 
argument. 
The Court denied the motion for continuance. 
Mr. Brown presented argument in support of the motion to 
strike affidavits. Mr. Fuller argued in opposition to the 
motion. Mr. Brown presented rebuttal argument. 
The Court denied the motion in part. The Court will read 
the documents and consider any new information. 
Mr. Fuller presented Defendant's motion for summary 
judgment. Mr. Brown presented argument in opposition to the 
motion. Mr. Fuller presented rebuttal argument. 
The Court will take the matter under advisement and issue an 
opinion as soon as possible. 
Mr. Fuller will prepare a proposed order for the Court's 
signature. 
Court was thus adjourned. 
H:cv067097.33mo 
081607AM3StClair 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of August, 2007, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to 
be delivered to the following: 
Mitchell W. Brown 
Lane V. Erickson 
PO Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391 
Mark R. Fuller 
PO Box 50935 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE 
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL 
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
corporation, 
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ORDER RE: MOTIONS ARGUED 
AUGUST 16, 2007 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court pursuant to Defendants' Motions 
for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's causes of action for Breach of Contract, 
Constructive Fraud and Misrepresentation and/or Nondisclosure and pursuant to 
Defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavits. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Continue Hearing on the 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court reviewed such Motions and heard oral 
argument on the Motions and after consideration enters the following Findings of Fact 
and Orders: 
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1. The Court, having interrogated counsel, determined that Plaintiff sought to 
continue the hearing for the purpose of obtaining the depositions of Sunnyside 
Industrial and Professional Park and Sunnyside Park Owners' Association. The 
Court finds that the Deposition of Sunnyside Park Utilities has already occurred, 
with deposition testimony being given by Doyle Beck, and that such testimony, for 
purposes may be imputed to all three defendants for purposes of the pending 
motions. As a result, there is no need to continue the hearing to conduct additional 
depositions of the other defendants. 
2. Therefore, the Court DENIES the Motion to Continue the Hearing on the Motions 
for Summary Judgment. 
3. The Court finds that many of the statements in the affidavits of Lane Erickson and 
Travis Waters are not based upon personal knowledge and are more properly 
characterized as argument than evidence. Such was acknowledged by counsel for 
Printcraft. 
4. Therefore, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Strike in part and DENIES the Motion 
to Strike in part. The Court hereby orders that all statements not based upon 
personal knowledge in the Affidavits of Lane Erickson and Travis Waters are 
stricken from the record. Statements which are expressly based on the affiants' 
personal knowledge and the documents attached to the Affidavits are not stricken 
from the record and will be considered by the Court in ruling on the pending 
Motions for Summary Judgment. 
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5. The Court has taken all of the Motions for Summary Judgment under advisement. 
DATEDthiS~YOf ~~7 
4~~ 
Honorable Richard St. Clair 
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